AKDENİZ İLETİŞİM

Akdeniz Üniversitesi
İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi

Akdeniz İletişim Dergisi

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İçindekiler

Editör'den

Bu sayıyı, Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi ev sahipliğinde 14-16 Mart 2007 tarihlerinde Antalya'da gerçekleştirilen "Kitle İletişimi Tartışmaları: Batı-dışı bir Perspektif / Issues in Mass Communication: A non-Western Perspective" başlıklı uluslararası konferansın bildirilerine ayırdık. Böylelikle 8. sayı bir "özel sayı" olarak tasarlandı. Fakültelerin tarihinde uluslar arası konferanslar önemli yer tutmaktadır. Biz de bu nedenle, Fakültemizin ilk uluslar arası konferansını böyle bir özel sayı ile sizlerle paylaşmak istedik.

"Kitle İletişimi Tartışmaları: Batı-dışı bir Perspektif / Issues in Mass Communication: A non-Western Perspective" başlıklı uluslar arası konferans bir arayışın ürünü. Büyük bir oranda Anglo-Amerikan ağırlıklı bir literatüre dayanan iletişim alanı için "acaba bir batı-dışı perspektif olanağı var mıdır?" sorusu konferansı düzenleyenleri harekete geçirmiş. Açılış konuşmasında da belirtildiği gibi, bu konferans özel bir konum önermiyor, yalnızca bu arayışa ev sahipliği yapıyor. Bu amaçla konferans Akdeniz Üniversitesi, Ural Devlet Üniversitesi (Rusya Federasyonu), İstanbul Üniversitesi ve Oriental Piemonte (İtalya) üniversitelerinden 14 akademisyeni bir araya getirdi. Konferansın üç oturumunda sunulan bildirilerden on ikisini bu özel sayıya aldık.

"İletişimin Sınırları" başlıklı birinci oturumda sunulan bildiriler uluslar arası ve ulusal iletişim düzenlerinin gerilimleri çerçevesinde Batı-dışı bir yaklaşımın gereğini sorguluyor. "İletişim ve Küreselleşme" başlıklı ikinci oturumda yer alan bildiriler ise küreselleşme dinamikleri karşısında ulusal düzeydeki iletişimin içeriğinin ve teknolojilerinin karşılaştığı sorunları ele alıyor. "Kültür ve İletişim" başlıklı üçüncü oturumda da Batı kültürünün Batı-dışı kültürlerdeki etkileri çerçevesinde kitle iletişimi sorunlarını ele alan bildiriler bulunuyor.

Bu özel sayımızda da, diğer sayılarımızda olduğu gibi katkılar bölümüne yer verdik. Bu bölümde iki yazı bulunuyor. İlki, Cengiz Çiçek ve Ümit Atabek'in KKTC Girne Amerikan Üniversitesi İletişim Fa-

kültesi tarafından 4-5 Mayıs 2006 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen *Küreselleşme ve Yeni Medya Politikaları* başlıklı uluslar arası sempozyumda sundukları "Global Medya Süreçleri Karşısında Yerel Medya Çalışanlarının Profili ve Meslek Değerlerine Bakışı: Antalya Örneği" başlıklı bildirilerinin gözden geçirilmiş şekli. İkinci yazı ise bir kitap eleştirisi: "Siyasal İletişimi Anlamak". Süleyman İrvan tarafından hazırlanan bu yazıda, Oya Tokgöz'ün *Siyasal İletişimi Anlamak* adlı kitabı tanıtılıyor.

Dergimize yazıları ile katkıda bulunan tüm yazarlarımıza ve her zaman olduğu gibi bu sayının hazırlanmasında da titizlikle çalışan editör yardımcılarına çok teşekkür ederim. Son olarak, dergimizin 9. sayısının Temmuz 2008 tarihinde yayımlanacağını hatırlatarak, okuyucularımızı dergimize yazıları ve eleştirileri ile katkıda bulunmaya davet ediyorum.

Saygılarımla.
Gülseren Şendur Atabek

The Opening Speech

Prof. Dr. Ümit Atabek
Dean of the Faculty of Communication,
Akdeniz University

Dear guests, distinguished participants

On behalf of the organizing committee, I warmly welcome you all; thank you for coming.

This conference is based on an initial idea from three people; namely Prof. Strovsky from Ural State University, Prof. Batmaz from İstanbul University, and me from Akdeniz University. Last year, Prof. Strovsky was on holiday here in Antalya and was very courageous to pay a visit to our Faculty, and Prof. Batmaz was by chance here too as the board member of Antalya Golden Orange Film Festival.

I must admit that I was very excited and happy to have talks with an academician from Russian Federation. Yes, I had been to Moscow before, and had met many Russians in Antalya, but this was my first encounter with a Russian professor. I believe it was Prof. Strovsky's first time to meet a Turkish professor too! We three came together, and eventually decided to make a substantive collaboration between our universities. We fully agreed on the extraordinary challenge of coming together and joining our intellectual potentials. And finally, we decided to organize an international academic conference on the field of mass communication.

Eventually, Dr. Seçil van het Hof had jumped over this idea and suddenly (and may be some how reluctantly) became the chief coordinator of this conference. After her unforgettable

efforts together with her team of research assistants from the department of public relations of our Faculty, this exciting academic event has been possible. I thank them all. Without their valuable contributions this organization could not be materialized.

I must also list and mention other valuable supports from other organizations. Of course TUBITAK, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey substantially supported our conference. We are very much honored from this support. I thank them very much. Turkish Federation of Journalists and Antalya Association of Journalists have supported us on this academic event, as they did for many of our other academic events. I owe to thank them too.

Odeon Tour, the biggest tourism operator in Turkey from the Russian Federation, eagerly supported us in many of social events related to this academic event. I thank and congratulate them for understanding the fact that tourism can only flourish if it is not merely based on economy. Their support for such cultural and academic relations is of vital importance for Turkish tourism.

And finally, my thanks go to our University Administration, especially to Rector Prof. Akaydın and Vice Rector Prof. Aktekin. Their material and morale support have given us the courage to organize such an international academic event for the first time in the short history our young Faculty. I thank them very much on be half of the organizing committee.

Before concluding my opening speech, I have some word on the content of the Conference. As the title suggests, we will deal with the issues on mass communication, however from a non-western perspective. The title sounds quite courageous and challenging. I hope this title is not conceived as yet an-

other threat to the West! Nevertheless, the title simply implies a fact that there is a western perspective on mass communication issues, and it speculates about the possibility of a non-western perspective. That's all the title suggests. Nothing more than this, should be attributed to the title.

I made a simple content analysis of my references in my published academic works. I realized that almost 80% of them are from Anglo-American sources. I have only one Italian (Gramsci on "hegemony") and one Russian [USSR] (Usenin on "workers participation in management") source referred according to my simple content (reference) analysis. What does this factual finding show? It simply shows that Anglo-American academic publications dominate the communication literature. Here I am not at the position of declaring this dominance is "good" or "bad", it is simply dominance.

The term "non-western" may sound weird; if some thing is non-western should there be an eastern? As the orientalist discourse suggests, yes there is the geographic and cultural east as opposed to the west. However, our conference does not look for such dichotomies and simply accepts that non-western is only non-western. As a matter of fact, our conference will simply pursue a non-western perspective in dealing with mass communication issues.

There are two important trends worth mentioning here to support our conference's title. First, the political economy of communication in general, and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular, is being more and more realized in non-western geographies, namely People's Republic of Chine, India, Russian Federation, Malaysia, Brazil (and

off course partly in Turkey). This rapidly strengthening trend should be taken with due academic consideration.

Secondly, intellectual space for communication studies is moving to non-western geographies as well. Recently, several western prominent scholars, including for instance Prof. Schiller, are contracting to teach in Chinese or Indian universities. In addition to this, western academic media is being occupied with scholarly works of non-western countries. If one takes a look at communications scholarly journal, he or she can see lots of scholars with non-western names.

I believe these to trends are the proof of the necessity of our Conference. I also believe that it is exactly the right time and place to have such a conference when our minds are being surprisingly challenged by intellectual shocks emerging from all geographies of the world.

I thank you again for coming and joining in support of our conference, which, I am sure, will be very successful.

Thank you very much.

14 March, 2007. Antalya.

Globalization and the Necessity of a non-Western Perspective

Ass. Prof. Dr. Seçil Deren van het Hof
Akdeniz University
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Globalization implies an increasing global interconnectedness in a number of inter-linked areas such as economy, technology, culture and politics. Thus it does not only involve in flow of goods, capital and people but also information, ideas and images across national borders. Mass communication is an intersection point of all the above mentioned areas. In late 1960 Marshall McLuhan made one of the early descriptions of this intersection when he combined "the medium is the message" with "global village".

As the origin of the technology that constituted the infrastructure of mass communication in Europe and North America, European and North American societies were the first in experienced the social and political outcomes of the media. Consequently, the first academic works also appeared in this western geography. Such academic studies originated from two distinct areas of social science: the theoretical perspectives appeared as part of political science and more empirical work mainly from social psychology. The field of political science opened its field of interest to research on propaganda and public opinion at the turn of the 20th century while social psychology concentrated on attitudes. At the end of the World War II, these two lines of academic interest coincided in a rising interest in behavior of individuals. Both consumer behav-

ior and political behavior were very much influenced by the media. In USA, starting from 1950, communication studies acquired an institutionalized status at the universities as an interdisciplinary field of social science. As a result, the main theories, concepts and terminology were imported by technology importing countries from the West.

In Turkey, the origin of contemporary faculties of communication lies in schools of journalism which first appeared in late 1940s. Following the Western academic developments slightly behind, Turkish academia followed the same route of emerging from political science and social psychology. Existing schools of journalism were transformed into faculties of communication in 1992. These faculties became quite popular and thus the number of them increased rapidly both in public and private universities. However, both the quality and the quantity of the academic research produced in the fields of communications do not match the number of existing institutions. It is even hard to say that the translations of the main Western works have been done, let alone the emergence of genuinely Turkish contributions to the field.

This situation only ascertains the 'developing' characteristic of the present state of communication studies in Turkey. However, the Turkish case is in no way a proof that native contributions are not possible. Just the contrary, the state of art in Chinese communication studies proves it is quite viable and plausible to produce a native perspective. This paper is an attempt to learn from the state of development of Chinese communication studies and to find out the possibilities of a non-Western perspective.

What's the problem with Euro-American or Western theories? Western tradition of social science is based on the

Enlightenment philosophy at the center of which we see a Cartesian dualism. Especially the social psychological tradition in communication studies usually blindly adhere to positivism based on Newtonian mechanistic and atomic view of the world. However, both the Enlightenment and the development of Newtonian physics are European social experiences. This emphasis in their specificity in no way undermined the value of European thought. It only aims to open our eyes to the possibility of thought systems which can be just as valid in understanding the world. However, the economic and technological dominance of the west, which also entailed a political and philosophical domination, brings up a singular understanding on social sciences and communication studies as well. This also justifies to categories other philosophical traditions as immature, underdeveloped or even unscientific. Consequently the monopoly of Western science is reproduced not only by Europeans or Americans but also non-Western academia as well.

In their pursuit to become modern, most nation states embraced a policy to adopt and implement Western science and technology. Moreover, the colonial experience established Western institutions in non-Western lands. Moreover, the effects of globalization strengthened the dominance of not only Western economic relations and scientific methods but also Western ways of living. Under such circumstances, whether it is possible to pursue a truly non-Western perspective appears as a valid question. Because, focusing to the non-Western societies as the object of research while using Western theories, concepts and research methods does not mean implementing a non-Western perspective. Non-Western communication studies must derive theoretical insights, rather than mere data, from non-Western culture. Or, the discipline of communica-

tions cannot be revolutionized simply by incorporating non-Western participants into the research process. Without challenging the methods that sustain the dualistic epistemology, it is not possible to achieve a meaningful theoretical plurality. Existence of cultural plurality is no guarantee to have plurality of intellectual perspectives. Thus a radical shift can only be possible with new theoretical lenses and corresponding research methods such as research design, data collection, data analysis and data interpretation.

Contemporary literature on communication studies brings up new terminology and instead of "Western"-"non-Western" dualism, Asian African, Indian, Islamic, Japanese, Chinese etc. perspectives are brought up. This literature puts more emphasis on the theoretical potentials of indigenous intellectual roots, situated knowledges and local modes of thinking. For instance, Dissanayake suggests that to build a distinct Asian perspective states that Asian scholars should walk away from the positivistic approach on the grounds that the functionalist approach has an obvious disparity from the Asian worldview. As another suggestion, Yoshitaka Miike bases its arguments on the assumption that there are two ways of seeing culture: culture as theory and culture as text. Miike wrote that "all cultures must be viewed as *theories* from which we learn to reflect on ourselves and our world, not as *texts* that we analyze and critique from someone else's point of view". If culture is seen as text, this means individual cultures can be studied without any epistemological problem through European theories and research methods. However, how far this brings us from anthropological work is an open question to me. Seeing culture as a theory is a radical attempt to break away from the Enlightenment tradition and refute the universality of Euro-American scientific methods. This suggestion, in this respect

is quite similar to the first one which offers a rejection of positivism. But this time we face the trap of culturalism. While cultural sensitivity is a form of political correctness, culturalism can be a form of relativism. Chinese scholars of communication studies, especially Guo-Ming Chen, have some challenging answers to such concerns. However, before going in detail of their works, I would like to present brief information how communication studies flourished in China.

China's entry to World Trade Organization in 2001 is an important landmark not only in the process of globalization but also in social and academic changes in China. However, China has begun to adopt a reform and open-door policy in the late 1970s and maintained a high speed economic development for more than 20 years. This economic development entailed a growing interest in consumer and cultural products. At present, with more than 300 million TV sets and an audience of 1.1 billion viewers, China is the world's biggest television market. China's TV advertising market was around 2 billion dollars in 2002 with an enormous potential of growth. This does not only signify the growth of media as an industry but also the transformation of its content. Chinese mass media has been viewed as a ruling apparatus of the government. This had to change with the flow in of foreign media investors because the political, cultural and social role of cultural products goes beyond commercial dimensions. However, China refused to open up its media sector unconditionally for the defense of cultural diversity and for political considerations. Resulting restrictions of foreign media investment and cultural products have been a ground of conflict in WTO negotiations. As long as Chinese media serves ideological purposes even partially,

the political considerations will have priority over economic consideration.

As a study area, Chinese communications has a history of almost 30 years. Chinese communication studies were promoted by professors of journalism. The first paper introducing American scholars' ideas on mass communication appeared in 1978 and Fudan University Department of Journalism began offering a Western mass communication course in 1980. The First National Convention on Communications, held in 1982, established a consensus that a primary task of Chinese scholars was to translate authoritative and representative Western works. The first wave of Chinese books on communication using Western categories and frameworks appeared during 1988-1991. However, this first generation of Chinese communication studies faced the opposition of Chinese Communist Party. The Party fought against any position or action that might weaken its control over the mass media or undermine the official ideology. "They believed that Western communications contributed to the Tiananman student protest in the summer of 1989. Thus, starting from Fall of 1989, communications was officially criticized nationwide as bourgeois scholarship; courses and meetings on communications were cancelled; and universities no longer enrolled graduate students in communications" (Sun, 2002: 6). Communication studies settled in China only in 1998 when Chinese government authorized some colleges/universities to offer M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in communication studies.

Chinese communication studies since its onset in late 1970s were based on Western, mainly American communication studies. Western communication studies provided Chinese scholars with a new paradigm and freedom from the restraints

of official doctrines of journalism and offered concepts to promote industrialization, commercialization and globalization of Chinese mass media. It emphasized the notion and importance of the audience, democratization and popular culture. It also introduced a set of research methods resulting in regular use of nationwide polls, surveys and media ratings. By 1999 more than 20 books and 2,000 articles analyzing the content and audience of the mass media were published in China. However, many Chinese researchers do not want to limit themselves to Western theories of communication. They claim although the discipline is established in the West, the "nativization of communication studies" is not only possible with respect to the rich historical and philosophical background of China but also quite necessary.

The notion of nativization is rooted in modern Chinese intellectual history. It was response to the relationship between Chinese and Western scholarship in the late 19th century and an echo of the "cultural fever" of late 1980s and "fever of traditional Chinese scholarship" in early 1990s. Although the first fever was related to the political and military invasion of the West and the second to the economic and cultural dominance of the West, both share the same beliefs, that is, China has a valuable cultural tradition and these resources enable China to answer all challenges it faces, and Western theories should be to improve but not to replace Chinese culture.

Guo-Min Chen, one of the advocated of Chinese perspective, delineates six principles of communication from the perspective of Chinese philosophy: (1) the principle of embodiment of reason in experience, (2) the principle of epistemological-pragmatic unity, (3) the principle of part-whole interdetermination, (4) the principal of dialectical completion of

relative polarities, (5) the principle of infinite interpretations, (6) the principle of symbolic reference. This is only one model propounded by Asian theorists. However, it is important to see the impact of Asian religious-philosophical traditions on the cultural systems of communication. The religious-philosophical tradition also has a role in shaping Asian selves and values. Departing from similar concerns Kincaid illuminated five basic themes for future inquiries toward the convergence of Eastern and Western communication theories: (1) unit of analysis, (2) the consequence/purpose of communication, (3) the limits of language and cognition, (4) emotion and rationality, (5) human relationships.

These themes bring up a comparison of Western and non-Western communication research as well. Western perspectives are sometimes preoccupied with measuring parts into a unified process, whereas Eastern philosophies tend to focus on wholeness and unity. Many Western theories are individualistic and highly cognitive, whereas Eastern thought stresses emotional and spiritual convergence as unplanned and natural communication outcomes. Western style thinking is dominantly language oriented and rationality biased, while Eastern theories place emphasis on intuition, direct experience and silence. Moreover, Western thought presumes that relationship exists between two or more individuals, while Eastern perspectives emphasize the complexities of relationships hat are evolving out of differences in the social positions of roles, status and power. A critical eye would not miss the basic dichotomy these theme rest upon: individualist society versus communitarian society, or *Gesellschaft* and *Gemainschaft*. Moreover, it would not miss the reproduction of the dichotomous thinking that Western philosophy is criticized for.

I focused on the state of Chinese communication studies in the hope that will inspire us on the potentials and limits of a non-Western perspective. I want to conclude by saying that although the field is extremely fresh, the oldest works dating back to late 1990s, and has many weaknesses, it has the potential to accommodate multiple forms of knowledge and to help make constructive East-West mutual critique, mutual learning, mutual enlightenment and transformation. However, all new theoretical attempts must be watchful to internal dynamics and diversities and avoid possible overgeneralizations in stressing cultural uniqueness.

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European Press and Media: Varieties of Historical Experience and Future Prospects

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This paper will cover two broad topics: (i) a typology of the role of the press in European history (1870 onwards); and (ii) an assessment of the changes in the role of press and media since the introduction of Information Technology.

Dominance of Western Models

Media studies are dominated by work based on US models of mass communication systems. This trend is to some extent justified by the leading role of the US in mass communications, and quite simply in offering a credible model of modernity. For example, developments in US television systems in the 1970s foreshadowed many of the subsequent changes in television systems elsewhere in the subsequent decades.[1] This objective dominance is then transformed into a subjective preference of media studies generally, which are inclined to adhere to US-originated paradigms, since the US is also the biggest market for media studies. Thus even critics of US models end up being as US-centred as any apologist of the current media systems in the US.

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[1] See Raymond Williams, *Television. Technology and Cultural Form* (London-Glasgow: Fontana, 1974).

This focus on the US experience does, however, prevent an actual understanding of the varieties of European historical experience in terms of the role of the press and the media.

Typologies of newspaper and media systems

The paper proposes a longer perspective of historical development in analysing media systems, taking as its starting-point the introduction of mass literacy. The concept of "early/late introduction of mass literacy" refers to the relative levels of literacy around the year 1900. Tables 1 and 2 provide a quick overview of the process of advancement of mass literacy in Europe.

Figures can be and should be questioned, but those provided in this table are accurate enough for the purpose of this overview. It is argued that the *timing* of these processes conditioned the *nature* of mass societies throughout the twentieth century, and that it *still* conditions them, and the nature of the media nowadays, more than a century later.

Let us make a short list of plausible groupings, with reference to Table 1. The first group includes countries in the range 1-10% of illiterates in 1900 (all Nordic countries, England and Wales, Germany, Switzerland). They were early in achieving mass literacy, at least 50 years before television. They all have a robust tradition of mass newspapers (usually despised by the highly educated classes). The second group ranges from 11 to 32% illiterates (Netherlands, Belgium, Cisleithanian Austria), representing an intermediate level, which in fact proved able to catch up with the first, and also establish its own versions of consolidated mass cultures. The third group ranges from 41 to 60% (Translethanian Hungary, Italy, Spain), with predictably weaker mass cultures. The last

group ranges from 61 to 80% (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia), with very weak mass cultures. The Russian empire can be excluded altogether both because of sheer size and diversity of conditions (ranging from the relatively high literacy rates in the Baltic regions to the low levels of Central Asia). The Ottoman Empire would be even more difficult to classify (both in terms of territory and of social and confessional structure). Of course all these countries had thriving *popular* cultures; of course they always had their own *high* cultures. Mass culture is what instead they were lacking.

Let us take a glance outside Europe, to avoid a purely Eurocentric vision. In 1900 the US had very high levels of literacy, and a correspondingly developed mass culture.[2] But what about Asia? In Japan, as it happens, at the end of the Togukawa period (1868) literacy could be estimated at 40%. Compulsory education began to be introduced in 1872, and by 1906 it had been extended to 6 years of schooling.[3] In other words, literacy levels were high. Unsurprisingly, Japan developed a mass culture in print form. As it happens, Japan was also the first modern Asian society.[4] Per capita circulation of newspapers remains predictably high (see Table 3).

To simplify things, we may define two main models of historical development: (i) countries *which have experienced an early introduction of mass literacy* (Northern and Western

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[2] See C. Goldin, "Education", in S. B. Carter and others (eds.), *Historical Statistics of the United States. Earliest Times to the Present*, III: part B: *Work and Welfare* (New York: Cambridge University press, 2006).

[3] Estimates of Japanese literacy vary, but there is a consensus on its high level at an early date. See Koji Taira, "Education and literacy in Meiji Japan: An interpretation", *Explorations in Economic History*, 1971, vol. 8, issue 4, pages 371-394; and R. Dore, "Education: Japan", in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 176-204.

[4] For a preliminary comparison of Japanese and Turkish modernization, see Ward and Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey.*

European model); (ii) *countries which have experienced a late introduction of mass literacy* (Southern and Eastern European model). The division does not correspond to a simple East/West dichotomy, but rather to a more diagonal line, and indeed to a variety of historical experiences throughout Europe. (The term "Eastern Europe" is a Cold War relic, which can be dispensed with.) This typology is applied in a broad overview of the successive phases of introduction of communication systems (mass newspapers, radio, television, IT-based systems), from 1870 onwards.

To illustrate the importance of the timing, we can refer to an observation made by the Yugoslav (and Serbian) historian Milorad Ekmečić on the connection between electoral franchise and levels of literacy:

> "One must look for an historical juncture in which a general franchise and a grown-up literacy meet. "Grown-up" means that at least one-third of the nation is literate. Both these elements joined together in German history after the unification of 1871, although both were attempted in the failed revolution of 1848. The "Reading Revolution", as an outstanding tool of the political education of the modern masses in the German case, was completed before the free constitution was introduced.
>
> Educated and illiterate men cannot both depend on the same type of nationalism. In 1866 only 4.2 percent of the entire population of the principality [of Serbia] was able to read and write. In 1884 it grew to 11 percent and in 1900 not more than 21 percent of the inhabitants (excluding schoolchildren) were literate. In the villages 98.4 percent were illiterate in 1866. The figure dropped to 93.6 percent in 1884, and by the end of the last [i.e. 19th] century it barely declined to 85.5 percent. Still, taken as a whole, more than 30 percent of the nation in 1900 was lit-

erate, if school children are included. In that year the majority (55 percent) of urban dwellers were able to read and write".[5]

In short, Ekmečić argued that there was strong connection between the advent of a "Reading Revolution" and the introduction of universal suffrage. If the former *precedes* the latter, this will determine a certain path in terms of state-building and nation-building (e.g., a German path). If, as happened in most of the Balkan countries, generalised (if not strictly universal) suffrage was introduced well *before* the advent of a "grown-up literacy", this would condition the process of state-building and nation-building.

The full implications of Ekmečić's argument on the state-building process need not concern us here. What is instead relevant is the *connection* he makes between the advent of mass literacy and other social and political developments. The suggestion we would like to put forward is that the *timing* of the advent of mass literacy affected (and *continues* to affect) the development of mass newspapers, and of all further developments in mass communication.

The reason for the importance of the timing of mass literacy is that the advent of new forms of mass communication is a *synchronic* process, not a *diachronic* one. In short, the process of diffusion of new forms of mass communications is more or less immediate: it has not only a demonstrative effect, but it can actually be transferred relatively quickly around the world.

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[5] M. Ekmečić, "The Emergence of St. Vitus Day as the Principal National Holiday", in W. S. Vucinich and T. A.. Emmert (eds.), *Kosovo: Legacy of a medieval battle* (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1991), p. 333.

Telegraphy,[6] telephones, radios, television and all the forms of electronic communication established themselves almost as soon as they were invented, without any need for a long and painful process of setting up structures and learning the skills to use them. Maintenance –a crucial aspect of technological diffusion – is much less of a problem in communications than in the rest of the industrialization and modernization process.[7] In the field of communications the gap between advanced countries and less developed countries is destined to evaporate very rapidly. In short, an initial technological backwardness is not such a big handicap to overcome.

However, without the "Reading Revolution" Ekmečić refers to, there can be no "Communications Revolution". Once the first stage has been reached, all the subsequent stages of the second "revolution" follow in rapid succession, without any significant time lag between the introduction of a new form of mass communication and its world-wide diffusion.

Of course, in the long run almost all societies achieve mass literacy, and therefore mass culture. All this would seem to point in the direction of Thomas Friedman's phrase, "the world is flat".[8] But the *duration* of the gestation process makes a difference. This is why mass cultures are in fact always different. Culture and mass culture especially, needs time to develop and to mature. As John Lloyd has pointed out,

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[6] On the diffusion of telegraphy in the Ottoman empire, see R. H. Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire", in Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The Impact of the West* (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1990), pp. 133-165.

[7] For example, the diffusion of electric typewriters in East Asia was hampered by problems of maintenance. The later diffusion of personal computers did not encounter such problems.

[8] T. L. Friedman, *The world is flat: a brief history of the twenty-first century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

"The less you understand the media of a given country, the more they seem similar. The foreign eye, unable to understand the language, picks up the similarities...The *more* one understands the media of that given country, the more foreign it feels. With understanding comes the recognition that a vast range of cultural reflexes, references and traditions are constantly in play".[9]

So the *gap* between the advent of mass culture and the introduction of mass newspapers, radio, television, is not simply important, it is crucial. This is because at each successive stage, new forms of mass communication inevitably cannibalise the previous forms. The advent of mass literacy involves a *lowering* of the intellectual content of newspapers. Radio represented a further step in this process. Television took that process a step further, with a further "dumbing down" of content. (Cinema, it should be noted, does not even appear in this process. After all, it does not actually involve a new process of transmission, and it does not provide the *simultaneity* which characterizes radio and television.) The brave new world of electronic medias (basically internet and mobile telephony) has certainly made their contribution to the debasement of culture, that is to say *mass culture* (which is the most important form of culture, sociologically speaking).

All this amounts to a mere updating of the common critique of mass society, which has long been fashionable in Europe (and elsewhere) since the end of the 19th century. As usual, such a critique –long favoured by elitist intellectuals of the Right and the left- misses a crucial point. Mass culture matters, in the sense that (i) it is not predetermined in its intel-

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[9] J. Lloyd, *What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics* (London: Constable, 2004), p. 28.

lectual content and form, and (ii) its forms affect subsequent stages of the "Communications Revolution". Mass newspapers may well be trash (from the point of view of their intellectual content). But reading trash is not the same thing as listening to trash; listening to trash is not the same thing as watching trash; and finally, downloading trash is not the same thing as watching it passively. The end result may seem identical, but in fact the mental process is quite different: reading involves a degree of abstraction; listening requires at least visual imagination; television requires much less. To read a newspaper you need to be literate; to listen to the radio you do not; to watch television you do not even need to understand the language of the speakers.

Television is therefore a defining moment in the development of mass communications; it is a turning-point, changing the speed at which change occurs. So the distance (in terms of time) between the first stage (advent of mass literacy) and the second stage (television) is crucial, because this distance is what determines the DNA of mass culture. If the distance is relatively long (say, half a century), this will allow the mass culture of a given country to develop certain characteristics. But if the distance is very short (or indeed, non-existent, in the case of the advent of television before the advent of consolidated mass literacy) mass culture will turn out to be less developed, if not malformed. As John Lloyd has pointed out, with reference to Italy: "Many people passed straight from a non-reading existence to the television age – with no newspapers in between".[10]

As can be seen from Table 2, Southern European countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) achieved the French or Bel-

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[10] Lloyd, *What the Media Are Doing*, p. 56.

gian levels of literacy of 1900 with at least a delay of at least 40 years. A comparison with Nordic countries would have even more unfavourable. On the other hand, the shift to a television-dominated culture was more or less immediate in the 1960s-1970s, all over Europe. This is what Lloyd is referring to, when he writes of "the television age —with no newspapers in between".

If one takes Table 3, one can see that the data on the number of daily newspapers per capita in 1975 still reflected the basic groupings of levels of literacy in 1900.[11]

Changing role of press and media since the introduction of Information Technology

The argument of the preceding sections of this has made use of a long-term historical perspective. This section will provide a brief analysis of the short-term and long-term implications of changes in communication systems since the mid-1970s.

Data on levels of per capita newspaper circulation for 1995 show already generalised decline reflecting the effects of a television-dominated society (see table 3). But the real change lies in the end of a unified communication market and the advent of a segmented system. Before the advent of Information Technology, the communication market was a unified entity, in sense that newspapers, radio and television were addressed first and foremost to a general public (and market). Niche markets always existed, but they could never develop beyond the level of a limited segment of the market, however

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[11] Data for some countries were probably affected by political circumstances (Southern Europe in the 1970s, the former Yugoslav republics in the 1990s). But the overall trends are remarkably consistent.

lucrative it may have been in terms of advertising. Advertising in fact demanded a unified market.

But once IT arrived, it emerged that the entire market (for communications, and therefore for advertising) could be *entirely* segmented. There was no longer any need to have a general product for a general public. All communication products could be tailored to suit individual or group demands.

The logic of this process is not simply a "dumbing down" of content. A process of segmentation can lead to the production and circulation of packages which are highly sophisticated and demanding in content, as it can lead to the production of trash.

If this broad assessment is correct, discussions of the "dumbing down" of the media are simply irrelevant. The media, in the sense of information and entertainment, are no longer mass communication in the traditional sense, i.e. a one-way process of transmission of a relatively standardised product. They are simply packagers of information and entertainment which can be sold or distributed for free. These packages can be then assembled by the clients, much like an IKEA product. If the packages are insufficiently attractive, the client can move elsewhere.[12]

To give an example from the field of politics, in the US presidential elections of 2008, not only is the internet at least as important as the press and television, but the number of viewers of political items on internet (e.g., YouTube) well exceeds that of many newspapers and television programmes.

This summary description (which does not make any claim or originality), does not explain much. For a start, it

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[12] For a critical evaluation of the effects of segmentation on the political system, see C. Sunstein, *Republic.com* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

does not provide an exhaustive description and analysis of the process which began in the 1970s with the third Industrial Revolution, and which has to our Brave New World.

It might be useful to start from the end result of these changes, i.e. the shift in terms of generations, as defined by market research, and in particular by in the country which is still the model of modernity, the US.

> "Whereas the boomers were the first to grow up with ubiquitous radio, and Gen[eration] X [born in the 1960s-1970s] the first to live with television, Generation Y [born in the 1980s] is the first to embrace the Internet...
>
> The Internet has already changed Generation Y's media habits in ways that marketers are only beginning to understand. Teenagers watch less TV than any other age group, and when they do turn to television, it is to choose promiscuously from among 100 channels: most of them have never known anything but cable. In the past two years, the average number of hours American kids spend watching television has dropped from 19 to 17 a week. They increasingly shun newspapers. Only about half of those in their 20s now read a newspaper every day, compared with about two-thirds in the early 1970s.
>
> If they spend less time watching TV, they spend more of it on the Internet, mostly chatting with friends online, downloading music and entertainment, and doing their homework on the web. Already, more than half of all Americans between 16 and 22 have Internet access. What is important is that the Internet is an active medium, not a passive one like TV... The Internet is also largely a written medium, and one that requires writing to communicate. And lest parents worry too much about time spent in front of a screen of any sort, it is worth noting that teenagers spend fewer hours on the Internet than do adults (who use it a lot at work). Surveys also suggest that they spend more

time in face-to-face contact with their peers than their TV-obsessed predecessors did".[13]

As we can see, the effects of the advent of electronic media are by no mean a uniform "dumbing down". Just as the effects the print media and telecommunications were not uniform across the world, so the electronic media will have quite different effects across the globe.

Newspapers as we know them, may be dead. Radio and television may also be on the way out. But strangely enough, reading and writing are not dead. And the world is not yet flat.

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[13] C. Anderson *Bright young things* (survey) in *The Economist*, 21 December 2000.

Table 1. Illiteracy in Europe, 1900 ca.

	% of illiterates
North-Eastern Europe	
Finland	7
Sweden	2
Norway	5
Denmark	4
North-Western Europe	
Netherlands	13
Belgium	32
England & Wales	10
France	17
Switzerland	2
Central Europe	
Germany	4
Austria (Cisleithania)	24
Hungary (Transleithania)	41
South-Western Europe	
Italy	48
Spain	52
Portugal	75

Source: H. Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik Serbiens* (München: Oldenbourg, 1989)

Table 2. Literacy rates in selected European countries (1870-1980)

Year	Belgium	France	Great Britain	Italy	Spain	Portugal
1870	64	68	76	31	31	14
1900	81	83	97	52	44	22
1940	94	94	100	83	77	48
1980	99	99	100	97	94	78

Source: G. Tortella, "Patterns of Economic Retardation and Recovery in South-Western Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", *Economic History Review*, vol. 47, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 1-21, Table. 6, p. 11.

Table 3 Daily newspapers per 1,000 habitants (1974 and 1995)

	Daily newspapers per 1,000 habitants (1974)	Daily newspapers per 1,000 habitants (1995)
North-Eastern Europe		
Finland	440	464
Sweden	536	465
Norway	391	594
Denmark	355	308
North-Western Europe		
Netherlands (1973)	311	307
Belgium	247	161
United Kingdom	443	345
France	220	210
Switzerland	391	386
Central Europe		
Federal German Republic	289	313
Austria	308	261
Hungary	232	198
South-Western		

Source: UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1975* (Paris: UNESCO, 1976), t. 12.1; and UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1999* (Paris: UNESCO, 2000), t. IV.8.

Protection of National Interests in the Sphere of Information: World Experience

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Introduction

The intensive development of exchange in the sphere of information and the expansion of the activity of the largest media corporations have led to the domination of information industry giants in the global information space. Such companies as News Corporation, Time Warner, Disney, Bertelsmann, Viacom, TCI have an income that exceeds 10-25 billion dollars per year, they own mass media throughout the world, their information product is circulated in most countries of the world and they have a real possibility to set up an agenda of information worldwide. This situation has both its good and bad points. Let's say that the possibility to effectively and quickly inform the world public about the most important events is definitely a plus. However, it makes obvious the situation when national peculiarities are lost in the mass media market with a loss of information sovereignty of those countries that cannot resist the expansion of information and thus cannot effectively develop their own mass media industry. Nonetheless, even the countries that are highly developed economically pay great attention to the protection of their interests in the sphere of information and constrain the penetration of foreign interests into their national media market. This issue has been raised to government level due to the fact that today

the expansion of information and the use of information technologies both within the country and on the international scene are a way to inculcate political interests. It must be noted that this phenomenon is in no way new.

The information policy of world powers in the historical context

Historical experience has proved that the formation and strengthening of any state power goes together with attempts to coordinate the flow of information. Because in the early stage of the formation of state structures the social situation is, as a rule, not stable, inculcation of a new political order within a country usually takes place in conditions of social stress. To enhance their influence the authorities use not only methods of direct physical coercion – the police, the law – but also information resources. The demolition of the old press and the establishment of a new one in the first years of Soviet power is a good example of this. The same happened in China when in the 1930s-1940s the communist party of China developed a system of information that would strengthen its political power. To do this, in 1939 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China began to organize departments for the distribution of the periodical press in all party committees (in the district ones as well)[1].

When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949, information agencies, editorial offices of newspapers, magazines, broadcasting systems that had belonged to the old regime were all closed and the technical equipment that could

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[1] Slobodianuk, I.N. (1958) New China press. Kiev. P. 54.

help set up the new system of mass communist communication for the people's power was confiscated.

Information resources are extremely important in the realization of external policy. Efforts are undertaken to enforce the influence of information abroad in periods of armed conflicts when territories have to be defended or new ones occupied. Japan's aggressions in the Far East and South-East Asia at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century are a good example of this. Such countries as Taiwan, Korea, China, Indochina, Thailand, Burma and Indonesia were within the sphere of Japan's political interests.

The authorities of the Country of the Rising Sun set itself the task of expanding its information on the territory of the said countries. Up till the mid-1930s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed this process, the army and the navy being active in it as well[2]. The Japanese organized a broadcasting network in Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan. Anti-Japanese radio broadcasts in the Far East were jammed. The Japanese authorities set up a rigid censorship of the press and electronic mass media on the occupied territories. The number of publications in national and European languages was minimized. Study of Japanese was recommended as an imperative need. Special structures were set up to help carry out foreign information policy. Thus, June 1, 1936 saw the creation of a Department of Information within the state structure of Japan, which in December 1940 was placed under the direct subordination of the Prime Minister of the country and became an organ with great power. This department had approximately 600 staff members representing information departments of the

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[2] See: Smorodinov, V.P. (1986) Information politics of military Japan in the occupied countries of the Far East and South-East Asia (1895-1945) (in) *Journalism in the developing countries.* Moscow. P. 96.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the army, the navy, the air force, and also the Ministry of the Interior. An important role in the expansion of information policy was also played by the Ministry for Great East Asia that appeared after Japan had occupied a number of Asian and Pacific countries, education becoming one of the domains of the Ministry of Propaganda in these countries[3].

Special structures to enhance the policy of the authorities in times of armed conflicts have been set up and are being set up in other countries.

In the second half of the 20th c. the world saw the opposition of information on a new scale, one that did not limit itself to local conflicts of two or three states. This opposition was one of the ways that the socialist and the capitalist systems counteracted each other. The military and political struggle of the two systems was always accompanied by a desire to install in the world an information order that best suited this or that side.

Expansion of information was undertaken by the conflicting sides in respect to each other and the non-allied countries. By the end of the 1980s the result was that the amount of information from the West to the developing countries greatly exceeded that which went in the opposite direction. UN data showed that

> "four of the biggest Western information agencies – AP, UPI (USA), Reuters (Gt. Britain), and France Press (France) – controlled 80% of the information that was circulated in the non-socialist world"[4].

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[3] Ibid. P. 99.

[4] Yermishina, E.V. (1988) International exchange of information: legal aspects. Moscow. P. 46.

Experts pointed out that the USA alone controlled 85% of the TV material circulated in and transmitted to the developing countries, and a third of all TV products shown in Latin America were also produced in the USA. By that time American TV import to Uruguay consisted of 60%, to Argentina, Columbia and Mexico it was 70-80%. A similar situation was to be found in the countries of Asia and the Pacific[5].

In the period between 1973 and 1976 in an attempt to change these tendencies the Movement of Non-Alignment formulated the concept of a New Information Order. Its main task was to change the system of international information relations so that all countries, developing ones included, could have an equal share in the international exchange of information. However, these efforts brought no result. Moreover, as proof of the thesis that information policies are an important part of state policy; the Western states came forth with an alternative initiative. They proposed to set up a new world communication order. An opinion has been voiced that the term "world" meant renunciation of state borders in the sphere of information exchange, in contrast to "international" which meant development of interstate relations based on principles of international rights. "The communication" order was opposed to the "information" one because the concept "communication" does not, as a rule, include the content of information, which consequently excludes the content of information from items that are liable to international regulation[6].

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[5] See: Poklad, A.Yu., Yudina, N.I. (1987) Mass information: international communication or subversive propaganda? Moscow. P. 60.

[6] See: Yermishina, E.V. Ibid. P. 49.

Regulation of the flow of information at the present stage

Today we see that governments still apply methods of information wars to achieve various political ends. This goes both for internal and external politics.

For instance, at the time of armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq at the turn of the century Americans used various forms of propaganda in an attempt to make the local population side with them: there was radio and TV broadcasting, publication of newspapers, leaflets were circulated, various special actions, such as humanitarian aid, were undertaken. For example, we know that US public relations men decided to "jam" the TV channel "Al-Jazira", which by the beginning of military actions in Iraq had already gained the reputation of "supporter of terrorists". At first, the "Al-Jazira" staff members received an offer to leave Kuweit, but by March 2003 the journalists of that channel had been ousted from almost all the Arab countries neighboring with Iraq and Egypt. In its place a new TV channel called "Al-Arabia" appeared. From the first days of its existence the channel gave a wide coverage to the American military and to the supporters of the new regime in Iraq, thus becoming, in essence, "a champion of American ideas for the Near East viewers"[7]. A similar strategy was followed in 2004 when the TV channel "Al-Hurra" was set up. A phenomenon to be mentioned separately here is the radio broadcasting station "Sawa" set up way back in March 2002 for the Arab countries. This station is for the young people, so the programs contain a lot of Western and Arab pop music. However, the broadcasting network contains news as well,

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[7] See: Shumilina, I.V. (2006) Iraq in the information strategy of Bush's administration (in) *USA-Canada: Economy, Policy, Culture*. No. 8. P. 44.

which is "intertwined" with information about the latest events in the region.

Methods of informational brainwashing may be very effective with significant political consequences. One speaking example here is Venezuela and its president Hugo Chaves where we see the setting up by mass communication media of "virtual" reality and the manipulation of public opinion.

When in 2001 Venezuela became head of OPEC its president paid a visit to all the main oil-producing plants in the country. The result of talks held during the visit was that fairer, that is higher prices were fixed on oil. Among other countries, Hugo Chaves also visited Libya and Iraq, which caused a negative reaction in Washington and sparked off a campaign to discredit him.

The mass media proclaimed Chaves dictator. With the help of such material the USA stated that it would support a transitional government if the people of Venezuela resolved to free themselves of the dictatorship. Prior to that the mass media of Venezuela cited results of non-existent surveys of public opinion according to which Chaves was supposed to be loosing popular support. Similar publications appeared in international mass media.

A conflict with the oil company PDVSA led to a coup d'etat. The PDVSA is one of the largest oil companies in the world and in all spheres of industry in Latin America. Chaves' plan to block the interest rates that oil companies were to pay for refining Venezuelan oil were blocked by the managers of PDVSA and by those workers of the company who were connected with its former corrupted trade union. On April 7 Hugo Chaves said that the board of directors of the company was to be fully renewed and the managers and workers went on

strike. The trade chamber also called for a general strike (one where if the workers don't turn up they are paid a bonus).

On April 9 and 10, private TV channels and most of the press informed the public about a non-existing strike. In spite of the fact that enterprises, educational establishments, shops and public transport were functioning, TV channels showed deserted streets and closed shopping centers, thus boiling down "the situation in Venezuela to several thousands of demonstrators who supported the PDVSA leadership". On April 11, Chaves made an attempt to speak to the people by way of a direct general transmission. The private TV channels simply switched it off. At the same time snipers began to fire at the crowd from high-rise buildings around the presidential palace Miraflores where crowds of supporters and non-supporters of the President had gathered. Three supporters of Chaves made several gunshots. This scene was filmed by Venezuelan TV and circulated around the world with the following commentary: "President Chaves' followers opened fire on his order at a peaceful demonstration of the opposition". Not one of the channels, however, showed the snipers[8]. After the coup d'etat no official information was issued forth about the President's participation – only rumors that he had voluntarily resigned.

On April 12, Chaves managed to pass information about himself but not one of the local or international mass media issued the information. It was only thanks to the international service of Cuban radio and Prensa Latina that the world learned that President Chaves had been kidnapped, there being

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[8] Yasinsky, O. Venezuela, the changeover from development to disobedience (in) *www.Cuba.ru* – 15.06.2002 (Cit. from Baichik, A.V. Latin America: history and new tendencies in the development of journalism (in) Mikhailov, S.A. (eds.) (2002) *Globalism and anti-globalism: pluralism in unity. The age of information.* St. Petersburg. P. 54.)

no talk of his resignation at all. Thus, the mass media of Venezuela

> "created the image of a huge opposition to the President, then they "constructed a general strike", then they warmed up the atmosphere for a coup d'etat, which, though it did fall through, could have in other conditions taken place"[9].

Coverage of events in Venezuela is an example how serious attempts of informational indoctrination from abroad can be for national security. Due to this, governments and state structures in places where this problem is a threat do their best to neutralize external efforts of this kind. These countries try to develop their own mass media (to show where they stand, and what their place is on the world information map), they also restrict the spread of information to protect their national interests.

Another example, the Arab countries know that their share in the world information order is minimal, for this reason they have in the second half of the 20th c. actively begun to develop satellite TV. This has led to the creation of the ARABSAT system – an organization of Arab satellite TV, the idea of which was supported in 1967 by a convention of ministers of culture of the Arab countries in Tunisia. Five Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates became the founders and major shareholders of ARABSAT. Since 1979 a system of exchange of TV programs between nine Arab countries "Arabvision" has been functioning along the same lines as "Eurovision" with the use of hired channels on foreign satellites. Thanks to this, Western monopoly in international TV exchanges has been overcome, a fact

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[9] Baichik, A.V. Ibid. P. 53-55.

mentioned by UNESCO specialists. So has the paradox when the Arab viewer saw events in neighboring Arab countries mainly through the TV camera lens of this or that Western broadcasting service. Programs, which explain the spiritual values of Islam as opposed to the false interpretations of Islamic teaching and its role in the life of Arab society, occupy a special place in the activity of satellite channels.

> "The Egyptian satellite channel Nile – TV International that is aimed at foreign viewers, helps the world to learn about the real face of Islam, its strength and purity. The timeliness of this kind of activity is determined, first of all, according to some researchers, by the dominance of Western media corporations in global information exchanges, which form a distorted image of Islam, its moral values and the way of life of Moslems"[10].

As for the ban on the activity of media corporations on the territory of this or that country, here we can give examples from a number of European states and the USA, that is, states with longstanding democratic institutions.

In most countries foreign individuals or legal representatives are not given broadcasting licenses. In the USA this was banned by clause 310 of the Communications Act passed in 1934. In Gt. Britain, the Broadcasting Act passed in 1990 gives the right to broadcast on the third or fifth national TV channels only to individuals who are subjects of Gt. Britain or citizens of the countries-members of the European Community who reside there permanently, also to those legal representatives who act in accordance with the law of Gt. Britain or the EC countries, which are on their territory. At this, the first,

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[10] Nekhad, M. Arab satellite TV in the 1990s (in) *www.relga.rsu.ru/n49/jur49 1.htm* – 04.03.2007.

second and fourth channels broadcast public TV programs, which by definition mean that foreign control of the content of the programs is excluded.

The number of financial participants is restricted in Greece as well. There the share of foreign participation in the capital of the broadcasting company cannot exceed 25%. In France direct or indirect participation in shareholding of such companies by foreign (EC countries excluded) individuals or legal representatives is limited to 20%. The law on mass media in Japan states that foreign property cannot exceed 30%; R. Murdock's attempt (he owned 30% of the TV company "Asahi") to make a deal with Japan's largest shareholder, a partner in the company, and get control over it led to the imposition of a direct ban on this act by the parliament of the country[11].

One other aspect in the sphere of information that has to do with mass media, and which in many countries is considered to be of national interest is the protection of moral principles. Practically in all countries the authorities take care that the mass media observes generally accepted ethic norms. Circulation of obscene information and pornography is restricted, special care is taken to protect children from the possible negative influence of mass media. Numerous examples may be cited here. In the USA the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) carries on a wide campaign against obscenity in mass media.

The broadcaster is held responsible even for unintentional demonstration of material that has to do with sex, also for carelessness that makes possible such a demonstration. The

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[11] The state Duma's struggle against Russian TV being controlled by foreign investors (in) *www.medialaw.ru/publications/zip/80/ch2.htm* – 05.11.2006.

culmination of this campaign was a fine of 550 000 dollars which in September 2004 the Federal Communications Commission imposed on the "Viacom" company – owner of the CBS TV networks and cable MTV company for demonstration of a program, which for half a second (!) showed a nude female breast[12]. The situation is the same in Europe. EC Directive on Transfrontier Television (1989, Article 22) say that states-members of the European Community should take special measures to put a ban on those programs that contain "unmotivated violence". If these programs appear during the night, the authorities "are to guarantee that a warning is voiced, or that a visual warning is present during the whole period of demonstration". It is of interest to note that the Republic of Moldova refused to transmit programs of some Russian TV channels because they had violated Article 7 of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television that required the broadcasters to watch that the programs circulated by them do not exert a bad influence on children[13]. We think that political reasons played their part here but the measure was taken due to some objective reasons as well.

In practically all the countries of Europe there is prohibition on scenes of violence (and eroticism) during the day. In Germany the ban on programs not to be shown to children younger than 16 is in force from 6 am to 11 pm, in Georgia programs not to be seen by persons younger than 18 are banned from 7 am till midnight and so on. In the case of Georgia it is films with scenes of violence.

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[12] Richter, A.G. Legal regulation of pornography in the USA (in) *www.medialaw.ru/publications/books/usa2/08.html* – 05.11.2006.

[13] Yefimova, L.L. Foreign views on legal defense of children from the harmful influence of mass media (in) *www.kroutov.ru/content/rgs/rgs7.shtml* – 05.11.2006.

Conclusion

One can definitely discern a tendency when political activity is carried over from the classical political space it occupies to the space that information occupies, a fact that leads to the formation of peculiar virtual social relations. The international arena witnesses a geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of information. Globalization swells the problem to a worldwide scale. Thus, the protection of national interests in the sphere of information becomes a priority for governments of most countries. In this light, the idea of a reasonable regulation of the flow of information within a country most certainly holds water. It is to be expected that more and more attention will be paid to this question in the period of transition to an information society.

The Regulation of an Unregulated Media in Turkey: Global Trends vs. National Barriers

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Faculty of Communication

Any discussion concerning with media or in a larger sense audio-visual industry in countries like Turkey, should be examined within the framework of global trends generally, and European audiovisual policies in particular. Having said that, one has take into account what globalization means in terms of communication and how media institutions, production circulation and consumption has to be understood within a global context. To a certain extent globalization, as fact or theoretical construct become very influential, if not a dominant paradigm in and arround communication creating a demand of a new approach to a nationally structured communication with an international dimension. In this article, I would like to examine the recent conditions of Turkish audio-visual sector from the perspectives of a new paradigm shift in international communication. It was once viewed by the terms like "media imperialism" or "cultural imperialism" refering to a modernized, developed and rich nations dominating traditional, less developed or devoloping nations. It will be argued that looking more than a decade back, commercialisation of television met some of its early promisses while failed some others. What is allmost certain is that Turkish culture industry, if ever existed, much more bussiness oriented and face quite a similar risks and opportunities with allmost any other national brodcasting structures.

An inquiry, by which globalisation is to be exmined should be considered as a debate or rather an interdisciplinary dialogue accross various fields in social sciences much greater extent than the old paradigm mentioned above. Among the competing theorethical approaches Giddens for example, identifies globalization as a consequence of modernity by which socieal relations has been changed radically accross time and space. He states that, globalization occurs in four key areas that as follows: the extent of the nation system; the global reach of the capitalist economy together with international division of labour and a global system of military alliances.[1] Robertson on the other hand, expalins the shift to globalization earlier in history, approximately mid-eighteenth century and developed phase by phase. European nation state, generic individuals with rights an freedoms were at its core entered in to its last phase with a crisis tendencies during 1990's.[2] Being more specific Appadurai identifies five dimensions that contributed to Globalisation. The complex disjuncture of global flow of technology (*technoscapes*), capital (*finanscapes*) and people (*ethnoscapes*) provided an infrastructure upon which global production and distribution of images (*mediascapes*) and (*ideoscapes*) became possible.[3]

As Robertson has pointed out, it was during the 1990s that a far-reaching restructuration towards a global cultural economy is felt. In terms of cultural economy, globalisation here does not refer to a culture, which is as homogeneous and integrated as a national culture at global level comes to replace

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[1] Giddens, A. "The Globilizing of Modernity" in Sreberney-Mohammadi, A. Et. Al. (eds) *Media in a Global Context*.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 19-26

[2] Robertson,. R. "Mapping the Global Condirion" içinde Sreberney-Mohammadi, A. Et. Al. (eds) *Media in a Global Context*.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 7-8

[3] Appadurai, A. 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy' in *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, pp. 295-310

the national culture. Instead it is a process of cultural 'integration' and 'disintegration' taken place at a 'trans-societal' level.[4] It is a change of the cultural function of media which ones the effective arms of a vertical integration of nation, supplamneted by a horizontal communicative interactions. That is to say, new communication technologies of satellite and cable as well as readiness of new terrestrial frequencies capable of transcending national boundaries now made it easier for broadcasters to reach large audiences across national frontiers.[5]

Europe responded to pressures coming from global dynamics at governement as well as community level. Governemets found themselves to srike a right balance between namely technological changes, ideological preferences, and market forces on the one hand, and supporters of a powerul lobby wish to keep broadcasting as public service. Individual governments, tried to tackle the isue by excerting control of what could be brodcast and by whom at each country. But this task prowed to be getting even harder as cable and especially satellite showing no respect to a national border. Yet European Court of Human Rights decesion was another set back for the governemets' willing to prevent cross-border brodcasting as it ruled that Article 59 guaranteed broadcasting freedom of movement. After the ruling Television without Frontiers Directive was issued in order to harmonize the services interms of advertising programme as well as ownership. The Council of Europe with its wider memebership patttern and also cultural specific mandate also involved. According to Hitchens,

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[4] Featherstone, M. 'Global Culture and Introduction' in *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, p. 1. Appadurai, A. 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy' in *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, pp. 295-310

[5] Negrine, R. and S. Papathanassopoulos. *Internationalisation of Television*, London: Pinter Publisher, 1990.

there seems to be three main issues that European Community had in mind in his policy making effort. First, there is the issue of "the competence of the community" has to dealt with the balanace between the protection of pluralism without damaging the completion of internal market. The second is to tackle with "changing media environment" namely "the relationship between terrestrial television and non-terrestrial broadcasting, particularly with the advent of digital transmission. Finally, the issue of "information society" a Community level commitment on the one hand and and technological developments making ownership regulation even more complex an issue.[6]

Nearly three decades after deregulation and reregulation European story can be seen both a sucess and failure. Europe can be considered became succesul in respect to transform national boradcasting environment in to a Europe wide Audiovisual sector. It is a vibrant bussiness accomidating over a million employees, expanding its advertising sector, some progress on competition with USA, especially in Hollyood produtions and distribution channels. European prouctions, be it single or co-prouctions getting better audience reception, more access, making them finanacially sounder.

But there are also problems which make one to consider European audio-visual markets to reflect rather confusing signals. As Hitchens shown, the frequency and scope of mergers and acquisitions have indeed raised significant calls from media critics, indepdened media producers, citizen's groups and some within the European Union for efforts to regulate levels of media ownership and concentration therefore to ensure diversity albeit with little success. Another diffuculty arises be-

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[6] Hitchens, L.P. "The European Community and the Regulation of Media Ownership and Control Possibilities for Pluralism" in Sreberney-Mohammadi, A. Et. Al. (eds) *Media in a Global Context.*Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 209-215

tween protecting pluralism and regulation of media ownership and control as she concludes that, "whether deliberate or othervise, the Commission consistently seems to ignore the impact of convergence of the broadcasting, telecommunications and computer Technologies for the regulation of media ownership.[7]

Since Hitchens'article was published devolopments in audivisual industry shows that what European policy makers failed, namely to prevent large conglomorates to dominate the European audivisual industry, it seems market forces are, to a certain extent, acheived. The 14th European Television and Film Forum discussed this issue recognizing that, there seems to be a dramatic decline in the circumstances of major audio-visual conglomorates on the one hand and possible merger and acqusitions on the other. One time promising features of fast develpments of digital technologies failed to meet the expectations of anybody in the sector. Whether the problem is to achive good combinations of new and the existing technologies or simply consumers do not have either the means or the intentions to get the services which advanced technologies are offering. Having said that how will the new services be funded and what kind of business models are needed to build a successful consumer base new services? What economics will exist in the audio-visual sector in the coming years and will they fundamentally change from traditional models.

Perhaps the guestion as to whether there are real rather than theoretical advantages, with economies of scale that have motivated the convergence of companies in the content and distribution spheres. One thing is certain that, Europe still continues to search for a beter regulation after the 1989 TWF Di-

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[7] Hitchens, Ibid. 216

recitve, which gone under revision in 1997 and what is called Modernisation in 2006. Despite all the lips services for public service, it is much more commercial now and it seems to remain so at least for a forseable future.

European policy preferences are particularly important for Turkey to shape and reshape its audiovisual sector. However it took a different path as a result of various reasons be it political, cultural, ideological or financial. The changing global political economy of communications coincides with changes that took place in Turkey. During the 1980s Turkey underwent what is widely known as the structural adjustment policies in response to a major economic crisis struck the country during the 1970s. The core of the program was to transform inward looking Turkish economy in to a more competitive economy in a globalised market.[8] To adjust the conditions of the global market, the policy makers initially aimed at eliminating what is perceived as the handicaps of economy; over-bureaucratisation, dismantling of state control through privatisation, and improve the export capacity of the economy.[9] It overall marked the end of state-lead national development. The export-led economy, stimulated industrialisation and growing service sector notably tourism, further strength-

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[8] The free movement of ideas, capital and goods became the motto and successfully mobilised to this end by the Motherland Party governments under the leadership of Turgut Ozal who has been involved in the structural adjustment program during the 1980s and the early 1990s first as the chief economic adviser and then prime-minister and the president. His contribution was significant in many ways that the period termed as 'Ozal decade.'

[9] For the economic policies of the 1980s and their overall impact on the Turkish economy see for example; Yesilada, B. and M. Fisunoglu. 'Assessing the January 24, 1980 Economic Stabilisation Program in Turkey' in *The Politics of Economic Reform in The Middle East*. Barkey, H. J. (Eds) New York:, St. Martin Press, 1992, pp. 183-210; 'The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reforms in the 1980s' in *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform*. Bates, R. H and A. O. Krueger. Cambridge: Blackwell Pub. 1993, pp. 333-386; Rodrik, D. 'Premature Libralisation Incomplete Stabilisation: Ozal Decade in Turkey' *Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper*, 1990. Ref: 03760/402

ened the market as a steering mechanism reflecting further differentiation between the sate and economy.

The global and domestic factors had wider implications on the sphere of culture and politics in Turkey. Globalisation in its broader sense is understood in terms of a process 'rendering the contemporary world as a whole as a single place' anticipating the realisation of existentialist potentials.[10] It essentially requires, as Arnason argues, the acceptance of 'pluralization' of the components of modernity and 'relativization' of its image.[11] The application of different rationalities in life-world and systemworld for the former, and understanding of modernity in the context of particular locality for the latter. Whether it is an opposition to global modernisation or part of the constitutive trends of global reality, localisation is felt mostly in ethnic and cultural fragmentation. Rising of national identities, in an increasingly integrated world on the one hand, reasserting of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities within the nation on the other, are the indicators of this trend.

Similar developments also took place in post-1980 Turkey. Kemalist elite's visionary modernisation has been challenged in two grounds. Taken together with European integration, relativisation of the image of modernity in the West undermined the Kemalist elite's self-confidence in regards to their modernisation project modeled after the European nation-state. They have realised that their pursuit of societal rationalisation became an empty array or in fact repression and undesirable colonisation of the life world. The parts of the modernist elite adopted this new version of modernity and re-

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[10] Robertson, R. 'Mapping the Global Condition', in *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, p. 19

[11] Arnason, J.P. 'Nationalism Globalization and Modernity', in *Theory Culture and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, p. 220-1

define it by emphasizing its liberal, pluralist, democratic character. As Nicole Pope has observed, among the writers, intellectuals, and even the businessmen there has been a growing social consciousness against the image of a modern nation as a cultural totality, imposing unity on a diverse life forms.[12] The intellectual vacuum also filled by a newly emerging Islamist elite with their alternative vision of Turkish society. According to Gole, the 'Islamist counter-elite' attempted to 'reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging modernity'.[13]

Despite the military coup in 1980 extensively restricted fundamental rights and freedoms, it paradoxically paved the way for the life world to reassert itself. The underlying logic of the 1980 coup was to bring the ideological polarisation of 1970s, which created anarchy costing 20 lives a day, to an end. Having realised that the Kemalist ideology, with its radical-secularist nationalism, is incapable of filling the cultural and political vacuum, the leadership embarked upon a policy of integrating the Islamic elements into a newly defined social unity. The re-legitimisation of Islam in the context of 'neo-republicanism' Birtek and Toprak have argued, sought for a new form of social unity based on a 'moral community.'[14] This liberal conservatism has generally been defined as the political tradition of center-right parties, which for Gole, 'is crucial for the democratisation and development of civil society

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[12] Pope, N. 'Open To Change' in *Index on Censorship*, 1996, Vol. 2, p. 156

[13] Gole, N. Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites' in *Middle East Journal*. 1997, Vol.51, No. 1 p. 54

[14] Birtek, F. and B. Toprak. 'The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics In Turkey' in *Praxis International*, Vol: 13, No. 2 (July 1993), p. 196

in Turkey'.[15] Neo-Republicanism is therefore, the ideological embodiment of this political tradition.

How the Republican modernisation came to this point can be understood by a condition common to all modern state. According to Bauman, the nation state must and indeed consciously attempts to create a unity in given territory unavoidably creates categories of 'friends' 'enemies' and 'strangers'.[16] In the context of territorial and functional separation of modern nation state the stranger remains the most ambiguous one. It is neither an enemy, -it exists in the life world of the nation- nor a friend as it would not incorporate into defined universe of friendship. Yet it has the potential of being either friends or enemies. Within the mental boundaries of Turkish nationalism, estranged -ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural- elements, which from the perspective of the state were defined as potential enemies who needed to be assimilated, have challenged the assimilation. Hence from the perspectives of the estranged, s/he is a potential friend in a re-defined universe of Turkish modernisation. Liberal conservative tradition in Turkish politics can be seen as an implication of this latter view in a practical level, which partially incorporated, into ideology in the context of neo-republicanism.

Since the conflicting point has largely involved a moral dimension, the neo-republicanism marked a moral shift defining nationalism 'within the confines of a unified cultural and religious communalism.'[17] The state was making Islam -in its official version- capable of communicating publicly essential

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[15] Gole, N. 'Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics; The Case of Turkey' in Norton, R. A. (Eds) *Civil Society in The Middle East.* Vol. II. New York: Leiden E. J. Brill, 1996, p. 32

[16] Bauman , Z. 'Modernity and Ambivalence' in *Theory Culture and Society,* Vol. 7, No. 2-3 (June) 1990, pp. 143-169

[17] Birtek and Toprak, 'The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics In Turkey', p. 196

information via the Directorate of Religious Affairs and *tari-kats* (the religious brotherhoods). Neo-liberalism re-traditionalise the political public sphere by allowing the informal networks, such as *tarikats* (religious brotherhoods) and *vakifs* (pious foundations), to play an intermediary role, as channel of communication between the regime and population.

The religious networks were not the only informal organisations to fill the gap that was created by de-politization program. In liberal atmosphere of post-1983 period, numbers of civil society associations have been flourished.[18] There formed the 'issue-based' voluntary organisations such as environment or women's rights civil rights movements joined by business associations, research institutes, debating societies. Recently a research-oriented Center for Human Rights at the Science Faculty of Ankara, the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights (*Turkiye Insan Haklari Vakfi*), The Association of Victim of Cruelty (*Mazlum Dernegi*), and influential The Human Rights Organisation (Insan Haklari Dernegi) are publishing articles on the issue, providing rehabilitation's centers for the victims, raising the issue for human rights abuses. These organisations are putting pressure on government to improve the human rights conditions. Under the pressure coming from these civil initiatives, the government first appointed one of the State Ministers responsible for human rights and later created a separate Ministry of Human Rights. Recently the government has declared 1998 the Year of Human Rights and concentrated on to improve the implementation of constitutional protection of basic rights. Police Academies and mili-

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[18] Civil societal developments of this period see for example, Toprak, B. 'Civil Society in Turkey' in Norton, R. A. (Eds) *Civil Society in The Middle East.* Vol. II. New York: Leiden E. J. Brill, 1996, pp. 87-118

tary schools now include human rights lecture as part of their basic training.[19]

The same domestic and global developments invalidated the rigidities of cultural and political identity boundaries. An individual Turk found her/himself surrounded by a multiplicity of cultural identities. One could now identify himself with the Ottoman past, the Islam or with an ethnic origin. Turkishness gained a new momentum at one level when the Soviet Republic was collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, many Turks remembered their diasphoric origins now spanned from Balkans to Central Asia.[20] At another level, while Kemalism lost its dominant position practically -legally still is dominant-, it reasserts itself in the life world. As a result of practical relativization and privatisation, Kemalism became one of the worldviews among others as a symbol of a modern-secular way of life attributing to a liberal attitude in regards to sexuality, alcohol consumption, and women's body. In that respect, Kemalist-secularist world-view positioned itself as opposed to the Islamic world-view.

At the end of the day, Kemalist modernisation's failure to deliver the contractual notion of rights brought about the reassertion of traditional forms of 'self' formation. To put it differently, the autonomous, moral individual striving to maximise the 'self' interest as it developed by classical bourgeois political theory, is as alien to Kemalist nationalism as it is to Islamic communitarianism. As the apex of Kemalism, the 1980 coup squeezed the contractual notion of rights even fur-

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[19]*The Guardian.* 11 September, 1998

[20]There is a degree of reactivation of Pan-Turkism when the social, cultural and economic relations are increased with the newly independent Turkic Republics in Caucasus and the Central Asia. See For example, Landau, J. *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation.* 2. Ed., London: Hurst & Company, 1995.

ther undermining the individual's ability to develop a political identity around citizenship. Instead it was re-legitimated the 'relational' notion of self which a person develops a sense of selfhood through connecting with other person or groups.[21] In contrast to contractual self, whom a person acquires, rights inherently issuing from citizenship or embedded his or her presented, relational selfhood becomes right holder by investing specific relations. Hence relational selfhood provides more fluid boundaries which commitment to loyalty can be shifted more easily. Although the multiplication of the forms of identity formation increases the autonomy of the life world *Vis a Vis* the state, the autonomy of person *qua* community or group would largely be depend upon the particular norms and values of community or group which a person identifies with. That is, relational rights in the context of authoritarian communalism or paternalism, could seriously undermines personal autonomy generally and women and juniors in particular.

Furthermore the relativization of the life worlds can be no substitute to a universal civic identity. A well functioning democratic public sphere requires a separation between culture broadly understood need not to be shared by all citizens and a common political culture, which requires a mutual respect for constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is difficult to see the materialisation of this condition in post-1983 Turkish politics, which is centered on the identity politics. On the hand, the state fails to provide a comprehensive legal framework, which is preferential to none of the life forms but guarantees the individual autonomy. On the other, Islamic communitarianism with its unique sense of common good could be problematic when it desires to hold on to claim the monopoly of ' the truth'

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[21] Suad, J. 'Problematizing Gender and Relational Rights: Experiences from Lebanon' in *Social Politics*. 1994, Vol. 3, No. 1. Pp. 272-85

thus impose a particular definition of an Islamic way of life over the society at large. This lack of relativization of Islam is in fact the view held by secularist groups in Turkey which in turn makes *de-etatization* Kemalist ideology a pseudo-privatisation since secular groups justifies or indeed lends supports for the state to maintain its non-neutral position.

To sum up, global and domestic forces of post-1983 period has to a certain extent, been successfully transformed the visionary concept of public opinion into a real one. However, in contrast the visionary who assumed a unified public, the real public is polarised around the identity politics. It seemed such polarisation articulates itself along three main categories with some points of bifurcation among them. The first is the secular-nationalism of the state that in the context of neo-republicanism although now incorporated some of the traditionalist and religious elements, continued to maintain the basic ideological parameters. The second is Western modernists view which may also be considered as liberal in relation to a particular life-style such as sexuality, alcohol consumption, the issues of women, art and music which represents a point of conjunction with the state's definition. Finally, the Islamism with its anticipation of an Islamic moral community is critical of western individualism and consumerism crosscuts the state's version in the search for morally regulated public sphere. The role of broadcasting, which I will deal with in the remaining part of this chapter, is clearly visible in this process first as subject to global and domestic dynamics it soon becomes one of the forces to influence the whole process.

As the political-economic principles of unfettered economic growth, the free market, and the sovereignty of the consumer gained a new momentum in the Europe and the USA,

the neo-conservatism of 1980s saw the state-organised and state-protected broadcasting as an historical anomaly and call for a deregulation in the field of broadcasting. The idea behind deregulation was to make broadcasting system more responsive to the tastes and preferences of viewers. The advocates of deregulation and the defenders of public service were in agreement that broadcasting service must reflect the interests of listeners and viewers. What dominated the discussion, and it was this point that the advocates of public service principles and the liberals fall apart was, who would have decide, and according to what criteria would the interests of listeners and viewers be better served. Public service advocates defended the believing that, it has still had a continuing role to play to protect certain values in society in a pluralistic broadcasting structure.[22] The liberals on the other hand, argued that the viewers and listeners themselves were the best judges of their own interests. In the UK, the Peacock Committee concluded that the principle aim of broadcasting was 'to enlarge both the freedom of choice of the consumer and the opportunities available to program makers to offer alternative wares to the

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[22] The most persuasive argument defending public service broadcasting were appeared in Media Culture and Society, and it found most stunning defenders in writings of intellectuals based on the Center for Communication and Information Studies at Westminster University. Garnham, N. 'Public Service Versus the Market', in *Screen*, 1988; ---'Public Service Broadcasting and the Consumer', *Consumer Policy Review*. 1993, Vol.3, No. 3 pp. 157- 163: Scanell, P. 'Public Service Broadcasting and Modern Public Life' in *Media Culture and Society*. London: Sage, 1989. Vol. 11, pp. 135- 166; 'Public Service Broadcasting: History of a Concept' in Goodwin, P. And G. Whanell. (Eds) *Understanding Television*, London: 1990, pp. 11-27: From a legal perspective including European level see, Porter, V. 'Re-regulation of Television: Pluralism Constitutionally and the Free Market in the USA, West Germany, France and the UK', *Media Culture and Society*. London: Sage, 1989, pp. 5-27; --- 'The New European Order for Public Service Broadcasting' *The Yearbook of Media Entertainment Law*. London: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 100: From the perspective of defending values and see the collection of articles, Blumler, J. (Eds) *Television and the Public Interest: Vulnerable values in Western Broadcasting*. London: Sage, 1992.

public.'[23] According to this view the tastes and preferences are detrimental to value judgment and the consumer must be the ultimate arbitrator of what should be shown on television. The idea of consumer sovereignty was based on the assumption and the market liberals were assuredly arguing that market model would bring 'individuality' 'choice' and 'freedom' in to the broadcasting field.[24] At the end, the national culture that had been jealously guarded for decades in the Europe opened up to market forces dominated by global actors. These global players begun to disseminate the norms, values, images and narratives that are largely produced by themselves are composed of elements of modern production and consumption practices including 'free market' and 'consumer sovereignty' and above all the master-term 'democracy'. In his well-known Mactaggart lecture 'Freedom of Broadcasting' Rupert Murdoch was championing these principles:

> '[W]e start the new decade with the possibility of enormous diversity, with monopoly control blown apart by market forces ... It is a revolution with huge positive benefits for society, above all in the realms of freedom and education; for a multi-channel broadcasting system in the hands of a diversity of owners is a bulwark to freedom and not susceptible to the sort of state control.'[25]

This was also the ideological philosophy that with a decade of gap paved the way to commercialisation of broadcasting in Turkey. Among the champions of deregulation were

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[23]*Home Office, Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC*, Cmnd, 9824, London: HMSO, 1986. Para. 547.

[24]Fowler, M. And D. Brenner, 'A Market-Place Approach to Broadcast Regulation', in *Texas Law Review.* Vol. 60, 1982, pp.207-57; Veljanovski, C. (Eds) *Freedom in Broadcasting.* London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989.

[25] Murdoch, R. 'Freedom in Broadcasting' Speech delivered *in Mactaggart Lecture in International Edinburgh Television Festival,* 25 August 1989, p.9

politicians from every political spectrum but particularly from opposition parties, the press, advertising community, and other possible beneficiaries such as sport organisations all have their own reasons. For the politicians who held the opposition, deregulation would bring them an effective means to disseminate their views and ideas. It is important, as there was a common belief that, the TRT's monopoly has always unfairly reflected political views in the expense of the opposition parties. For the advertising community it was obvious that private stations were meant an alternative to the capricious attitude of the TRT. Moreover, deregulation was expected to shift the balance of power towards the advertising business. The press, on the other hand, saw the opportunity to expand, which otherwise their business would be at risk in competing with commercial broadcasting in a relatively small advertising market. As in the West, much of the argument for liberalisation was the capacity of private channels to extent freedom and choice. Advocates of privatisation managed to convince that privatisation would contribute to improve democratic politics in Turkey. As a result, technology made it possible what the liberal ideology was anticipated and the impact of Globalisation became clearly visible in the sphere of culture by all its aspects (integration-disintegration) even without direct involvement of any major global player.

The rush of the local entrepreneurs to seize the opportunities, the new media has created the mass media environment consistently defined as 'mass media disorder' implying contrasting and conflicting trends.[26] These channels are broadly classified as secular/mainstream and Islamic/alternative. Despite the easy grasp of the former category, the Islamic televi-

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[26] Kural, S. A. 'Mass Media Disorder and the Representation of "the Other" in Turkey' Paper Presented to *Turbulent Europe: Conflict, Identity and Culture*. EFTSC, 1994.

sion requires further elaboration. Once commercial television was introduced, a new kind of television stations appeared on Turkish broadcasting scene. For some these television channels are broadcasting to 'niche markets.'[27] They, on the other hand, defined themselves according to their audience groups that appeared to be the 'Muslims in Turkey'. It is argued that, at the begining these channels are motivated not simply by a commercial logic although it is obviously an important one but a degree of ideology and value considerations how they define their operational codes and targeted audiences. Observers may prefer the term 'Islamic television' while 'Muslim television' be preferred by these televisions themselves.[28] For the latter, the important point, as Meeker has argued, is an identification of themselves with the norms and values of Islam rather than merely reflecting the opinions and views from an Islamic perspective.[29] This is also true for Muslim television. They defined themselves and their broadcasting policy based on anthropological, self-referenced categorisation, as 'broadcasting by Muslims for the Muslims.'

Worth mentioning among them is TGRT is belongs to Ihlas Holding Foundation whose chairman Enver Oren is also

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[27] Colakoglu, N. 'TV'nin Gelmisi, Gecmisi ve Gelecegi' (The Present, Past and the Future of TV) in Turam, E. *2000'li Yillara Dogru Turkiye'de TV* (Television in Turkey Towards the Year 2000) Istanbul: 1996, p. 94

[28] The term 'Islamist' is employed to define the groups or movements in a religious character. Meeker for example draws attention to such terminology regarding to 'intellectuals' in contemporary Turkish intellectual. Meeker, M. E. 'The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey' in Tapper, R. (eds) *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State.* London: I. B. Tauris, 199, pp. 189-219. Two recent articles define publications in a religious character as 'Islamic'. See for example, Acar, F. 'Women in the Ideology of Islamic revivalism in Turkey: Three Islamic Women's Journals' in Tapper, R. (eds) *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State.* London: I. B. Tauris, 1991, pp. 280-303: Gunes-Ayata, A. 'Pluralism Versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications', in Tapper, R. (eds) *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State.* London: I. B. Tauris, 1991, pp. 254-279

[29] Meeker, Ibid. p.189

the head of religious brotherhood followers of the Naksibendi sect. Samanyolu TV launched by another highly influential Fethullah Gulen Community, followers of the Nurcu Order.[30] The group well known by their activities in the fields of culture and education, achieved to mobilise substantial amount of cultural and social sources through *vakifs*. They run a network of colleges and universities in the Central Asian Republics as well as in Turkey. In media sphere, apart from Samanyolu TV, the group publishes magazines, owns a daily national newspaper and three radio stations. One radio station and Samanyolu TV broadcast in Europe, Central Asia, Africa and Middle East as well as in Turkey.[31] The followers of the Iskender Pasa, a group of the Naksibendi sect, set up Kanal 7. These channels are still broadcasting and a number of new channels begun to operate albeit rather small and appealing to niche market. TGRT has recently sold to Rupert Murdochs FOX TV and naturally changet it program policy.

The extension of public sphere then generated a mixed reaction. For some the representation of 'radical views' was a 'democracy test' for Turkey, which, it could only pass this test without discriminating any opinions that exist in society. For Birand, by providing necessary means, private channels (in Turkey) are deserved to be called the 'statues of democracy.'[32] In a similar line Sahin argues that, private channels have brought plurality and tolerance in public sphere. The opposite views and opinions formerly prevented any interaction, today

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[30] Nurcu's are the biggest religious group in Turkey. They are the followers of Saidi Nursi whose approach to Islam and modernity is influenced by the early Islamises such as; Cemaleddin Efgani, Muhammad Abduh, Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi. According to Kara, Saidi Nursi mentions that he read the Kemal's *Ruya* (the Dream) and then awakened. Kara, I. Ibid. p. 22, fn.8. This particular group known as *Fethullah Hoca's* group which, named after its founding and current leader Fethullah Gulen.

[31] Information extracted from *Samanyolu TV Bulletin*. Vol. 3 June 1995

[32] *Sabah*. 20 April 1994

shared the same spheres -TV studio- to discuss the common problems 'aimed at finding the common ground rather than emphasising the differences between them.'[33]

In opposite camps commercial television viewed as jeopardising public order and threatening the national unity. They legitimised ethnic, religious and sectarian identities dividing people into secular, and anti-secular, Alevi and Sunni, Turk-Kurd.[34] The test for democracy for, secular-Kemalist opinion writers, in fact, is 'the test for foolishness'. In the view of Emin Colasan, in the name of democracy, private channels provide nothing else but the propaganda machine for the 'Kurdishness and *Seriat.*' For Colasan, our TV screens are invaded by 'the fortune-tellers, magicians, Arabesk musicians, nudism, and travesties, is irresponsible behavior ... which there was no power to stop.'[35]

Still for others the commercial channels achieve greater than bringing delicate political issues to the fore. Commercial channels were 'witnessing the history' by putting the light of the camera on the dark corners of society.[36] As the news programs informed the public, 'Talking Turkey', which was the popular slogan in 1980s referring to the removal of political ban imposed by military regime, was realised at grass-root level, through talk shows. Ozkok praised these popular talk shows: 'Turkey is talking during the night' and it was rebuilding itself.[37] In this Turkey, ordinary peoples especially

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[33] Sahin, H. 'Ozel Televizyonlar ve Democracy Atmosferi' (Private Television and Democratic Atmosphere) in Turam, E. (eds) *2000'li Yillara Dogru Turkiye'de TV* (Television in Turkey Towards the Year 2000) Istanbul: 1996, p. 193

[34] Akguner, T. *Radyo TV Sorunlari Hakkinda Turk-Italyan Semposyumuna Sunulan Bildiri.* (Speech delivered in Turkish- Italian Joint Symposium on the Questions of Radio and TV). Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Iletisim Fakultesi Yayini, 1995, No. 44, p. 67.

[35] Colasan, E. *Hurriyet*, 2. March 1994.

[36] Dundar, U. *Hurriyet*. 23 December 1993

[37] Ozkok, E. *Hurriyet*. 5 August 1996

women, would express their long suppressed ideas and feelings and shared their experiences to each other. They will learn how to endure to each other, became more tolerant. For Ozkok, this mediated social communication of private experiences is as much important for democracy as discussing the political issues.

At another level this polarisation can also be defined from the perspective of modernity or the master-narrative of the Enlightenment. The TRT continued to pursue to defend the Republican ideals in which the emphasis was on nation building around secularism constructed within its universalistic framework of positivism and progress with an added dimension. Somehow paradoxically and rather naively they sought for a 'Turkish audio-visual space' in Turkish Diaspora spanning from Turkish immigrant workers living in Europe, Muslim-Turkish minorities in the Balkans and Turkic Republics in the Central Asia to convey these principles. Motivated by a commercial success, mainstream private channels represent less ambitious but a firm stand in modernity. Although they divorced from this universalistic frame, the commercial channels stunningly defend the modern way of life and its production and consumption practices. Islamic channels on the other hand, depict an alternative, anti-modernist discourse. They used to focus in opposition to positivist secularism of the TRT and the consumption patterns of the commercial channels.

To sum up, the impact of changing global political economy of communication has, like anywhere else is significant in all accounts be it ideological, cultural and economic. By significant I do not mean that it is all anticipated and desirable. In the course of privatisation, the increased number of imported programs coincided with local productions as a result

of which Turkey became an open arena where the global as well as local cultural values begun to challenge. Internationalisation of programming was not entirely a new phenomenon. It was the usual practices of the TRT to import programs from international market mostly American and British. In the mid-1980s when the TRT expanded its broadcasting time, the total imported programs reached % 45.[38] Privatisation multiplied the number of popular entertainment programs. American action series, British dramas, Brazilian soap operas, game and quiz shows, news and current affairs programs, and reality show begun to pour in. With the extended choice and diversity consumers feel power in their hand and zapping has become familiar to Turkish audience. Game and quiz shows and other forms of entertainment also made considerable breakthrough. Despite the globalisation of program genres, professional norms, and conventions, these light entertainment programs also carry the patterns of domesticity to the extent that the substances of localities appeared in broadcasting screen.[39] Presenters have developed their own style, a mixture of global influences (speaking Turkish in American manner or using fashionable global terminology) and local accents and humor.

Yet the mainstream channels' popular approach to programming policy was bringing long neglected cultural components in to broadcasting sphere. Various authentic folk elements mixed with *Arabesk,* belly dancers performed alongside the Western and Turkish classical music. Contrasts to TRT's uniform culture, private televisions promote a culture that is the amalgamation of local, national and global cultural forms.

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[38] Cankaya, O. *Turk Televizyonculugunun Program Yapisi: 1968-1985* (The structure of Programmes in Turkish Television: 1968-1985) . Istanbul: Mozaik Basimevi, 1986, p.97

[39] For the differences influenced by the local-national economic, political and cultural dimensions see for example, Wallis, R. and S. Baran., *The Known World of Broadcast News.* London: Routledge, 1990

Partly this commercial logic and partly the recent economic stability Turkish audiovisual sector showed a reasonable growth. According to Nielsen Media Research International; "Turkey is emerging as a significant market, with annual advertising expenditure of more than US \$2.25 billion. In addition, its forecasted annual growth of 10% in entertainment and media spending outpaces growth in most countries in Western Europe and Asia Pacific, as well as the United States." Turkish film industry making good progress domestic as well as international, or the latter thanks, largely to Turkish Diaspora in Europe. Another promising area is hardware. Major Turkish Companies producing hardware, mainly television, have large stake in European market. Last but not least, introucing digital TV as late as 2012 will boost the market.

Similar trends can be observed in producing TV programs. Today nearly 200 hundred home-prodution TV serials compete for audience. What Straubhaar called "geo-cultural markets" could be seen as one of the main driving force behind the reinvention of once allmost dissapeared Turkish film industry not only in terms of TV serials but also movies.[40] According to one estimate in 2005, 30 million viewers paid a total of 127 million dolar for 204 movies. Films like G.O.R.A and Vizontele Tuuba acheived a reasonable box office success and together with other Turkish films took the reasonable share of 39 per cent ranking Turkey one of the two countries (the other is France) where audience most prefer domestic productions.[41]

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[40] Straubhaar, J.D. "Distinguishing the Global, Reginal and National Levels of World Television" in Sreberney-Mohammadi, A. Et. Al. (eds) *Media in a Global Context*.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 284-298 at, 291.

[41] *Hürriyet*, Şubat 2005

From the perspective of a representative public sphere, the role of commercial and Islamic channels as catalyst seemed to be stil more relevant than that of the TRT. They championed the democratic values prior to legalisation and their very existence and continued legitimacy would depend on the sustainability of a democratic public sphere. However, Istanbul based media was not monolithic. The Islamic televisions represented their own version of social, cultural and political issues contributing the formation of such cosmopolitan agenda. They entered the broadcasting arena anticipating a moral community with a cultural strategy of self-redefinition and self-maintenance. They still do but a degree of moderation. They often broadcast recitations from *Qur'an*, and broadcasting *mevlut* they still does but occasionally and either very late at night or specific religious days. One of the most significant among all then was the female presenters with a headscarf appeared in broadcasting scene for the first time in Turkey. Today headscarf still a very hot political issue as govermmet has recently made a constitutional amendment these channels seemed to be refrain from it. Although broadcasting music generated some debate in these early days, they soon become accustomed to broadcast music, drama, and talk shows. The anticipated criteria for these programs whether imported or self-produced, are their compatibility with Islamic norms and traditional family values appears to be even more loosened. It seemes, Mc Luhan's prophesy seemed at work: iti no doupt that television is a poverful medium through which you can disseminate your messages. Yet it is also true that medium is the message. Once they have realize that broadcasting is an expensive bussiness and in order to survive in a highly competetive market condition one should play by the rules: making money, which in turn, requries paying attention

to what the audience desires to see in their television or face the consequence. I mean, whether TGRT's sell out to Rupert Murdoch's Fox TV is anything to do with it remains to be a rough speculation.

The TRT continued and stil continue to represent the nationalist stand. However still remains as marginal player in contrast to its considerable capacity in terms of technical, financial as well as expertize and manpower. Hence there is a strong signal coming from governemet that it is likely that the TRT will be subject to organizational restructring means it will become smaller organization. Whether it can be acheived or not if so how audiovisual sector will be affected by this move remain to be seen. While the mainstream commercial channels with their advocacy towards Western consumerism has not changed and continue to lead the market.

Finally, it was generally belevied that the real novelty of choice and diversity stemmed from the information function of private channels. That is to say, they extend the concept of public by giving voice to voiceless. Plurality of opinions and ideas has been realised in both editorial level as well as broadcasting spectrums at large. The taboos of the official 'public sphere' had broken into pieces by the act of private televisions. Less motivated by the ideological considerations, private channels brought formerly forbidden issues to the public sphere. Day in and day out a controversial issue is discussed in studio. Secularist with Islamist, Kurdish politician with nationalist, liberal and conservative gathered around the same table to discuss these delicate issues.

At another level local issues are being brought in to the public sphere. Highly centralised political structure reflected in public communication system always prevented the TRT to

represent the local needs and demands. Commercial broadcasting responded positively to the local needs and demands largely by local broadcasters as well as national radio and television stations. While local televisions strengthened local enunciation, the local news more often became the part of the national agenda with the help of a private broadcasting news agency which was set up to provide the news material particularly for broadcasting. Prior to privatisation the overall public agenda was drawn out of power balance between these two centers. When private channels were set up in Istanbul, it truly became the media center of Turkey shifting the power balance in the expense of Ankara thus marginalizing the TRT, its cultural and the symbolic arm. Istanbul based media was keen to impose its commercial, and sensational as well as cosmopolitan agenda.

However, the days in which democratic nature of commercial channels were praised without questioning has already gone. Seemingly quick victory of the commercial media being the champions of democracy after all begun to be perceived more cautiously. Loking all the way back to these early days of commercialization one wonders, for example, had the TRT had more representative and non-repressive practices would the result be the same? Rather realistic picture might emerge if one takes more objective stance. What emerges is the fact that both arguments represent only the part of the truth. Those who criticise the practice of commercial television express concerns about the possible consequences of the sudden emergence of long suppress and underrepresented views, ideas, feelings identities and so forth, and demand recognition and representation. However, this view is proved to be rather defensive and myopic approach. It is defensive as it tries to justify the old system of denial and repression. Yet, it is myopic simply because it fails to see that

simply because it fails to see that a desire for social order free from conflict is no longer compatible with modern society and democratic politics. Modern democracy is a polity in which the ideal of social order 'achieved' by rational deliberation of different views and ideas in public sphere.

On the other hand, the private media's contribution towards democratisation cannot, and should not be taken granted. Generally speaking as an industry which audience maximisation and the profit are its primary consideration 'public-sphering', in the words of Dhalgren, is not the private television's dominant purpose.[42] Although private television contributed to improve the conditions of democratic public sphere in Turkey, the shift is largely the outcome of conditions specific to Turkey rather than a result of consciousness attempt. The most noticeable drive among others is the commercial logic of maximisation of audience and profit. It was this 'populist' nature of television that must be taken into consideration. It can be argued that media professionals socialised into democratic norms and values namely expressive rights, is surely an overoptimistic view. Even if it happened to a certain degree, it happened as a comprimise between business considerations and journalists' self empowerment on the one hand, and governemets political aims. So as the specific program genre such as news, news and current affairs, and talk shows as a means to disseminate knowledge hence to contribute to informed citizenry since news programs dominated by infotainment.

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[42] Dhalgren, *Television and the Public Sphere*, p. 148

National Media in Terms ff Cultural Unification
Following globalization of information space

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Introduction

This paper investigates one of the pivotal items affecting the contemporary national media in the manner of their dependence on international political and economic priorities. The first fiddle to be played in this process is likely to belong to world globalization which affects both trends and stimulates the evolution of new information priorities. In the meantime, world globalization is among those factors which look very contradictory for the modern media landscape. On the one hand, it creates good perspectives by making media enterprises amalgamated with larger and more prosperous monopolies, and thereby, to some extent, reminds a high-speed locomotive pushing carts, one after another, along the way of their financial independence. On the other hand, the process of globalization evokes noticeable difficulties regarding the existence of each national media system. At the same time globalization has a direct influence on people's psychology no matter if they clearly perceive it or never think of that. Globalization presumably makes the worldview of people more advanced. Yet, it frequently undermines national cultural priorities which can be wholly envisaged as a pretty specific tendency. As a consequence, national mass media are likely to lose its historical traditions and sovereignty being thoroughly pressured by international media monopolies. The above problem especially

faces "second-line" countries including Russia, Turkey and many others which nowadays are unable to compete with "first-rate" states (more developed in economic way). Can a destructive effect be, to some extent, lessened by well elaborated media politics or this situation, anyway, is inevitably looks detrimental for them? This is the basic question to be raised and researched in the paper.

Media imperialism?

Globalization has become an evident factor within the system of political and economic relations in the world. It is generated by a number of reasons including 1) an increasing level of intensive industrial production, 2) affiliation of financial flows from different countries into unified international capital, 3) concentration of economic resources, etc. These processes can be regarded as acting in terms of social relationships under which time and space become more intensive and dynamic. In these conditions, national interests also become more convergent and affiliated with international resources. The situation is more advantageous for the countries that possess hi-tech technologies and an intensive labor levels, and simultaneously able to regulate world financial flows. At the same time, *globalization which implies consolidation of different industrial enterprises into the unified industry for market monopolization on both national and international levels* is fairly considered to be one of significant modifications of modern international society. In these conditions we observe the process of enriching different cultures and a gradual dominance of one culture over another (on basis of right of the strongest).

The dominance of one culture over another in terms of globalization drew attention of some foreign scholars as early as the 1970s who called this phenomenon as "cultural imperialism" which holds back or even ceases development of some countries which are more feeble politically and economically[1]. Later on, amount of research has greatly increased. Some scholars branded the process of globalization as the "late capitalism"; the others called it as post-modernism or high modernism.[2] Leaving aside the essence of the above definitions (since all of them have to be investigated separately and thoroughly), it is worth noting that, first, cultural dominance affects all levels of social background and gets through economic, financial and many other fields of activity. Second, the role of communication and mass media throughout the above debates and arguments were admitted as pivotal for evolution of modern life.

For the last some years the issue of the relationship between social/economic development and the sphere of information has become even more evident due to complex problems occurring in the media field. There exists a danger for some media products to be undermined by their financially independent and more influential rivals. Simultaneously, the media process changes in a way of being more financially oriented. In order to survive, even quality outlets have to take into account basic instincts of individuals, i.e. eagerness of the latter to satisfaction of their priority needs. The mass media, thereby, turn out to be focused on by the cultural dominance.

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[1] Schiller, H. (1976) Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains.

Mattelart, A. (1979) Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture. New Jersey.

[2] Mandel, E. (1975) Late Capitalism. London, Jameson, F. (1984) Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (in) *New Left Review*. N 146. Pps. 53-92, Harvey, D. (1989) The Conditions of Postmodernity. Oxford, Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Boston.

As Murdock stressed, studying of communications from within cultural perspectives:

> "is centrally concerned with the construction of meaning — how it is produced in and through particular expressive forms and how it is continually negotiated and deconstructed through the practices of everyday life".[3]

The process of globalization does not leave this agenda. The former absorbs different media flows and integrates them into the complex one having a certain number of signs concerning political and economic orientations of the media.

Globalization toward the mass media is characterized by interaction of means of creation and distribution of information which, due to concentration of mutual abilities, create a principally new level of informative influence on society. Following this, globalization is defined by common evolution of economics along with existence of modern technologies which bore diversity of produced and delivered information. As for technologies, they are provided by investment from the most self-sustained countries: USA, Canada and Western Europe possessing technically developed facilities. According to it, an individual, on the one hand, has an immediate access to contemporary realities, and thereby is able to develop his/her worldview. On the other hand, he/she actively consumes a "borrowed" mass culture. It reinforces insecurity of less developed states. Over thirty years ago a British scholar Boyd-Barrett called this tendency "Mass media imperialism".[4]

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[3] Murdock, G. (1989) Cultural Studies: Missing Links", *Critical studies in Mass Communications*, Vol. 6, No 4, Decemder. P. 136.

[4] Boyd-Barrett, O. (1977) Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems (in) J. Curran, M. Gurevitch and J. Woolacott (eds.) *Mass Communication and Society*. London.

A contradictory situation concerning penetration of new technologies makes impossible to treat it unilaterally but provokes a more complicated comprehension of where the reality is leading to. It is suitable to refer to the amusing quotation by Sreberny-Mohammadi who relates these positions to the views of the two differently oriented men:

> "One position is that of the happy post-modernist who sees that many kinds of cultural texts circulate internationally and that people adopt them playfully and readily integrate them in creative ways into their own lives... Another is the melancholy political economist who sees the all-pervasive reach of the multinationals and wonders how long distinctive cultures can outlast the onslaught of the western culture industries".[5]

These stratifications, to some extent, seem to be looking ideal. "The simple dichotomy between «dominance» and «pluralism», Humphreys stresses, is a useful starting-point, but in reality media systems contain a complex mixture of these features.[6] Therefore, clarification of the effect from the situation very much depends on the national background. It is obvious that any penetration into different culture is not frightful if spiritual values shared by a nation are strong and self-defensive. The intrusion of new priorities, as a whole, broadens general cultural practice and creates new informative approaches toward the media. Yet, a problem of dissonance between "ours" and "alien" can be easily envisioned if, due to the media intrusion, habitual values are to be smoothed over. A similar problem happened to Russia in the 1990s when na-

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[5] Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. (1994) The Global and the Local in International Communications (in) J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds.) *Mass Media and Society.* London, N.Y. P. 134.

[6] Humphreys, P. (1996) Mass Media and Media Politics in Western Europe. Manchester. P. 5.

tive movies had disappeared from TV-screens and been substituted by American hits of beyond-the-line quality. Criminal heroes and the so called "New Russians" have overshadowed life of average people previously being popular on television. Today this informative culture keeps rendering influence on moral frameworks of Russian society which looks pretty painful for its state. "Global rarely means universal", underlines Sreberny-Mohammadi.[7]

National priorities vs. the global village

Impetuous penetration of new information becomes real which is obvious on the segment of Internet. An overwhelming part of data in the world net is being created and distributed in English. The same language becomes dominant in the process of working out main programs while searching necessary electronic addresses.

Does this situation look anxious for developing national information priorities? Those countries which are unable to compete with the leading countries in the field of information technologies seem to be mostly worried. For instance, Igor Panarin, Professor at the Diplomatic Academy of Foreign Ministry in Moscow, spoke out that the information exchange favors only the interests of the US and, to some extent, Britain and leaves apart other less powerful countries. In his opinion, Russia becomes "the main victim of this expansion" because its cultural space is being destroyed and undermined by the unilateral globalization.[8] Similar opinions in Russia have become quite popular.

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[7] Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. Op. cit. P. 134.

[8] Kultura i globalnie vzrivi mirovogo razvitiya. V Mezhdunarodnie Likhachevskie chteniya, 19-20 maya, 2005. Saint-Peterburg, 2005. P. 41.

Meanwhile, a pivotal task for Russia does not aim at limiting foreign Internet technologies. National priorities have to focus on improvement of own information opportunities which are still imperfect. The basic Russian searching system, Yandex, so far is not always suitable to provide users with necessary information due to imperfection of the searching system itself (following the author's personal experience). Besides, the level of computerization in Russia leaves much to be desired against a background of the most technologically-advanced countries. In many villages and towns people have no access to Internet and are cut off from equal opportunities for getting information.

Western academics estimate the fact of developing Internet more positively than those beyond the US and EU. They claim, in particular, that Internet enabled to regulate the flow of information and made easier its search which is resulted in ongoing penetration of democracy aiming to see society as an equal partner of the power to lobby political decisions. Advocates of this approach consider Internet as the information source providing everybody with the same opportunity to receive any data no matter which part of the Globe he/she belongs to. Therefore Internet is regarded, in some way, as a "watchdog" of democracy controlling its development. As Truetzschler put it:

> "… Internet can (at least in theory) lead to an enhancement of the democratic process by improving citizen participation and public discourse, creating awareness about elections, election candidates and policy issues that occur outside regular elections".[9]

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[9] Truetzschler, W. (1998) The Internet: A New Mass Medium? (in) D. McQuail and K. Suine (eds.) *Media Policy: Convergence, Concentration and Commerce.* London. P. 78.

The above priorities of many Western academics can be easily explained by their personal affiliation with Internet resources and obvious inability to imagine their own lives without technologies (which is stimulated, for instance, by delivery of many international conferences and seminars without leaving personal offices by their participants). It goes without saying that there is also a very profound cohesion between mass media globalization and the Internet.

Contemporary distribution of information facilitates to strengthening of what Canadian sociologist and historian McLuhan called in the 1950s the global information village, i.e. unification of people living far from each other but getting constantly in touch by the means of technical facilities.[10] From the very beginning McLuhan was very optimistic about "global village" being created by technical facilities of the modern world. He considered such distribution of communication as a very perspective thing. McLuhan was deeply convinced that tensions and conflicts stem from "breakdowns in communication" and that if we could only have "better communication a more harmonious global order will come about.[11] This idea has so much pierced the mind of McLuhan and his adherents that then they turned out unable to see negatives of the process.

In the meantime, nothing presumably could be regarded as negative concerning the process of information distribution. It was considered that the world recreates a common communication space without which the gradual development of national communities is unlikely to be possible. Those communities which are not switched to these facilities are supposed to

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[10] McLuhan, M. (1964) Understanding Media. London.

[11] Gurevitch, M. (1994) the Globalization of Electronic Journalism (in) J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds.) *Mass Media and Society.* London, N.Y. P. 178.

be wiped off from the international information trend, and take the risk of being left beyond technical progress. However, moral principles of distribution and use of information are still on the agenda. The above claim expressed by Professor Panarin confirms that this issue is extremely actual and therefore worth reflecting.

One way or another, but due to new technical facilities, our vocabulary has initiated the term "news eruption" resulted in a constant increasing flow of information which is being born by itself. Nowadays the international community insistently raises a question if it is able to properly "package" the volume of information which is leading to searching the new forms of data regulation.

Stepping beyond the borders: The media case

Globalization of the information field is not limited by technological innovations making the process of submitting information more perfect. Key flows of information, to much extent, are regulated by traditional mass media: the press, radio and television. These media, as before, have extensive opportunities greatly affecting mass consciousness. British scholar, Negrin, pointed out that the quality of our lives is determined by meanings we have reserved from others. Then he continued:

> "Everyone lives in a world of such meanings. As the influence of other agencies of socialization and knowledge transmission such as the Church, schools, and political parties decline, the mass media become even more central in the creation of the "images in our heads of the world outside".[12]

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[12] Negrine, R. (1994) Politics and the Mass Media in Britain. London. P. 4.

Besides, the mass media turn out to be a pivotal social institute which can unite or disunite society. Therefore this institute can be fairly called omnipotent following its degree of penetration into social life. In this regard, for instance, McQuail sees the media as not just any other business but an alienable part (and essence) of public interest responding their information needs.[13] In the meantime, the media rests on economic priorities which, in turn, subordinate to private interests.

This tendency looks as a strategy of information development in the modern world. Globalization does not act only in a way of increasing a number of mass media enterprises. First, there exists a redistribution of capital within a holding which initiates business. Second, information structures draw investments from other undertakings owned by the same media tycoons. Many proprietors do not limit their businesses only by the interests within the media themselves but tend to control industries beyond such as banking, insurance, tourist companies and other profitable businesses which serve as successful instruments for pumping up the money to media.

There are also many vice versa examples. It is not an exception when world-wide communication conglomerates operate within the media and leisure industries using mainly or even purely the profits from their original operating base to buy into other sectors.[14] This creates for the entrepreneur the so-called financial "scales" between revenues and losses within the same international monopolies which enable the owner to redistribute money from one business to another. In

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[13] McQuail, D. (2000) Mass Communication Theory. 4th ed. London. P. 204.

[14] Murdock, G. (1992) Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications industries (in) M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran, and J. Woolacott (eds.) *Culture, Society and the Media.* London. P. 119-120.

this regard, Tunstall and Palmer fairly confirm that the "classic example of the media mogul confines his business activities largely to the media". However "there are also examples of entrepreneurs who are primarily captains in some other industrial field, but in addition own and operate major media interests".[15] Quite often the business which commences nationally, steps forward beyond the national borders and penetrate in different territories.

It goes without saying that the media globalization leads from separate outlets and broadcasting companies to more global media undertakings, and later on to international concerns amalgamating information enterprises in different countries.

For example, the biggest world-wide informational holding *News Corporation* run by R. Murdoch owns many tens of enterprises of the press, broadcasting and production studios in five continents, and this clearly confirms the existence of cross-media ownership. News Corp. is active in filmed entertainment (owing in particular, the 20th Century Fox Corporation), book publishing (running HarperCollins Publishers, a very powerful company which unites many printing houses, notably Bartholomew, University Tutorial Press, etc.), and other operations. A significant addition to its activities are their satellite TV developments which are dominant in many regions and are capable of covering two thirds of the world's population, from Turkey to Japan[16]. Taking into account that this statistics was submitted over ten years ago, today the Murdoch's empire has certainly enlarged its ability to affect people's minds in different parts of the Globe.

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[15] Tunstall, J., Palmer, M. (1993) Media Moguls. London. P. 105.

[16] Williams, G. (1994) Media Ownership and Democracy. London. P. 35.

A very developed activity is exercised by the British *Maxwell Communication Corporation*, Italian *Fininvest*, Japanese *Sony* and others which confirm the same case. Moreover, some media giants set up local media undertakings financial resources of which sometimes exceed those of many big companies (British *News International* is a huge company which t the same time is considered to be part and parcel of the above *News Corporation*). After Conrad Black's takeover of the *Daily Telegraph* in 1985, it (along with the *Sunday Telegraph*) became a part of his huge and diverse corporate holdings. The papers are run by Hollinger Argus Ltd, a Toronto based mining firm which, in its turn, is a subsidiary of the Argus Corporation, a company with many interests, including financial ones, controlled by Black. He is also Director of the Canadian Imperial bank of Commerce (the second biggest bank in Canada), the Confederation Life Insurance Co and other big enterprises, mainly in North America, which impact on international business and the flow of capital.

It confirms once again that globalization does not exist by its own but affects different activities and looks as a multiplied process of converging political and economic interests. Boyd-Barrett fairly claims that

> "...Regardless of ownership of formal control, intercultural penetration may also be exercised by external customers for media services — in particular, the multinational companies which buy advertising space, or any advertisers who channel their custom through multinational advertising agencies, or both. Both media and advertising may have resort to multi-national public relations, market survey, and opinion-poll organizations in order to appraise the size and social composition of media audi-

ences and the potential audience demand for various com-
modities".[17]

Thus, everyday culture as a whole and information cul-
ture in particular become affected by diverse commercial in-
terests. Media tend to lobby insistently the above interests fol-
lowing the shrinking of political pluralism and less diversity of
information.

Presently the same tendency takes place in Russia and
almost all CIS countries. Although the Russian media business
did not come out beyond the borders, it will definitely occur
one day due to Russian great political and economic potentials.
It is obvious that the media belonging to holdings gradually
lose their independent positions and become more involved in
sharing some other interests. Modern Russian reality displays
many examples of concealing information by the media in fa-
vor of reaching political and/or economic purposes.

Russian media practice is getting through the first stage of
globalization acting within national media regulation. It is fol-
lowed by many unresolved questions regarding the relation-
ship between media and society. The national media concen-
tration can be regarded as the beginning of globalization in the
field of information. Political pluralism being proclaimed, to
some extent, shows democratic priorities of national develop-
ment. Yet, a newly introduced property in the information
sphere has not provided Russian society with a long-awaited
media freedom. This once again makes globalization a very
disputable term.

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[17] Boyd-Barrett, O. (1992) Cultural Dependency and the Mass Media (in) M. Gurevitch, T.
Bennett, J. Curran, and J. Woolacott (eds.) *Culture, Society and the Media*. London. P. 179.

Keeping national identity: a myth or reality?

Contemporary distribution of information is generated by a number of issues actual for both media theory and its practice. One of the questions being raised, concerns a possibility for national journalism to maintain its initial make up in terms of consistent evolution of the international media business. The process itself undoubtedly, albeit implicitly, undermines the Russian media which are traditionally determined by specific content and stylistic frameworks being rooted historically as a result of a particular relationship between the press and the government. The problem itself is affected by the intrusion of modern technologies into the national media process which change the media content and design. A significant amount of information gets to the media through numerous information agencies, Internet and appears being virtually unchanged which also affects the make-up of the national media.

For Russian journalism the problem of keeping the national priorities looks extremely uncertain due to remarkable zeal of many outlets to put in practice foreign information models (American, in particular) which became a footing for the national media. Destruction of the Soviet theory of one-party journalism and an obvious eagerness to borrow the standards of western "free journalism" along with active investment of the media from foreign media moguls have led to borrowing and, to some extent, full-scale copying of oversees information approaches.

As for television, this situation provoked the appearance of an immense number of "soap-operas" and different "infotainments" under which even the most serious events are being covered in an entertaining way. Besides, the content analysis of prime-time news programs in the national TV-channels

(ORT, RTR, NTV and some others) clearly illustrate basic priorities of broadcasters in selecting information and pictures to cover occurrences. The press, as whole, confirms the same tendency of infotainment due to facts selection resulted in a particular reflection of the world development in consciousness of most readers. Relishing of rapes, killings, robberies, etc have long become pivotal for many local printing media. Quality publications are still in print but its number decreased for the last years compared to the total number of outlets. Many Russian scholars pursuing mass media say about an increasing readership's interest to quality media but the modern situation does not confirm so far the alteration of information priorities.

At the same time, most Russian journalists have a pretty poor knowledge about national journalistic traditions laid down as early as three centuries ago and carried on in media practice in pre-revolutionary and the Soviet times. Russian journalism is a specific occurrence being developed in terms of the strong power constantly undermining freedom of the press and patronized by government. Along with it, the Russian media showed respectability to the so-called "average" man who for the last time had almost disappeared from the media content, due to the media strong impulse to make profits. The impetuous renewal of media scenarios being alien to traditional content values recreates the barriers in a way of absorbing professional standards and making the media respected by the audience. By "alien" the author does not mean any hostility toward national defensive interests but unrestrained intrusion of different cultural priorities into the Russian media content under which national information products are not able to compete with their oversees patterns. In other

words, the terms of supplying foreign products seem to be more profitable then those produced by Russian companies.

The problem of keeping a proper make-up of the national media is not purely Russian. Many countries are presently affected by American mass culture. This situation frequently leads to cultural misbalance and stimulates the process of "transnationalization" under which an individual is undermined by "alien" values. This is gradually affected by media politics promoted or ignored by governments. The media do not exits on themselves but profoundly dependent on state interests. This factor is very often ignored by some modern Western intellectuals who consider the media in "free society" as being able to fulfill the most priority task — strengthening democracy and to be its "watchdogs". It is true, to some extent, but the media content depends very much on political and economic priorities of the country no matter what kind of regime the latter defends.

One of most popular discussions presently initiated by Russian academics is whether the state power is able to elaborate and put in practice the measures aimed to turn down intrusion of information from oversees. Some of them suggest the creature of balance between Western countries and Russia, so that an individual living in this country could not feel his "utmost" dependence on foreign culture as it occurs today. This dependence can be viewed from TV programs being switched to borrowing oversees shows and movies instead of producing basically Russian products. True, the last years have demonstrated a slow shift towards keeping safe the national information interests (due to more active financing of national products). However, the mechanism of creating the barriers which would prohibit intrusion of foreign information seems to be

impossible in terms of the modern market development in Russia only creating standards of broadcasting. The same concerns the press which has not overcome yet indefatigable sensational evaluations and the loss of ethical principles in covering many daily occurrences as a repercussion of the media transition from one political system to another, a completely different one in its basic political orientations.

There is one more thing that seems to be more realistic while bolstering national information flows. It is maintenance of quotas on foreign broadcasting aimed to defend national information products. This practice was brought about, for example, in Canada, UK and the Scandinavian countries.

Nonetheless, the problem of keeping information space independent from foreign "intrusion" turns out to be actual and not entirely resolved in terms of universal democratic development. National governments, even in most advanced and prosperous countries are scared of being blamed in intolerance towards foreign cultures. In fact, much can be done on the basis of self-determination of journalists and their comprehension of a priority to follow national traditions and to maintain responsibility for acting. This idea, in turn, seems to be working only in conditions of relatively good standard of ethic shared by national journalistic communities and their readiness to bear responsibility for activities which can be, to some extent, reluctantly treated by population. To be certain, bearing responsibility is not supposed to restrict nations from penetration of foreign cultures but to understand clearly that nations gradually develop only in terms of understanding national cultures. Therefore, the media becomes one of these instruments that can easily stimulate or disorientate people in understand-

ing these cultures which may have far-reaching consequences for nations.

Conclusion

Thus, globalization looks as a very specific phenomenon of the day affecting an individual due to the influential information flow. This flow undermines, to the very extent, personal priorities of a man while bringing them down to communal interests. This problem of globalization, however, seems to be invisible for an individual. In many ways he/she does not pay attention to this hidden agenda of globalization which, quite the contrary, is treated fruitfully.

The media is also affected by the process both nationally and internationally. Stemming from separate outlets this process got through different stages and now seems to be of great priority for understanding the development of the world information flow. The modern state of the media — its concentration and affiliation with non-media enterprises — has been gradually changing from the beginning of the 20th century and nowadays a particular media landscape full of political and economic contradictions. Treating it as an inevitable component of the media practice it is worth paying attention that the process of globalization depends very much on historical traditions of the country and its law as well as responsibility of journalists. The very fact that some countries turn out to be more dependent on the globalization pressure confirms once again the low standard of their technological facilities compared to real necessities of the day as well as financial difficulties in making the media production more competitive and developed.

These frameworks help to better understand the chances for keeping the national media landscape stable presently and later on regardless of the world tendencies in the sphere of mass communications.

The Turkish Media in the Hands of Globalization: Can there be a possibility of independence?

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Information shape the world, and yet who shapes information, for whom and how? These are the questions which have to be addressed when we deal with solutions for ontological matters and future developments of human essence on media. Since, the definition of information itself is self explanatory and ontological. It has something to do with forming of the self, changing the current existence and shaping the others. But there is more to that: always "someone" and "some motive" are there to form in-formation. So there is always a circulatory puzzle in the questions we have asked about media, communication and information. In short, information, media, and communication shape the world, the world shapes information, media, and communication. This seems an egg-chicken dilemma. Is it so? This brief presentation will focus on these questions from the point of view of globalization and modernity within Professor Arif Dirlik's framework of global modernity.

When dealing with information as commodity of knowledge and consciousness, in the global world of the Western hemisphere, i.e. capitalism, then we encounter another paradox: The countries left out from capitalistic (westernized) part of the world claim to become part of the global world by attacking western ideas, such as human rights, self determination, freedom and sovereignty. The eastern, the South, the un-

derdeveloped, the Islam or ex- or post-socialist world is becoming more and more eager to become part of what they are critical of. So we encounter the same question: who shapes who? The critique or criticized?

So, sharing the same grounds and same concepts, we find two rivals striving for the same thing. East and West want to be modern, capitalistic and humanly free.

In fact globalization is the culmination of these paradoxes, expressed succinctly by McLuhan when coined two paradoxical terms: Global Village.

Media is the highway of these adversely oppositions and probably we have been witnessing dramatic and drastic fatal accidents on the road going towards west and east, simultaneously. The globalization is creating, on the one hand village type of micro-nationalism, identity crises, small-private-ownership-competitions and fundamental religious and terrorist oppositions which have been labeled and rejected as traditional for the modernization theorists; on the other hand, targeting to create a web of international global ties and providing a road towards more humane societies, so-called "liberal democracy" and collapse of nation-state's sovereignty.

Can we claim that we are in the age of media paradoxes of which the solution seems impossible under the framework of the "global" world we live today? If so, is there a way out from the chains of capitalism which brought about a world full of insoluble dilemmas?

If there is, what is to be done? This old question needs to grasp the world as passing of towards some other world which would not be "global" and "village" at the same time. So, we can start to work with, and criticize, of the concept of "Global

Modernity" notion as Arif Dirlik had provided some useful underpinnings.[1]

After mentioning what the world is when we are talking about media, I will explain the past and the future of the Turkish media which have long ago stepped the threshold of becoming captured by the global capitalistic media networks for the last fifteen years.

There is little hope of independence unless the understating of the world is changed and some new target paths defined as modernizing the globe as the "Enlightenment Project" had suggested two hundred years ago, which could rest its foundation in the notion of "Global Modernity."

Todays' Media, Communication and Information

Ben H. Bagdikian published *The Media Monopoly* two decades ago (in 1983) and in 2004, he published the seventh edition of his influential book, titling it with more globality, *The New Media Monopoly*. In the first edition, he was mentioning that 50 companies had been dominating the newspaper, broadcast, magazine, book and movie industries. Not so amazingly, twenty years after, only 5 are dominating: Time Warner, Viacom, News Corporation, Disney and Bertelsmann. He states that "these five corporations decide what most citizens [over the world] will, or will not, learn."

Bagdikian is right in the bird-eye-view but there are more to that: the Big Five's alleged powers of mind control, there are a list of influential news organizations besides the Big Four Newspapers they don't control in the USA and the world.

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[1] In English, Arif Dirlik, *Global Modernity, Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism*, Paradigm Publishers, London, 2007; and in Turkish, Veysel Batmaz (Ed.), Arif Dirlik, *Global Modernite ve Sosyalizm*, Salyangoz Yay., Istanbul, 2006.

These are: Newspaper chains: Gannett, Knight Ridder, Cox, Scripps, McClatchy, Landmark, Copley, Newhouse, Freedom, Hearst, MediaNews, and Tribune. Besides these chains, there are independent newspapers such as The *Boston Globe* and *Newsweek.* The various NBC belongs to GE. *The New Yorker* and Conde Nast's other titles are published and sold heavily, not to mention PBS or NPR. Reuters, AFP, AP, Bloomberg as news disseminating agencies do not belong to these five. There are more independent but influential networks of media: *U.S. News & World Report*, Pearson, Hachette Filipacchi, The *Atlantic* and The *Economist.* And of course, all other national and local media outlets scattered all around the world and core of local numerous TV stations.

But what is the use? Whether Bagdigian is right in his overstatement or wrong, the core of the media content does not change a bit, from China to Russia; from the USA to Madagascar. The story is not all media. When the global media is getting in the hands of few capitalists, the other information and communication echelons are spread out due to the externalities of technology.

Besides media, information is delivered via other communication technologies. Since 1990 there has been a huge growth in information and communication technologies (ICTs). Globally, access to either fixed or mobile telephones tripled from 10.1 subscribers per 100 people in 1990 to 46.42 in 2004; or put another way there were 530 million fixed or mobile telephones in 1990 and by 2004 there were almost 3 billion, which is nearly one for every two persons on the planet.[2] There are now more mobile than fixed telephone sub-

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[2] ESRC Report, 2007: Millennium Development Goals Storyline (2006) International Telecommunication Union, pp 3 (accessed 4 January 2007) The Millennium Development Goals Report (2006) United Nations, pp 25, (accessed 4 January 2007)

scribers around the world. In 1990, 11 million people world wide had a mobile phone; by the end of 2004 this grew to 1.8 billion with an annual growth rate of 44 per cent. The estimated number of personal computers rose from some 120 million in 1990 to 777 million in 2004. Just 27 countries had a direct connection to the internet in 1990 - by the end of 2004, virtually every country in the world was online and there was an estimated 864 million internet users worldwide.[3] But in 2007, all figures have raised 50 %:

Top Ten Languages Used in the Web - 2007 (Number of Internet Users by Language)					
TOP TEN LANGUAGES IN THE INTERNET	% of all Internet Users	Internet Users by Language	Internet Penetration by Language	Language Growth in Internet (2000 - 2007)	2007 Estimated World Population for the Language
English	30.1 %	379,529,347	18.8 %	167.3 %	2,022,629,545
Chinese	14.7 %	184,901,513	13.6 %	472.4 %	1,356,701,170
Spanish	9.0 %	113,463,158	25.4 %	359.7 %	446,648,991
Japanese	6.9 %	87,540,000	68.7 %	85.9 %	127,433,494
French	5.1 %	63,761,141	15.6 %	422.7 %	407,819,872
German	4.9 %	61,912,361	64.2 %	123.5 %	96,403,511
Portuguese	4.0 %	50,828,760	21.4 %	570.9 %	237,003,607
Arabic	3.7 %	46,359,140	13.2 %	1,575.9 %	350,965,119
Korean	2.7 %	34,430,000	47.6 %	80.8 %	72,346,515
Italian	2.6 %	33,143,152	57.0 %	151.1 %	58,178,115
TOP 10 LANGUAGES	**83.7 %**	1,055,868,572	20.4 %	221.4 %	5,176,129,939
Rest of the Languages	**16.3 %**	206,164,125	14.4 %	534.8 %	1,430,840,227
WORLD TOTAL	**100.0 %**	1,262,032,697	19.1 %	249.6 %	6,606,970,166

Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm

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[3] *Ibid*, p. 2

Comparison of the above table with Bagdikian's data presented shortly, suggests that, although there is a huge concentration over the classical media market, thanks to Internet and local usage of technologies of different sorts, provides a little divergence globally in information dissemination.

Let me give another example how global decentralization and divergence in media and information sector took place in the recent years: We can compare two distinct movie industry world-wide:

Bollywood and Hollywood

The Indian film industry - sometimes known as 'Bollywood' - is located mainly in Mumbai (Bombay), India, while Hollywood in California in the USA is central to Western cinema. Table compares the size and global reach of the two film industries.

Table 2: Bollywood vs Hollywood, 2002		
	Bollywood	**Hollywood**
Films produced*	1,013	739
Tickets sold	3.6 billion	2.6 billion
Worldwide revenues**	US$ 1.3billion	US$ 51billion
Annual growth rate	12.6 per cent	5.6 per cent
Average production cost per film	US$ 1.5million	US$ 47.7million
Average marketing cost per film	US$ 500,000	US$ 27.3million

Source: <u>Bollywood vs Hollywood</u> (2002) "Can new money creates a world-class film industry in India," December 2, 2002. *Business Week* Online.

While global homogenization is in effect in many multitude ways, the world also encounters fractures.[4] At the organizational structure, we witness unification but at the cultural side the world is getting apart. Governance and content wise, we consume the same commodity world wide. In religious and ethnic practices, we deliver different and hostile messages. Apparently this is how global world present itself to us. As put in Arif Dirlik's words:

> It was from the early 1990s that globalization rapidly and insistently emerged as a concept with paradigmatic claims, demanding attention not only as a guide to the present, the future, and the past of the world we live in but also as a resource for the reevaluation and reorganization of the social and human sciences -- and our ways of knowing in general.[5]

The global world, as has been firstly recognized in the works of communication scholars like McLuhan, has everything to do with information and media which are the essential means of knowing and practicing everyday culture, often defined as "popular culture."

So we can define the current position as globalization in such a way that two opposing current is fighting with each other: the organizational and the cultural globality. While organizational globality establishes itself in the economic, political and managerial spheres, the cultural globality maintains its effects and expressions in media sectors, information and communication technologies.

What is the result?

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[4] Dirlik, *Global Modernity*, p.1

[5] *Ibid,* pp. 1-2

Robert McChesney puts it succinctly:

> "A specter now haunts the world: a global commercial me-
> dia system dominated by a small number of superpowerful,
> mostly U.S.-based transnational media corporations. It is a
> system that works to advance the cause of the global mar-
> ket and promote commercial values, while denigrating
> journalism and culture not conducive to the immediate bot-
> tom line or long-run corporate interests. It is a disaster for
> anything but the most superficial notion of democracy--a
> democracy where, to paraphrase John Jay's maxim, those
> who own the world ought to govern it."[6]

Why two opposing currents play important role in shap-
ing the global world. Again, McChesney gives the answer:

> Global conglomerates can at times have a progressive im-
> pact on culture, especially when they enter nations that had
> been tightly controlled by corrupt crony media systems (as
> in much of Latin America) or nations that had significant
> state censorship over media (as in parts of Asia). The
> global commercial-media system is radical in that it will
> respect no tradition or custom, on balance, if it stands in the
> way of profits. But ultimately it is politically conservative,
> because the media giants are significant beneficiaries of the
> current social structure around the world, and any upheaval
> in property or social relations—particularly to the extent
> that it reduces the power of business—is not in their inter-
> est.[7]

In short, we are living in a very puzzling world and
evolving to a more mystical level and incomprehensibility,

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[6] Robert W. McChesney, "The Global Media Giants: We are the World," 1999.
[7] Robert W. McChesney, "The New Global Media: It's a Small World of Big
Conglomerates", *The Nation Magazine*, November 29, 1999.

when we realize overwhelmingly hegemonic structures live side by side with the local independent rival forces. This is what Arif Dirlik describes as the "global modernity."

The Turkish Media: Background

The dynamic and yet rival and unsettled global scene is everywhere as it is in Turkey: After the Reaganomics and Thatcherism of 1980s, the 1990s marked the beginning of cultural globalization in Turkey with the establishment of private electro-magnetic media for the first time. The public broadcasting system which was founded in 1964, dismantled in 1990 and now, 16 private television channels are broadcasting national. Star-1, the first private television channel in Turkey, started broadcasting from abroad in 1990 and later, with the name of Inter-star. A total of 244 private TV networks, of which 15 are regional and 229 are local, have applied for licenses in the country in 1995. A total of 1,180 radio stations, of which 36 broadcasting at national, 108 at regional and 1,036 at local are broadcasting. Private television and radio stations and television channels finance themselves. Their only income sources are advertisements. But to put it more accurately, most of them operate as side business of big conglomerates of different sectors, as political influencers.

The annual average number of circulation of the 20 newspapers distributed at the national level is around 3 million. National press utilizes the highest technology available in the world. According to the polls, "the habit of reading newspapers in total population is 66 percent."

Local (Anadolu) Press Association reports that around 3,500 periodicals, half of them weekly, are published in Turkey. The average daily circulation of local newspapers varies

between 700 and 10,000. According to the same report, "local newspapers play an important role to provide for disseminating vital information, for local politics but the effect is minimal. The local press has been trying to renew itself technologically in recent years. Many local newspapers, which follow the national press in utilizing modern technology, have started to use state of art printing techniques."

The number of magazines on various subjects has increased in recent years. The total number of magazines which was 20 in 1990, reached 100 in 1999. The total circulation of the magazines, which are generally published weekly or monthly, is around 2,300,000. But in recent years it dropped drastically. The activities conducted on income sources based on advertisement revenues and sales in Turkey have shown that the annual average net circulation (not net sales) of the written press is around 500 million US dollars from sales alone.

With this environment, Turkey has experienced a reluctant appeal for foreign investment in the media sector for a long time due to the legislative uncertainties. CNN and NBC have had partnerships but the main trust has come from FOX. Recently, FOX has entered the scene and managed to become the fourth network in television for a short period of launching. Some domestic investors and companies in media started to have foreign partners like Bertelsmann.

Consequently, for the next five years, it is very probable that Turkey is becoming an arena of foreign investors in the media sector.

Then the global cycle will be in working fully and integration to the world market information wise will bring about more dependency.

Now it is time to ask the vital question.

Is there o hope for independence?

A quick and current answer is no.

But technology, being an independent factor historically, can delineate the future prospects.

Internet, multi-media, "face-book" and "you-tube" type practices can be used as a means to widen the horizons of information dissemination otherwise have greater information gap among the peoples of the world.

Nevertheless, hope is not at hand readily. Hope must be organized and strived for with planned counter effects. Some new experiences should led light on the path such as Venezuela's media struggle. One of BBC's correspondents reports how this struggle is hard in the global fight over hegemony in Venezuela. I am including this lengthy report as a case-study to think about how the war on mainstream media or traditional media poses hard problems to solve:

> "Nowhere is the polarisation of Venezuelan society more apparent than in the frequent attacks on media workers, coupled with government threats to shut down independent TV and radio outlets.
>
> Watchdogs have criticised both the behaviour of the privately-owned sector and the president, Hugo Chavez, for his attitude towards them. Violent attacks against both the pro-government and opposition media have become commonplace across the country.
>
> They range from physical aggression towards individual journalists and camera crews to bomb attacks on stations and intimidation by groups of protesters on both sides. So far this year, the government has broadcast 39 of-

ficial transmissions on national television and radio, which shunt all scheduled programming off air while they run. This is a total of 40 hours of airtime in two months for the controversial leader, not counting the weekly TV and radio phone-in show, "Hello President".

But according to government estimates, during the recent general strike an average of 700 pro-strike advertisements were broadcast every day by the independent channels.

In February, the National Assembly granted initial approval for new broadcasting regulations. These measures have been designed - according to the government - to control propaganda without violating freedom of speech.

It seems unlikely that they will affect the state channel, Venezolana de Television, which most opposition supporters believe runs nothing but government propaganda.

Mr Chavez regularly cites Channel 8, as the station is also known, as a "paradigm" of the new Content Law, a rare example of a successful and balanced station.

Government sympathisers accuse the private media of leading the fight against the "Bolivarian Revolution" in the absence of a credible and united political opposition. They see the hand of powerful media moguls behind the short-lived coup on 11 April 2002.

When Mr Chavez was returned to power by popular demand just days later, the subsequent news blackout on the independent channels was put down to safety concerns for reporters on the streets, but Chavez supporters are not convinced. Throughout this historic day the channels ran nothing but cartoons and Hollywood movies.

The opposition now say the new broadcast legislation - which they have nicknamed the "Gag Law" - is tanta-

mount to censorship. They have already held several marches in defence of press freedom.

The recent threats by Mr Chavez to shut down certain TV channels - based on alleged violations of broadcast regulations - have been condemned by a number of international non-governmental organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Reporters

Some of the president's proposals are undoubtedly a threat to freedom of the press, such as clauses regarding the respectful portrayal of government officials.

But many Venezuelans would welcome some sort of non-political controls on all sectors of the media industry to ensure greater impartiality and balance in reporting. The public have come to understand only too well the dangers of distortion.

During Mr Chavez's TV and radio phone-in on Sunday 22 February, the president used the slot to warn the international community - and Colombia, Spain and the United States in particular - to stop meddling in Venezuelan affairs.

The following day bombs went off at the Spanish and Colombian embassies, and the US embassy subsequently closed for 24 hours following security threats. The opposition claim that Mr Chavez's broadcast incited these attacks.

But the government blames the media for the eight-week general strike, which contributed to a 16.7% contraction of the economy in the final quarter of 2002, according to Central Bank figures. The oil sector shrank by nearly 26 per cent as thousands of workers walked off their jobs.

Mr Chavez now refers to the powerful media owners who promoted the strike as "the four horsemen of the apocalypse".

But months earlier, he had already written off the press for publishing "rubbish, just rubbish, lies, perversion, immoralities", after reading critical newspaper articles regarding the state of the Bolivarian schools programme.

At a meeting in Washington in January the foreign minister, Roy Chaderton, complained that the media are immune from the electoral process.

"In Venezuela, you can disagree with the military, religious leaders, intellectuals and politicians, but never dare to challenge the holders of media concessions."

Venezuela's independent TV channels are owned and directed by several high-profile businessmen, including: Gustavo Cisneros (Venevision); Marcel Granier (Radio Caracas Television);

Alberto Federico Ravell (Globovision 24-hour satellite news channel); Mr Cisneros, owner of Venevision and head of numerous joint ventures with multinationals such as Coca-Cola, has been dubbed the Rupert Murdoch of Latin America. Mr Chavez regularly singles him out as a "coup-plotter" and a "fascist".

Marcel Granier of RCTV also speaks out against the Chavez regime. During the strike he told Union Radio that when Mr Chavez first came to power, many of the independent channels favoured him.

But "little by little", Mr Granier explained, "anti-democratic actions, actions violating the rule of law, attacks on journalists and attacks against the media have created the current situation in which the majority, not all, of the Venezuelan media are very concerned by the systematic and repeated violation of human rights". [8]

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[8] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2827273.stm . See also JUSTIN DELACOUR's article on Venezuela: http://www.counterpunch.org/delacour07032004.html

The scene in Venezuela provides a vital starting point on how global actors play important role over the media hegemony and rival forces to global actors play sacrificing war to become independent.

In Turkey, it is very hard for envisaging such a prospect but the scene is very alike but the solutions and the type of struggle is very different. This shows us, all kinds of different social formations must strive for their own peculiar ways of becoming independent from the media conglomerates.

As we are living in media paradoxes, human paradoxes always create solutions paradoxically, in Turkey or any where else.

Is Journalism Still On The Agenda?
Following the media's make-up in the epoch of globalization

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It is possible to admit that the process of globalization and new information technologies produced by newsmakers along with convergence of ideas and opinions cannot but put on agenda a question about the media role in social and political practices. The priority and very important question in this regard is whether journalism changes under these conditions or continues to exist and prosper?

In the all-Russian yearly press festival taking place in Sochi in 2005 one of the then delegates noted that today only four percents of the whole media stuff can be referred to real, professional journalism. A certain intrigue is that nobody calculated a certain figure; the data for investigation was not known either. However an obvious social problem now is to understand if journalism indeed is «pushed out» from the mass medial.

The term "journalism" itself looks very uncertain, to some extent because of different positions of participants. The western countries and the USA in particular confess that the very term is very much overlapped with the idea of public journalism. By public one means that everybody can participate in creature of stuff and its distribution around the entire Internet Globe. This sort of activity nowadays can be viewed

everywhere in the world. Sparing at the definition «civil» or «public» regarding the media we undoubtedly switch to blog-gerskaya journalism. It concerns ability for a man to operate with information data according to his own imagination and to make up even separate web-sites on his/her own.

Nonetheless, the problem of distinguishing journalism from different media practices becomes more urgent. This does not seem to be only an academic task to figure out the issue but a practical one because a huge number of people are involved in media business including all those working for editorial staff (journalists, analysts, etc.) and others such as students of journalism faculties and political technologists.

Exact clarification of journalistic standards is still not a resolved issue which makes editorial obligations as being a very serious testament in many ways. The core of the problem is how to provide the profession with public consciousness and trust which give both to definitions of journalism as a «fourth estate», «basis of democracy», and «an element of civil society».

Therefore, one of pivotal needs for teachers of professional journalistic subjects gets straight to the terminology revision. In the meantime, neither words nor terms are of great importance but a practical experience and practice, under which they reflect, express, summarize professional realities.

Americans Bill Kovach and Tom Rozenstil, caused anxiety in academic community while splitting up journalism from media communications such as PR and advertising. At the same time they tried to investigate the very essence of journalism resulted in nine principles of journalism to be put on agenda:

1. The first obligation of journalism is telling truth.

2. The most important ally of journalism are citizens themselves to whom it serves.

3. The core of journalism is careful verification of facts.

4. Journalists must be independent from those whose activity they cover.

5. Journalism must come forward as an independent observer of power.

6. Journalism must become a debatable ground for public criticism and achievement of compromise.

7. Journalism must try to act as important, interesting and meaningful.

8. News must be clear and proportionate.

9. Journalists have a right to operate according to their conscience.

One more way of professional reflection was suggested by the Finnish graduate student Tina Laytila. She exposed to the analysis 31 national professional codes accepted by associations of journalists in European countries. According to her conclusions, the codes regard responsibility of journalists more vital then a public priority and the right for journalists to search information. In the meantime all three are pivotal to guarantee newsmen to work properly and successfully. Therefore, a professional standard in the field of journalism create a conditional "all-European code". The conditional content of the latter would be looking as follows:

1. Freedom to pass on information to the audience is beyond any limits.

2. Freedom of expression and a necessity to defend these rights.

3. Journalistic equality which implies a strict limit of discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic prejudices such as religious, sexual, social, professional, physical or some others.

4. Honesty while gathering information.

5. Respectability to sources of information, copyright and quotation.

6. Independence and right to resist whatever pressures and the right to follow a personal conscience.

While preparing the abstracts for the basic studying course «Introduction to journalism» first-year students of the journalism faculty at the Ural State University regularly interview more than thousand people including journalists, editors and media managers. Questioned about priorities of contemporary journalism the interviewed people in the Urals see the role of the profession similar to what American and Finnish researchers demonstrate.

True, there are some additional points. These interviews being prepared for not publication (about it sources were beforehand warned) display one more thing. The interviewed people speaking out to students, who investigate the situation, sometimes suffer from didactics and are eager to insistently teach the profession. Therefore, it goes without saying that this affects the very essence of high journalistic values being expressed. Moreover some respondents seem to be very certain about the role which is played by journalists. They consider the idea of freedom being strongly correlated with political and economic positions of the media in a way of sacrificing the former in favor of the latter. One of the most popular opin-

ions is that journalists must tell a true, but correlate it with our circumstances.

It is not surprising that, according to many sources including Union of Journalists in Russia the profession itself become more corrupted, and in practice turns down ethical standards. It is being fairly claimed that some clauses fixed in the 1991 Russian Media Law and other professional standards are being regularly under the threat. Among those are

1) Information about an event can be based on personal involvement of a journalist into the case;

2) A report about a separate fact not to be viewed by a journalist can not be based on a «source, wishing to remain unknown»;

3) Any interview, including as a fragment of more wide text, must be arranged with the person being interviewed;

4) Journalistic investigation can not be based on the only information source;

5) Stuff should include opposite views;

6) Politicians, businessmen and other persons, who are objected for criticism, must be notified beforehand about preparation of publication, if it does not jeopardize the appearance of publication.

A media text, following a mathematical language, functions on the basis of certain number subjects. In other words, a media product (as it is called by managers) is resulted in actualization (expression, analysis, realization and cooperation of interests. An obvious question is which interests. There are many of them including those stemming from priorities of

1) founder-owner;

2) medium of communication as enterprise, carrying on business;

3) advertiser and sponsor;

4) state structures, political organizations, public associations;

5) participants doing editorial management;

6) professional corporations;

7) members of audience;

8) journalists.

Everybody mentioned in the above list can benefit for a journalistic work. Arrogance and intolerance to any subject mentioned here can lead to professional failures and non-objectivity of information. Disturbance of interests of, at least, one of them may hinder expected results.

Contemporary media practice, nonetheless, confirm that there exists many circumstances that affect objectivity of information and the balance of interests.

The 152th article of Civil Code of Russian Federation titled «Defense of honor, dignity and business reputation» specifies likeness of violation of balance between the media interests and the interests of citizens being touched by journalists.

It is worth alluring to one more examples. According to an anonymous source, the jailers of the military base in Guantanamo who were humiliating the captive Muslims threw off the Koran into the toilet. This caused anxieties in a number of countries and brought some people to death. The formal refusal of the American weekly "Newsweek" from publication telling about violations of rights of prisoners puts on agenda

the question about the right of freedom for edition and the idea of national safety for the USA.

Appearance of alternative media in Internet in the forms of blogs, personal sites, forums are going to be resulted in censorship of traditional mass media which are limited with freedom. The press now often legs behind the necessities of the day and therefore becomes not very productive. Moreover, it does not guarantee equal rights for everybody to speak out their viewpoints on different occurrences on the basis of political and economic reasons affecting the press nowadays.

Therefore, in order to define the notion of journalism as the field activity relating to collection, processing and distribution of information, it would be necessary to add an important item: public interest. Information presents public interest if its distribution can entail substantial consequences for the audience of a magazine, a TV channel, a wireless station, etc. and if somebody is able to harm or to promote prosperity, welfare, safety of majority of the audience.

Any doctor has an ultimate goal: to cure. A pivotal task for an engineer is building up and controlling over the schemes of objects. An advertiser, in turn, is aimed to sell goods. As for a PR-man it is conducting of a client's behavior or lobbying of a necessary decision. What journalists have in mind? This is the process of informing so that people could accept independent decisions.

The tendency taking place in the last few years confirms that modern newspapers are involved in battling for the readership and position themselves, to very extent, as useful for everyday life. Therefore, outlets try to look as much as practical and stimulate the audience's interests by many ways giving daily advices and recommendations (the «Kremlin diet» from

the nationally circulated youth newspaper «Komsomolskaya Pravda» is a brilliant example of such kind).

To be only "serviceable" for the media makes their position pretty strange and far from being of high-quality. This stimulates competition but at the same time destroys the professional standards of journalism.

Quite the opposite, the interests and necessities, of public reading, listening and TV-watching can be based on human rights. The public interest makes the concept of news-making visual under which certain interests and necessities become common for a considerable part of the audience. Following this, they might become the background for attention of journalists. Their appearance and actualization take a place in the moment of substantial changes of population. While explaining the priorities of social development these interests can become the instrument for defending people from the fruits of globalizations mainly aimed on pragmatism.

Impact of global ICT discourse on Turkey

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I will start with the argument that an independent media is possible in a global world order. This argument generally involves the possibilities offered by new technologies. It is generally believed that new communication technologies bring new possibilities for an alternative media regime. Furthermore, this discourse is extended to promote the technology as a remedy for the harmful consequences which are inevitably brought by the globalization process. Therefore globalization ideologists usually put technology as the key concept to their arguments for globalization. For instance famous globalism proponent Sachs (1999) acknowledges information technology revolution as one of the primary factor for globalization. Levitt (1983) who is usually credited to coin the term globalization also put technology to the center of his globalization analyses. Borrowing Boorstin's "Republic of Technology" terminology without hesitation, Levitt claims that technology and globalization are two inseparable vectors which shape the world.

On the other hand, four international organizations, namely World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are proactively producing and globally spreading the technology discourse in general and ICT discourse in particular. The content of the documents

produced by these organizations is mostly pro-ICT. They claim that further ICT investment and/or spending means better economic and social progress. One may also add UNESCO to these four organizations for its recent pro-ICT approaches. It is obvious that UNESCO too has shifted its position from MacBride Report of late 1970's NWICO debate to 2000's new fashioned "Information for All" program which is giving more emphasis on the technology not the content. Padovani (2005) notes that the approaches of MacBride Report is substantially different than those of World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) in 20003, *Building the Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium.* The first report emphasized the mass media and information flows while the second document accentuated the importance of the new media and information technology. Therefore, especially with the neo-liberal wind the ICT discourse has become an undisputed and sacred one and even a number of anti-globalists naively adopted ICT friendly approaches for their counter globalization arguments.

Here I will argue that the ICT discourse as disseminated by global powers has several aspects for which the developing countries should take care. To this end, I will try to provide some evidence from the political economy of Turkish ICT experience which is usually encouraged and named as one of the best practices by global institutions. For instance a 2002 report which emphasized how ICT could "revolutionize" economic development worldwide, stated Turkey for Network Readiness Index (NRI) as the 41st on a list of 75 countries, well above Mexico (44th), Russian Federation (61st) and even Chine (64th) (Kirkman *et.all.*, 2002). Rapid increase in Turkey's ICT in-

vestments especially during Ozal[1] period in 1980's had been promoted as an excellent success story in compliance with the neo-liberal global policies of his counterparts Regan and Thatcher.

Today, Turkey is generally acknowledged as a success-fully developed country in terms of ICT parameters. Turkey's total information and communication technology expenditures share in gross national product (GNP) has increased from 1.6 % in 1995 to 3.6 % in 2001 (World Bank, 2002) and to 7.9 % in 2005 (World Bank, 2006). The average ICT share in GNP for Europe is 5.5 %. World Bank, naturally applauses such higher ICT shares in GNP as a keen supporter of higher ICT investments. Another successful indicator is the share of ICT spending in total household spending. Share of ICT spending in total household spending has substantially increased from 1.8 % in 1994 to 4.5 % in 2002 (Yükseler, 2003, p. 11). Fi-nally, ICT market growth rate of Turkey is remarkably above the World average. ICT market growth rate is more than 15 % annually while it is approximately 3.6 % in Europe and 4.6 % in the world (EITO 2006). Turkey's total ICT spending is ex-pected to reach to 32 billion USD in 2006 (Korea-EU Interna-tional Cooperation Center, 2007).

I hereby propose that a non-western perspective is needed here to asses this so-called success is well applauded by west-ern institutions. I must admit that the non-western perspective I employ here is somewhat non-capitalist. Off course I am not here at the position of paralleling non-western perspective with non-capitalistic perspective. This argument is far beyond this paper's scope. However, keeping in mind that capitalism

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[1] Before becoming the prime minister in 1983 and president in 1989, T. Ozal, as prime minis-try undersecretary in late 1970's, was the actual designer of the neo-liberal policies known as the "24th January Decisions".

is basically a western invention, it sounds evidently logical that a non-western perspective requires being non-capitalist as well. Nevertheless I simply abandon this argument and turn my focus into Turkey's ICT success. This western approved success of Turkey obviously brings its costs. Therefore the right question is "what are the costs did Turkey bear due to this ICT success?"

We can summarize the costs due to this success in two groups. 1. Turkish budget deficit increased. 2. Wages of Turkish workers decreased. ICT spending of Turkey is one of the most important items in its budget deficit. Total ICT imports of Turkey was more than 10,8 billion USD in 2005. That year total ICT exports were less than half of the ICT imports, 4,4 billion USD. That was a deficit more than 5 billion USD. Total trade deficit of Turkey was more than 40 billion USD in 2005 and is expected to reach over 60 billion USD for 2006. This means that ICT sector is an important trade deficit item. More you export on ICT more trade deficit you have. Components (active and passive electronic parts) sub-sector of ICT seems to be more responsible this deficit. In 2005, only 130 million USD exports of components was realized while the imports exceeded 2,3 billion USD that year. Consumer electronic sub-sector however seems to have better deficit figure; 3 billion exports and 1 billion imports. Most of the consumer electronic exports are on colour TV sets mostly to EU. These figures tell the story: in order to export to EU you, need imports from Far East, mainly from PRC. This is the reason of the trade deficit on ICT. Then what happens in Turkey? It is the cheap labour to make this troubled business to continue. Components from Far East are imported to Turkey where they are assembled by Turkish cheap labour, and finally exported to the West. This process needs cheap labour and we note that for 1997-2005

period, the real wages in the manufacturing of radio and television equipments has decreased nominally by 6.6 %; and this was the worst decline ever witnessed in manufacturing industry wages in Turkey (Yükseler and Türkan, 2006, p. 45). Real wages were worse in that period: real wage index (1997=100) in private sector radio and television manufacturing is 56.6 in 2005 (TUİK, 2006).

The acute need for cheap labor also gives way to informal/illegal/unregistered employment in the sector. In a highly concentrated consumer electronics sector, informal/illegal/unregistered is expected to be around 22 % of legal work force (Güloğlu, 2006, p. 29). Therefore, the cost of high ICT expenditure is as follows: increase in the foreign debts and decrease in labor earnings. The more Turkey exports consumer electronics to the West the less the Turkish worker earns. One may even argue that the EU consumers' capability to buy cheap TV sets is derived from Turkish cheap labor. Additionally it contributes to the widening of the informal/illegal/unregistered employment and distorts the labor regime. We can conclude that development discourses emitted from western institutions may be ill-fated in non-western geographies. Those institutions prominently support western values and norms which may not necessarily be good for the people living in non-western geographies. For instance, software piracy is strongly condemned by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as well as other four Western intuitions which are mentioned above. However, for the people not living in the West it may be arguable to put barriers to their right to learn from the contents (software or others) which are basically produced after a long term intellectual accumulation by all human beings. Himanen (2001) points out

the strong contradiction in hiding the knowledge to the others while accepting all the knowledge from them. How then the children in non-Western geographies will learn computer programming if all programming routines and tools are appropriated by Westerners? Therefore a commonly approved Western position may arguably be false for the people of non-Western geographies. In general we can say that ICT is one of the best areas of interest for the communication scholars to explore new possibilities of non-Western perspectives. The danger in that exploration is that even most non-western geographies are by far occupied by Western ICT formulas. Nevertheless a profound critique of Western ICT assumptions and proposals will yield good possibilities for a new ICT order.

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Cultural Resources of Russian Identity: A Non- Western Way

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Introduction

This paper considers one of the main problems for modern Russia dealing with shaping of Russian identity in the conditions of globalization. Globalization leads to permanent encounters of each individual with norms and values unknown and alien to him. Everyone is frequently in contact with representatives of other cultures. A person who is prepared for these circumstances is one who is tolerant towards the cultural and social differences that these situations imply. He\ she does not try to evaluate other cultures and tries to cooperate and use theirs best ideas.

Cultural and economic development of different countries is closely connected. And each country in every moment can theoretically move to another phase of development. The point is that nations begin to live in a new space. They loose their old conception of form and borders, and the term "nations" changes its meaning. People speak French, English, German and other languages spread out over the world and live in different countries. The international relationship of the state soon would depend on the ability of its citizens to meet the demands that are articulated by globalization. So when we ask whether Russians can satisfy the demands of globalization

whether the population of the country accepts traits, values and orientations of the globalization.

At the same time one of the main paradoxes of globalization is the crisis of identity. The deep crisis of identity in Russian society   occurs in modern Russia. There are two reasons of it. One of them is the process of globalization; another reason is the collapps of the Soviet Union. In these conditions the social   model behavior of individuals and social groups as well as a traditional culture destroy. How can Russians identify themselves? What   type of culture can develop in modern Russia? Should Russia be a part of the East or the West? All these questions are discussed by Russian scholars, thinkers, politicians. All these questions have practical   political consequences. I think that the analyses of these problems can make contribution to the study of   Russian identity as well as the question of the integration Russia to West or   East. I dare say that this problem has deep roots in our science. Let's remember about the discussion between slavophils and westerns in the middle of the X1X- th century (1). In the middle of the XX-th century Russian people became identify themselves with the "soviet people". It was proclaimed that this problem was solved.

The collapse of the Soviet Union with its communist ideology in he 90-th of the XX-th century led to an ideological vacuum, cultural and political pluralism, to the lost of identity of Russian people, to the development of common opinion. In my paper I pay attention to the question dealing with the crisis of identity in contemporary Russia. To my mind, there are some criteria of breakdown identity.

They are: social, political, cultural, regional, national. I try to see them in my paper.

Theorizing Identity

There are a number of main strands within the XX-th century theorizing identity: sociology, psychoanalytic theories, the poststructuralist cultural strand and also theories devoted to the discussion "modernity –late modernity-post-modernity". A concern about identity is far from being something new. Identity is present in the famous "Know Yourself" precept, inscribed on the frontispiece of the Delphi Temple. Identity is also goals of many of the famous Socratic questions and Plato's dialogues. The Enlightenment philosophical tradition shows identity to be essential, unitary, fixed and unchanging. However, at the and of the twentieth   century and in the beginning of the twenty first century an interest in research of identity has grown as there is recognition that individuals have a cluster of identities and these are the subject to change. It should not be forgotten about significant history of interests in identity issue within sociology, particularly within tradition of symbolic interactionism, work of J. Mead and E.Goffman. (2) A.Giddens argues that "In post modernity people are reflexing about what constitutes the self" (3).

E. Ericson   draws attention to the process of shaping identity. He points out that the main factors of shaping identity are cultural ones. They are cultural characteristics of the community (religion, ideology, rituals, norms and values of culture) (4).

The concern of identity is a social characteristic of a social community. This has common values, social roles, attitudes, and actually identity provides the solidarity for a social group and its ability to become a subject for social action (5).

From a sociological approach, if the sense of collective identity is weak, or "washed-out", the social group can still be rec-

ognized by others. It can be seen as "reflecting a multiply set of characteristics, as: common features, which are picked out by outward observer, even if these people do not realize that they have his feature" (6).

In the concept of "social construction of the reality" of P. Berger and T. Lukman we see the idea that shaping of identity "is impossible without interaction between persons and society, without synthesis of values and retuals of society. As the result of these interactions, the ties between a person and its community forms" (7).

In contemporary sociology a sense of identity for an individual, means the process of recognizing an emotional state and other similarities with another person, group or community. This is achieved through cultural socialization and socially valued experiences. Within sociology, a sense of identity grows through the mechanism of socialization. This provides the sameness for individuals with a real or imaginary person, group and /or humanity. Social roles are adopted and social standards of behavior, and an activesubjective relation to the social system (8).

Thus, identity is a mechanism of socialization and can be represented as personal, social, national, regional, and cultural. The main agents of mechanism of socialization: mass-media, ideology, family, system of education and so on. In personal identity the name of individual plays very important role. Through personal identity person marks someone as unique and significant. Social identity is identity, which is shared with others (family, group and society).

In Parson's general theory of action, social identity is defined as a "subsystem of personality and assigned a major role

in determining a person's participation in the social system". (9).

Cultural identity is one of the types of collective identity. How can we define it?

Russian scientist L. Ionin defines it as "perceptions of a person\or a community which determine its acceptions of norms and values of concrete culture". On the one hand, cultural identity can be considered as the mean of unification of culture and on the other hand, it can be considered as the mean of making distance between own culture and another culture, which can help shaping the model of socio-cultural interaction" (10).

Social Cleavages and Russian Identity

Social identity (cleavages) occurs in all societies. People every where define themselves, or are defined by society, as belonging to certain groups and not belonging to others. We are all familiar with and speak of a Russian social model, even if it has undergone substantial transformations. As we know the social state contributes inter alia to strengthening of social consensus. Social consensus demands the process of constructing a concrete type of society. For example, in contemporary Europe and USA there is being formed a social structure made up of a huge middle class, a more or less detached elite class and an underclass. 60-80% of the population in both sides of the Atlantic (in Europe and in USA) is supposed to belong to the middle class. For even, Mediterranean countries which 15 years ago maintained a sizeable agricultural sector as well as a clearly defined working class now exhibit characteristics of a typical middle class society. In modern Russia so-

cial structure rapidly changes. In the Soviet union social structure consisted of two classes (working class and peasantry) and one stratum – intellectuals. In now days, the social structure is quite different. The new social structure is not legal and not reflected in individual's consciousness. Many people define themselves as marginalis. Representatives of all classes and strata have different values and norms of social behavior and culture. People in one social grouping will differ radically from those in another. Think, for instance, of differences between those on welfare and well-to-do, between well-educated and marginalis, even between men and women. If these different subgroups within broader culture act and think differently in many ways, it should not surprise us that they also act and think differently on political matters thanks to their different political culture.   The typical middle class in modern Russia consists of 20% of the population.(11). It's just the opposite to the social structures of Europe and USA.

Since groups of people differ from each other on key values any action by any group to support its values will inevitably produce a counteraction by other groups who think differently. The resulting conflict between these groups produces different political identity which occurs in contemporary Russia.

Cultural Resources and Political Identity

Political identity of different social groups is a new phenomenon for Russia. Few years ago all soviet people identified themselves with communist ideology, because only one party (communist party) existed at that time. Mass-media, ideology has been shaping this identity for a long time. Today some social groups such as pensionees, eldest people, poor

people, and lower strata of the population of the villages are oriented towards traditional system of values and norms, towards traditional political attitudes. To be more exact, they support communist ideology and identified with it. They are the subjects of traditional totalitarian political culture. According to our survey conducted in the middle Ural   20% of the population of this region identified them with this ideology.

More advanced part of the population of Russia such as intellectuals, the part of previous elite (rulling class), the population of big cities and megapolices, youth are socially oriented people. They are oriented towards market economy and civilized West. They are the subjects of democratic political culture which is developing in Russia today and they identify themselves with liberal, democratic ideologies. In according to our survey 45% of respondents are the subjects of a new political culture which develops in modern Russia. It's a pity, that more than 30% of the population of Russia can't identify themselves. As the rule, they don't give their votes during elections, most of them do not believe parties 'leaders and don't like the political course of the country. So we can see two different type of political culture in contemporary Russia. It's no exaggeration to say that East and West have been political and cultural symbols of Russian culture for centuries and have served as reference points for Russians in their search of cultural and political identity. They continue to play this role now. No doubt, that political culture in Russia has been totalitarian for centuries. In todays conditions two political culture exist and oppose to each other. It's very difficult for Russia to integrate to West or East as well as to shape its political identity.

Mass Culture and Cultural Identity

Culture rapidly changes in modern Russia. Now we can see some tendencies of changing culture they are: a) as we know, culture is paradoxically both visible and most problematic of forces for societal integration. It's most visible because the modern nation-state self-consciously uses language, policy, formal education, collective retuals, values and mass-media to integrate citizens and ensure their loyalty. State-building elites and officials have self-consciously used culture as an instrument of cultural and national integration. The former Soviet Union and so called "soviet culture" are good example of it. In the Soviet Union there was a strong national myth of soviet culture or standard national culture. Our ideology and mass media as the main agents of socialization of a person told us that russian culture is the best culture in the world, that we were the most "educated people' in the world and so on. The soviet people believed such myths. Let us think. Can anybody say that one culture is better than other? I'm sure, nobody can do it. 15 years ago the Soviet Union disappeared and the myth of the "united soviet culture'" disappeared too. Today Russian culture can't integrate society on the base of common values and norms.

Secondly, market of culture rapidly developes in contemporary Russia. It's a new phenomenon for our culture. As the result our culture became an "opened culture" for West and East, the term "mass" revealed a fundamental aspect of contemporary russian culture. The development of new forms of mass communication and "opened russian culture" raised many problems. On the one hand, television, computer, Internet, moving pictures all allowed for passive consumption of mass produced culture. On the second hand, all of them are re-

sponsible for the process of westernization of Russian culture, to be more exact for the process of americanization of our culture. Common culture patterns are being created too in many spheres. As one tries the "menu" of satellite TV, once notice that the language may often remain national, but the shows look like clothes "made in China". It's as if they took advice from somewhere to adopt a standard low cost model. The shows are made up of well built bodies, but at the same time of "cheap raw material" with ready made decors and scripts. According to our survey about 70-75% of moving pictures are American one. Most of them are poor quality. Now we see the process of americanization of Russian language. In the transition countries (if some of them is already formal Soviet union) therefore this culture is strongly promoted by mass-media. It comes to each person across the globalized emblems such as Mac, the MTV and the Coca-cola, casual dressing, shows. This is maybe the prototype of the forming "middle class" society that in reality will have a concrete type of governance including flexible labour relations, increase of stock exchange transactions and other institutions that encourage social mobility and widening of economic equalities. Society which at the same time is preparing for environmental concerns and voluntary organisations, where there will be channeled politial activism for those so wishing.

Besides, at time of "expansion", as those the new Russia finds itself, it's almost inevitable that common cultural patterns take priority over individual or national cultural originality.

Thirdly, common values of soviet culture rapidly changes. The main values such as collectivism, paternalism and absence of personality have disapeared. Now the most of

the young people of modern Russia (80%) support another values such as success, freedom, individualism, practicism and so on. Most of the old people (80%) support the values and norms of previous soviet culture. Most of people from the age of 30-45 years old support the values and norms of modern culture. No doubt, that the most of values of modern Russian culture are the same as the values of European or American culture. But I can point out that these values have not deep roots in Russian culture. The value of soviet culture was not formed by communist ideology. They had been formed by Russian Tzars and by our religion many centuries ago. This is related with a thick cultural identity definition based on the belief that Russian community is based on ethnic ties, a common culture or shared fundumental norms that shape the collective identity of the population. The Russian culture before the revolution 1917 was especially based on Cristian culture. At that time Russia had been strong Empire and created unifying remarkable culture and "cultural dualism" which had been associated with large political entitles. After the Great October revolution ideology has changed religion. Soviet culture continued to shape the same values of culture (collectivism, paternalism, absense of personal characteristics of culture and so on). But at that time it was supported by soviets ideology. We can points out that at that time ideology played the role of religion in the soviet society, to be more exact, it was erzats-religion in our society. Our survey showed the gap between old and young generation in modern Russia. This gap has deep civilisational roots. Young generation rejects values, norms, style of life mentality of the old generation.

National Relations and National Identity

National identity is a new phenomenon for Russia. Russia as well as the former USSR is a multinational state. In the Soviet Union people identified themselves with "soviet people". It was supported by the official communist ideology and mass-media. If you are, for example, Russian, Estonian or Ukrainian you called themselves "soviet people" or a citizen of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the collaps of the "soviet people". As the result the most people of different nationalities who live in modern Russia identify themselves within their nationalities, but not with their citizenship. Our survey shows that only 32,5 % of respondents identify themselves with the citizens of Russia. More then 60% of our respondents identify themselves with their nationalities. They mentioned that they don't see reasons for identify themselves with Russians. Many of them points out that they didn't like their country and if they have a chance they leave it for any western country or for USA.

Meanwhile, national identity characterized by definite dynamism transforms under the influence of different psychological factors. Considerable growth of national components in Russian identity structure, orientation for one's national identity may result in hyperbolization of nationality. Let us consider the example of Caucasian region. Caucasian culture is static comparativly with a dynamic Russian or European cultures. However, times goes by and worlwide changes cause a need for constructive social innovations, which often contradict with historical norms and mechanisms of social regulation. As the result, it is more complicated that ever to preseve a unique socio-cultural situation determined in many respects by traditional socio-cultural environment within a globolized

world. Islam is one of value –symbolic complexes which is very important for understanding a contemporary situation in the Caucasus. It is a resource which influences modernization of the Caucasus not only in socio-cultural, but also in a geopolitical space of the Russian Federation. Ethnoces, subjects of these cultures, in the sphere of national relations consider national community to be the whole, wthout underlying title ethnoces as independent objects of research. But modernization of the social system and its components urgently demands another approch for solving the problem of international relations and for shaping national identity. Ethnoces must be considered to be a special socio-cultural world entering in interaction both with its diaspora communities in all Russia space and with living on its territory other ethnic groups.

However, transformation of national identity may result in its leveling national indifference. Extreme forms of shifts in national identity are equaly dangerous for the whole system of international relations since they determine different behavioral strategies in international relations. In the changing Russian society national identity turned out to be most actual and available form of the group consolidation in the context of social instability. Thus, we can say that at present the autonomous republic (Adygei, Bashkortastan, Ossetia,   Tatarstan, Dagestan and others) are going through various processes of national/ethnic self-consciousness and national identity formation. The striving for self-isolation is understandable in the context of the current ethnopolitical processes that have taking place almost in all former USSR autonomies. At the same time the choice of a concrete strategy in building contacts with representatives of other ethnic groups and nationalities depends on many factors.   Mass-media has to play one of the main roles in solving this question.

Regional Cleavege and Regional Identity

Thanks to breakdown of economic, cultural and social ties between regions in contemporary Russia the regional identity occurs. Now we can observe strong centeres such as Moscow, St. Petersburg (Leningrad), Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk) and weak provinceses such as South and Siberia. The qualities of life of the population of these regions are quite different. For example, the quality of life of the population of Moscow is higher then the quality of life of the population in Siberia or in the South of Russia. It reflected their political and cultural identities. We can mention one main aspect of regional identity. It's the gap between the quality of people's life in small towns and big cities, megapolicies and villages. The differences between their style and quality of life are quite different. In addition, they are recipients of different cultural values and norms. All these facts prevent shaping of Russian identity as a whole. There is no such gap between regions in contemporary Europe or in USA.

Conclusion

Even since the times of Bismark, or on the eve of modernity in any event, central authorities have constantly tried to integrate regions, social groups into a new political entity through a common market and common political culture and to shape their identity. Democratic modernization in contemporary Russia is of course known to permit more political and cultural autonomy to component territories. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia. Democratic modernization, even when it gives priority to market building as well as infrastructure creation, is not known to neglect cultural rights. It points out that in the conditions of globalization Russian culture have

the right to develop it's your own culture and shapes its own identity.

From this point of view we should not be extremely troubled by "crisis of russian identity" formulas (even if there is really such). Russia should be following at that moment the middle line. It is also rich of great culture and intellect. Russia must combine borrowed ideas (for example, Atlantic market building instruments), with ideas of "old Europe "and its native, national ideas in order to create its unique culture and its identity. For politics, scientists are a pretext for talking and thinking.

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Western TV-Formats on Russian Soil

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Introduction

The paper deals with the processes taking place in Russian media since early 1990s. These processes are directly connected with the phenomenon of globalization with the effect of the more economically developed countries on the less developed ones. Russia has been mastering the experience of TV formatting and TV programming. US television (unlike French, for example) was basically developed as a commercial trend: that is why it was of much interest for those countries which began transition from the state broadcasting to a great variety of commercial programs, Russia being one of them. US TV industry having significant technical might provides the world not only its own ready-made product but working experience, managerial, popular formats as well; it also provides entertaining show models that further on are rooted in a definite national mentality quite differently. So what happens when western TV formats come to Russia? To what extent are we subjected to other mentality effect? Does any format correction (taking into account Russian mentality) take place? Are we aware of its necessity? Is it really effective? We will dwell mainly on entertaining programs.

Some points concerning American influence

The statement on American TV having overtaken average economical figures producing world-wide show patterns and having become the first in 'television abundance" phase is beyond any doubt. The number of satellite channels was impressive even in the early 1990s nothing to speak about the present! N. Golyadkin, a Russian TV researcher, observed in the middle of 1990s:

> "Nowadays US broadcast that many programs that it used to do during the whole week 20 years ago. An average American family TV choice exceeds 40-50 hours a week in front of TV screens yielding the amount of TV viewing only to Japanese" [1].

These figures do not contradict the ones brought by American scientists:

> "TV is switched on in an average American family more than 7 hours a day (over hours in the houses where cable and subscriber's TV is available), an average adult or a child watching TV 2-3 hours daily; a person spends more time (in his everyday activity) only on work and sleeping time...A child manages to spend over 2 years of his life before a television set up to 18 years of age" [2].

The paper deals with the processes taking place in Russian media since early 1990s. These processes are directly connected with the phenomenon of globalization, with the effect of the more economically developed countries on the less developed ones. Russia has been mastering the experience of TV formatting and TV programming. US television,(unlike French, for example) was basically developed as a commercial trend; that is why it was of much interest for those countries which began transition from the state broadcasting to a great

variety of commercial programs, Russia being one of them. US TV industry having significant technical might provides the world not only its own ready-made product but working experience, managerial skills, popular formats as well; it also provides entertaining show models that, further on, are rooted in a definite national mentality quite differently. So what happens when western TV formats come to Russia? To what extent are we subjected to other mentality influence? Does certain format correction (taking into account Russian mentality) take place?

Are we aware of its necessity? Is it really effective? We will dwell mainly on entertaining programs.

I'd like to share my personal impressions (August 2006) of American programs viewing and from observing average Americans spending much time before their home TV screens. They are mainly following 5-6 stations programs, local stations occupying the leading position. All sorts of play shows, sport competitions, talk shows, serials are broadcast there. There is also a specialized channel for weather forecast, sport program, commercials (adverts) broadcasting (the so-called "tele-shop"). Local realities dominate in news programs. Two or three accidents are covered daily – car crashes, assaults, etc. TV shows are quite balanced by style and manners but not by the content. Generally, TV viewing produces monotonous effect. Commercials impressed me positively: they were few; their sound was not amplified when interrupting a program. Besides, commercials are done professionally, they are bright and eye-catching. By the way I noticed few commercials that are being constantly rotated on Russian TV, but there were some familiar ones, though. Mention should also be made of a

peculiar feature in American commercials – namely humor. A number of researchers point out the effect of humorous nature on a person. American researchers G.Bryant and C.Thompson write:

> "One should recollect a number of funny commercials to understand commercial-makers believe in humor persuading power. The survey has revealed the fact that TV viewers enjoy humor; it reduces their sense of caution, makes them think and communicate positively" [3].

Though another American researcher R.Harris observes:

> "Some of the funniest and the most successful (as far as creative approach is concerned) commercials turned out to be difficult to sell; since humor dominated the advert message in them" [4].

We will discuss the place of humor on TV later on.

Thus much is being written about US global effect on the entire world of cinema and television determining the phenomenon by the notorious term –"American cultural imperialism". However the statement is being refuted by the everyday practice itself. First, Hollywood production itself does not possess any national character. Take, for example, world-known (including Russia) frankly cosmopolitan films about turtle-nindzya baby kids where characters with famous Italian names (Leonardo, Michaelangelo) act. Second, American researchers point out that USA, occupying the leading place in the sphere of export their own films and television programs (these being the second important US export goods), are not only the biggest video production manufacturer but a huge market for its demand as well.

Many US cable companies rebroadcast "Spanish International Network" programs. Americans buy Mexican "soaps" BBC and Granada TV companies programs. Third, TV empires stretch along language boarders not along geographical ones. Thus, former French colonies in Africa and French Canada buy programs in the French language. Americans ask for their exported programs dubbing directly to Paris. Fourth, the largest television production exporters (along with USA) are Brazil, Mexico, and Japan. Russia is energetically importing programs and formats not only from the USA but from the mentioned above countries as well. Russian TV audience enjoy Brazilian and Mexican "soaps", French and Italian feature films and entertaining programs, British feature films and newsreels, Japanese animated cartoons. Still Russia is borrowing US television programming model (from the two encouraged in the West: loyal (European) and competitive (American). the first is characterized by a great variety of programs, genres, complex broadcasting tables which explains the fact that commercials are not the subject of intense competition. In the American model the state and private sector compete for commercials, the number of genres is limited, broadcasting tables are simple and rigid. The number of channels in the USA does not testify the viewer's choice diversity. Unification, standardization, availability of the same type programs is evident.

The leading factor for the most popular broadcasting forms determination is rating. However one should mention that rating is not the only parameter for media and audience measuring, as many people think. There exist about 50 parameters. These are audience volume and coverage, time of TV –viewing, market share, and target index, co-efficient of

transition from channel to channel etc. One should take into account the number of these factors including the audience tastes and demands. But it is the rating that is paid most attention to. Why is it so? We have to clarify the notions. Rating is mostly understood as popularity level, a kind of mark, audience like-dislike; the answer to the question:"What is your favorite TV program?" However there is another rating type – the one that indicates the number of people watching the given program during the given period of time. People engaged in advertising are interested in this very rating type as it is audience range that is interesting for them not the degree of love to a program. It is that type of rating that is being chased for. It is quite predictable. Various factors effect it. The fist is broadcasting season. The second is broadcasting time (it is connected with the working schedule of the targeted audience). The third is the received channels number: the more the channels the more distributed the audience all over the channels is, the lower the rating of any program. And the forth, is audience genre preferences. It is at this very moment that the most popular formats appear both in Russia and abroad, including USA. Generally they are films, serials, information and entertainment.

S. Ilchenko, a St.Peterburg researcher writes:

> "The fight for audience leads to demonization of rating as a program profitability indicator. And this, in its turn, brings popularity not only to information segment but to entertaining programs as well" [5].

The most popular TV formats folk origin

Why do people seek entertainment? Entertainment is a person natural demand. It affects his psychology positively.

"Entertainment essence consists of a specific deviation from routine and involvement into new activity" [6], which cannot be possibly achieved in everyday activity. Entertainment is liberation from hierarchy that is very important for a person. The theory of play was created by a researcher studying culture Johan Huizinga from Netherlands who noted:

> "Homo ludens, a person playing, is performing the same important function as a person creating and he should occupy his place beside Homo faber" [7].

It means that labor does not cover all the sense of human life and only in combination with entertainment it forms two parts of an integrated process – mastering reality by a person. In the Soviet Union entertaining programs were often banned and were often estimated as beyond -the –line quality programs. Banning has been totally eliminated nowadays. Entertainment has flooded our screens. This is an understandable society reaction to all sorts of banning. However, TV is acting as a source of entertainment all over the world. Federico Fellini stated:

> "If you work on TV you should remember that you come to audience not the audience to; you intrude into the audience house may be at the moment people are chewing or whatever…and you have to amuse them or you are at a risk of losing your viewers" [8].

Entertaining media products are in the focus of scientific research since early 1960s in the West. C.R.Wright, an American scientist in 1960 called entertainment one of mass-media function. All kinds of plays and carnival appeared at the dawn

of civilization; these activities are now at the basis of actually all entertaining media projects. The first joke is considered to be the one when a medieval man stumbled and fell down and his neighbor laughed at him. Platon used to mention that failure and success of other people bring him pleasure pointing out that the kind of pleasure contradicts morals. Monten, a French philosopher called entertainment a way of relieving stress, improving unhappy life. Zigmund Freud, a XX century psychologist, developed the theory of wit and believed entertainment to relief human suffering. Entertainment as a kind of staged in the theatre activity is as old as civilization itself. According to Huizinga playing is even older than culture itself as animals play as well.

Thus the origin of the most popular cinema and TV genres, folklore is ancient. These roots actually justify their existence. Constant folk tastes references and folklore understanding (the so-called "fairy-tail approach to listening" and the so-called "puppet-show understanding of a performance) are at the basis of the genres. There traditional folk plots are reproduced, inner sequel mechanisms operate. As Neya Zorkaya, a Russian researcher writes:

> "Mass market production is a kind of basis, the so-called "cultural layer" of ancient traditional plots, "blocks" and "tropes" in folklore genres, some of them having old and ancient origin" [9].

"Drama was born on the square...Laughter, pity and horror are three essential strings of our imagination shattered by dramatic magic" [10], A. Pushkin, our national genius, thinking about the drama impact nature, having actually predicted three initial genres in the cinema, i.e. comedy, melodrama,

fairy play; though naturally he never thought of the coming cinema. All kinds of people irrespective of their education, age, sex and profession tend to them.

The same we observe on television. Reminiscences of folklore culture origin are reflected in "folk" show-games and drama sequels. Generally erosion of boarders between "mass" and "elite" production has become a distinguished feature of modern information community, featuring by aesthetic criteria mixing. Plot curiosity in "soaps" is built on a certain logic which might be called the logic of a myth. Mythological reality understanding is presently much wider spread among population than one could imagine. These are initial forms of collective world understanding existing in a conserved way. A Russian TV viewer has been brought up on the myths throughout 75 years of Soviet power.

Currently old myths are being exchanged into new ones. This repertoire is being filled, modernized and transformed. The more natural program folklore origin is, the more opportunity for success it has. The closer it is to our mentality, the more it impacts the audience. This mechanism forms the basis for both role-play and reality shows. Some western formats have not rooted, others have transformed under the influence of Russian mentality. Domestic folk entertaining programs formats were appearing. Life in Russia differed dramatically from TV show formats. Russian mentality features traditionally were: honesty, kindness, sensitivity, openheartedness, unselfishness, preference of spiritual values to monetary ones, not the desire to grasp the profit.

In different countries TV show-games ideas are transformed quite unusually under the influence of national tradi-

tions and social needs. Thus the program "In the Shadow of Koran" used to be popular in Saudi Arabia in which young men were awarded sums of money for Koran reciting. In Malaysia there was a program in which participants had to compose a poem on the given subject (usually socially significant – e.g. family planning).In the Soviet game-show " Come on, girls!" charismatic participants competed not only in answering difficult questions but also in vacuum-cleaning, cooking, etc. As if corresponding the folklore tradition to encourage "hardworking Cinderellas".

Formats themselves are being transformed. Researchers observe usual TV journalism genres convergence taking place in television world as well as the wide new synthetic TV broadcasting genres proliferation such as "infotainment" – informational entertainment, "politainment" – entertaining policy, "businesstainment" – business entertainment.

It refers us to the phenomenon which we have already touched upon in a number of articles, as TV syncres. By this we mean that television on the whole is a kind of "undivided entity which might be compared to the European medieval carnival in that sense as an outstanding Russian scientist M.Bakhtin described.

> "Carnival is not just looked at; it is being lived in; everybody lives in it, as it unites all the peoples by its origin. While carnival is on, everybody enjoys freedom, nothing else. Carnival has a universal feature; it is a very special world condition, its revival and renewal, everybody being related to it" [11].

One should remember the place television occupies in people's life and roles people play on both sides of the screen:

various reality-shows, talk-shows, interactive games, ceremonies etc. and many items will be clearer. M. Bakhtin called carnival the second people's life, based on laughter; he called it a festive life. And he explained festivity as the initial form of human culture derived not from practical conditions and not even from social labor aims and, moreover, not from a person's need in regular rest and relaxation. He meant spiritual essence of a festival, its everlasting presence, its opposition to an official holiday with its own official truth and existing official power. Everything taking place on a TV screen nowadays might be likened to an everyday festival; we have determined that by the term "infotainment", "politainment" and "businesstainment" above. It is an obvious fact the people need for a festival is always inexterminable.

What is the degree of national character, national spirit, liberating and reviving power of laughter that was so strong medieval carnival? Unfortunately its fraction on television turned out to be very little today. The reason is that carnival developed freely and spontaneously. We may speak about authentic democracy and realism on the screen only hypothetically. Real people participation is often added by additional "narration", fantasy (by it we mean a kind of fabrication or invention). It again confirms genres convergence in this case reality-shows and soap operas. The given processes are more acceptable in the West. Television is considered to be a kind of fantasy there. Cinema has always been "Daydreams Factory" for them. In Russia people tend to believe television, radio, and mass media generally. That is why first people just flooded the screen. Real people started taking part in the shows of the type declaring their own existence and their own personal problems. Participation in various show-games was

not only a way of competing and entertaining; it was a way of public self-expression, our contemporary's character traits personification, their personality demonstration on the screen. When broadcasting of the shows (with non-professionals; the so-called rank-and-file people) began, there were many participation forms. Such programs as "Come on, Girls!", "Come on Guys!", "What? Where? When?", "KVN", "People's Actor" was initially of this type, including the newest program "Minute of Fame". Let me draw your attention to the fact that the last program is determined in the broadcasting table not as a show but as a serial! Competitions, show-games have never been called like this in Russia; such title was applied to the western analogues of soap operas. It means festivals tend to become regular in this country having not a cyclical nature but a serial one. Now they are shows to be continued. By the way medieval carnival was the fest of time, maturity, transformations and renewal. It had the same periodical pattern as it has in serials and sequels with their seasonal changes. The TV observer O. Grigorenko considered the regularity of "the "What? Where? When?" program (intellectual casino) broadcasting a sort of approach almost pagan ritual winter and summer season games [12].

However much is being changed nowadays. More and more fiction and production elements are discovered in Russian reality-shows; invented stories develop before our eyes, false heroes or ritual pop-stars ritually take part in them – e.g.

"The Trial Time", "Two Stars", "Stars on Ice", "Circus with Stars" and that sort of stuff. We can hardly call these shows real only just by mere habit. State power and business are very much interested in further audience drifting away from reality.

Russian Popular TV Formats

We can conditionally divide show-programs formats existing in Russia into three groups at least. They are: borrowed, adapted and originals. The totally borrowed programs just cannot be rooted properly. Thus, the leading character in the program "The Last Hero" (Survivor" originally) initially turned out to be on the Russian television the "last villain", the program was accused of "artificial production". "The Weak Link" program together with its presenter knocked the audience down challenging social morals. "Behind the Glass" ("Big Brother" originally) and the "Windows" programs were accused of moral lack and negative life approach. Anyway there was nothing real and close to Russian mentality in this program.

The following programs as students' variety show, role-play capital-show, "intellectual casino", puppet-show, "news-show", folk tack-show looked differently. Not all of them were witty and original. They were also borrowed but much had been adapted and modified to our realities. The ready made formats were sometimes transformed beyond any recognition. Our mentality was against any copying. "KVN" program ("Merry and resourceful people club") is considered to be an absolutely Russian format. And by the way it was just a Soviet version of Czechoslovakian program "Guess, Guess, Guesser!" program. "The fortune wheel" became "The field of wonders" program which I understand as a peoples' program with two very important from Russian point of view items: presenting gifts and a desire to declare oneself for the "whole Universe". As far as the necessary item of folk fest i.e. humorous nature is concerned, our national tradition never tended

neither to naked entertainment, nor to Italian "lazzi" patterns. Along with the deep social sense, direct addressing to Russian reality the famous rule of classicism (the idea that everything should be funny in a comedy) was broken as often as not. There was no abstract cheerfulness which Ekatherine II preferred in the work of Russian satirists. The fun and bitterness mixture, that very "laughter against tears" which Gogol used to mention, was always there.

"The Puppets" Russian program which has become genuinely peoples' one, was borrowed in the West especially concerning its pattern. The common feature is only the fact that puppets play politicians. The program authors recollected: the moment "The Puppets" program was broadcasted it became a kind of revolutionary phenomenon. The secret of it lies in the fact that a puppet is a symbolical depiction of a person not identical to him. The puppet is only his image often quite independent even having some relations with him and hence a nice and safe way of telling the truth. More over: it was a new format of transmitting the truth. As compared to western programs each Russian one was a short film, discussing a certain political reality moment. There was no a strict division of characters into leading and secondary ones. Each character was bright and funny. "The Puppets" impressed images sharp definitions, maximum recognition. Our puppet characters were not that rational as the English and French counterparts, their actions were based on emotions. Laughter was the main of them. According to D.Likhachev and A.Panchenko makes the world more stupid, exposes vice; returning the world its initial chaotic patterns; but laughter is creative; it comforts and treats.

> "The Puppets" became a wonderful miracle: million TV viewers were broadcasted satire on the leading officials in

the state; and it was in the country where people for many decades were having awe before the authorities" [13].

"The Puppets" program was closed. The satire puppet shows "Switch of the light" and "Red arrow", having unique computer technique followed suit. Unfortunately their places are vacant now. Second rate humor is still spreading the screen in some shows. The "Gorodok" ("Town") program and the satire talk-show with the participation of a famous satirist M.Zhvanetzky are more qualitative. This program is interactive and touches upon topical problems. Besides it is broadcasted on large screens placed in the center of Moscow.

Live broadcasting, interaction of audience and the writer, sharp satire which, according to Zhvanetzky, is accompanied by sharp pain renders the program deep generalized meaning.

The above mentioned programs and distinguished (as far as their format is concerned) programs of the type "Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov", "Vremechko", 'Segodnyachko", "Floors" (in Ekaterinburg) prove that the "infotainment" notion is applied to a television product socially and morally important as well. The programs of this type "Vremechko" ("Time" in the humorous sense) and "Segodnyachko" ("Today" in the humorous sense) both informed and entertained. News used to be humorous, strange, and time and again ridiculous. TV viewers themselves supplied them, getting small bonus. It was an absolutely new phenomenon. As usually the news comes directly from media to audience. And here the source of information was a private person, willing to hear his name and voice on the air and inform the fact which would be definitely omitted on official channels.

The "Vremechko" program authors tried to make the studio atmosphere and presenters images democratic, open-hearted, cordial impression. The presenter was that very person with whom these events accidents happen or might happen. The distance to the viewer was as short as possible. The sleepy condition of Leo Novozhonov, sitting in the center of this "Universe chaos" - a program presenter and co-author impacted the audience positively. Weather forecasting manner in this program was very ironical mentioning the weather in God-forgotten remote Russian villages.

A person was spoken about with great sympathy in that program. The main program addressee was an average Russian citizen described in Russian literature i.e. Gogol character Akaky Akakievich "who inhabits vast Russian territories" [14].

Unfortunately "The Vremechko" program was criticized much. It was accused of incompetence, stupidity, marginality. The authors objected saying that all Russian literature is for marginals and about them. The program distinguished by bright role-playing manner, unusual words and situations use; improvisation was in favor and cliché were rejected. The observer A.Vartanov wrote in his article that parodying was the basis of the program aiming at mocking and ridiculing the official "Vremya" (The Time") program" [15]. Again we observe "laughter against tears" phenomenon. Laughter, pity and horror are known to be the main human emotions. It is pity and horror that are on our screens in peoples talk-shows "From the bottom of my heart", "Wait for me" (devoted to search of lost people) as well as in different criminal programs, which don't correspond to taste and moral demand.

We can observe production elements in everyday life (e.g."Vremechko", "Segodnyachko"). News is presented like show. (Unlike other shows where production, imitation substituted real life). L.Novozhonov the presenter of the above-mentioned program explained production elements in his program in the following way:

> "New television decisions are demanded as we live in a period of time abounding in production elements" [16].

Indeed, there are many programs presenting information in the form of a play. The illusion of authenticity is strictly observed there. Audience understanding and attention is being energetically activized a person is literally "drawn" into the "game". Journalism "theatralization" is becoming a real way of creating sense.

One more project born on Russian soil should be mentioned. This is the famous program "What? Where? When?" produced by Vladimir Voroshilov "It was the priority of universal human qualities that counted as well as free improvization, ability to make a choice" [17]. V.Voroshilov expressed himself like this:

> "I deal with game that is life. Being a playwright and a producer I have to foresee, predict the fact and shoot it just at the moment of occurring. The ability foresee and to govern the fact is very important" [18].

O. Grigorenko called Voroshilov one of the brightest presenters, "myth-makers"; he made his role of a presenter the role of a Creator- invisible, powerful, irresistible, everything depends on the motion of his hand. And only Chance can co-operate or compete with him (roulette is an infernal incarna-

tion of Chance); he governs the game, the stake in it is immortality (the title of immortal players); the main power is money and wisdom" [19]. The presenter governed and the players should have been ready to respond quickly using their brains, experience, ability to guess, wit. The program demonstrated syncres of life and screen: the unity of fiction and documentary. The players were playing against TV viewers; viewers, in their turn, could easily participate in the game. All participants were actors and viewers simultaneously. First the program was of educational character and had nothing to do with making profit. Presently it has been transformed into a mere casino game shuttered by "Golden Rush". The stake used to be a good book and the symbol – precious souvenir, now the stake is huge piles of money stocked near roulette. Just profit; nothing else. This is another sign of globalization – the same values determination; values which are not sometimes quite valuable.

Conclusion

As one may observe Western formats have firmly occupied the place on Russian television. Their correction taking into account Russian mentality is constantly taking place. On the other hand there is a correction in accordance with Western samples of our Russian formats. It is worth understanding that everything is not as harmless as it might look. People believe that media should reflect the world around. In practice media create the world which becomes reality later on. Let me cite R.Harris again: "This world might be accepted by TV viewers who as often as not don't even suspect the latent processes considering they are just being entertained. In a certain period of time the world image as it has been constructed by media

might be rooted in our mind to such a degree that we will not be able to differentiate it from the reality" [20]. Currently we are observing these processes, and they are quite obvious.

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Take the Best, Keep the Traditional
Following the peculiarities of the modern Russian media

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Democratization of Russian society along with involvement of the Russian mass media into open information market and the extensive intrusion of foreign information products including especially American newspapers, TV programmes, web-sites have led to the exchange of journalistic technologies and new "make up" and the method of coverage towards key facts and events. All these factors brought about substantial professional evolution of the Russian journalism.

The blog journalism is a phenomenon which appeared in the USA. It deserves a more detailed attention, first of all, following the appearance of the blog communities and even blog newspapers under which ordinary people may become journalists with a clear ability to create and publish their materials on their own web-pages in the Internet.

What is specific in terms of scientific analysis is the appearance of reader's forums in the mass media. As a result, newspapers and magazines became more interactive, giving their readers an opportunity to discuss articles on-line.

Nevertheless, the process of inter-communication and inter-penetration of two rather different journalistic schools is very contradictory. Nowadays, more and more Russian newspapers and magazines try to use American content models. In

such situation, it would be logical to speculate over the problems they usually face.

What do we mean by that? Speaking about American content models of the mass media we mean several circumstances. It is worth calling some of them and understanding the way they affect the "non-American" society.

The libertarian principle is going to be labeled as a priority. According to this, all the materials are prepared and published without taking into consideration possible consequences (Libertarian principle does not prevent thus, as Black specifies, "to have unviolent influence on a reader and potential elector"). This approach is very well shown in a famous example: "nobody cares if a dog bites a man, but everybody cares if a man bites a dog."

Libertarian principle looks rather acceptable for the American school of journalism. At the same time, the spread of this principle among the Russian Mass Media led to appearance of so called "yellow" journalism. This means that more and more editorships aspiring to get facts at any price, including distortion of real information. Picking out sensational phrase, using memorable headlines does not often correspond with general content of message. The problem is that the Russian legal system does not have the word "defamation". Following it, many editorial staff is not confused while looking at people's private lives in order to publish "burning" facts. Such publications turn down business reputation of people, and editorial staff do not fear any legal actions against them.

Libertarianism of the Russian mass media, as well as substantial monopolization of the economic sector and the lack of traditions of free journalism in post-Soviet Russia have caused such phenomenon as "PR-nalism" (synthesis of "journalism"

and public relations). This phenomenon comes from one of the ancestral features of journalism: its function of lobbying. This kind of journalism is supposed to be loyal to businessmen or politicians, paying for certain information they want to be published or announced on TV. Although, it is widely spread in the Russian press, of course, it has nothing to do with genuine professional functions.

Secondly, the principle of the priority of the fact, that is more important than any comments to this fact, also comes from the USA and became very popular in Russia. This significantly influenced the content organization of either business publications, or social political editions. Moreover, it caused the crisis of several popular and well developed Russian genres. What meant are genres that usually appeal to not only intellect, but to the reader's emotional sphere as well? This first of all relates to such genres as essay- both portrait and problematic, sketch and feuilleton. This tendency significantly weakened the genre basis of the printed Mass Media. As a result, journalists, especially young ones, stopped drawing their attention to analytical genres, expressive figures of author's syntaxes, methods of reasoning.

Thirdly, the influence of the foreign mass media led to such tendencies as tabloiding. The decrease of the analytical level of stuff and the appearance of so-called genre salads are caused by the same problem. It means that a usual magazine issue puts on agenda only one topic.

Fourthly, the Russian press, as well as foreign outlets, suffered from the fall of the number of verbal texts and disproportionate increase of graphic line; photographs, graphs,

diagrams. Also, new text formats, such as info graphs and references, appeared. They tend to replace a traditional journalistic text.

All this is only a small part of new coming tendencies, which put the problem of keeping the traditions of the Russian journalism into the agenda. It is crucial to preserve its Russian features and paradigms. There is no doubt about that due to the democratic values, freedom of press, fixed in the Constitution and in the legislation, journalists are able to decide which models of journalism they prefer to use. At the same time, can be and must be cultivated in the process of educating future journalists, especially if we speak about representatives of periodical press. What is important is to take the best features of Western journalism, adopting world media brands' experience in the sphere of looking for informational occasions and fact interpretation. But at the same time, the Russian journalism should keep its most remarkable features, such as analytical aspect, expressiveness, clear author's position. In this case, the traditions are not the end in itself, but huge experience of Russian masters of word, who have been creating public opinion in Russia for more than 200 years. By promoting the main values of the traditional Russian journalism, we make young journalists more flexible in using different types of compositional and lexical methods of information processing. We also form careful attitude to their language and healthy patriotism.

Nowadays, the Russian periodical press faces the same systematic problems as the world press does. It is the decrease of number of editions (3,5- 4 per cent) for the last few years (6-7 per cent in the UK, 4- 5 per cent in the USA). In addition, since the audience of the mass media becomes older, it makes journalists to change the subject programmes and business

plan correspondingly. We also confronted the mass loss of readers and TV audience, who now prefer using the Internet (there are 17 million users of the Internet in Russia). What is more, this trend is going to develop further on accompanied by the appearance of fast- speed Internet. The difficulty of this situation is that modern periodical press came under threat of losing its news functions. While on-line informative agencies need less than an hour to spread the news, newspapers and magazines are always late.

In which directions should the further work develop?

First of all, it is important to point out that the influence of American "technological approach" (Turov Lester in 2002 wrote, that technology of influence on a reader is worked in the American press the more than this reader is remote at New York Times) is rather significant; anyway we can not proclaim its total victory. Moreover, our traditions turned out to be rather enduring, and this let keep both the originality of the language and variety of genres. Furthermore, some Russian newspapers are quite successful in promoting "moral" topics in their articles. As a rule, such topics do not appeal to the readers' logic, but to their feelings and emotions. That would be next to impossible in the American model of the Mass Media.

The journalistic format of the "story", which has been so popular in Europe and in the USA for 20 years, is one of bright examples. The magazine "Caravan Istoriy" ("The Caravan of History"), where everybody can read extensive articles about famous people might be classified as one of them. This type of format became very popular in the West, especially

among the female part of audience. Nonetheless, this format has seriously changed in Russia. If the Western "story" primarily is a description of local life of a "star", Russian publications show up a complete essay with the entire set of compositional features belonging to a Russian essay: logical semantic structure, figures and tropes of authors' syntaxes, dialog constructions. Thus, the format, which used to be alien to the Russian journalism, became customary and even got familiar features.

Linguists speak more frequently about the third wave of the mass foreign loan-word (The first two waves registered in a XVIII century during the reforms of Peter the Great and at the beginning of a 20 century, after the Bolshevik revolution. The basic changes were affected by economic and military spheres - Amirov V. 2000). Today's scale of this process cannot be compared with neither the epoch of Peter the Great, nor the post revolution period. The mass media as whole and business editions in particular use vocabulary which very often shrinks the Russian language. Actually, terminosystems of English origin are transferred into the Russian language.

Should we try to resist it? And what is more important, is that possible to resist this trend?

The history of development of the Russian language (journalistic as well) has displayed the language itself is labial, full of allegories, metaphors, figures and tropes of author's syntaxes. All the factors preserve the active vocabulary from Anglo-Saxon intrusion. Even if we take into consideration the fact that the penetration of Anglo–American terminosystems into the Russian language and teenagers' subculture is inevitable. As it happened in the eighteen century, foreign lexemes did not destroy the natural structure of the Russian language a

very fast they become Russian. For example, the English word "user" has already been adopted and, by adding prefixes and endings, new words appeared. Another example is the word "haliava", which came to Russian from Yiddish. It gave a birth to several new Russian words such as "haliavshik" –a person who likes getting everything for free, "na haliavu"- free of charge. There is no doubt that the same situation will happen with such words as "manager" or "management". In the meantime there is a possibility of their replacement by the terms of the Russian origin.

We have already mentioned genres. Combination of different genres exists both in Western and Russian journalism. For example, the report elements appear in ordinary sketch, while the elements of interview can hardly surprise anybody. By the way, we can observe an opposite phenomenon in the Russian Mass Media: development of traditional genres in its genre framework. According to this, the further development of such genres as portrait and problematical essay, interview-dialog, sketch is absolutely obvious. Tragic events, connected with the combat conflicts on the Russian boarders, have always been widely presented in the Russian press. Military operations in Chechnya recreated military and military political publicistic writing. This genre is traditionally developed in Russia as almost every generation of the state witnessed or took part in some war.

One more strength of the Russian journalism is "the problem of hero" (Under the problem of hero we understand the problem of choice of example for our readers of all generations, problem of moral and social orientation of citizens in society - Amirov V. 2007).

Success is the main criteria for becoming a hero of a publication in an American magazine or newspaper, which actively promote ideas of "equal rights" and "American dream". Russian social-political press is basically more social. Its heroes are ordinary people, who have to work really hard to earn. This is the personality which steps forward to the spot of Russian journalism.

Any professional content analysis of central and regional mass media show that more ideological word "people" is used more often than the neutral word "population", and the word " justice" is used more frequently than the word "equality". It means that the Russian mass press still plays a protective role from the political powers, than only an informative function. Large amount of letters are being received by newspapers and magazines which confirms the above fact as well. These letters are full of complaints of unpunished officials and municipal disorder. So to say, people apply to the press as they are used to seeing an ally in the press. People complain and very often press helps them, though it is not its function at all. American and Western press is free from such feelings and actions. But it is doubtful whether it is an advantage or not.

Anyway, the Russian press must keep its identity and its unique features. It has everything to accomplish this idea.

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Mass Communication and Consumer Society: a Turkish Experience

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Introduction

Previously, the consumption ground has been occupied by the intellectual savages of the commercial world – advertisers, marketers, packagers and the media – whose anthropological artifacts are now dug up or, more likely, viewed on a video, and unscrupulously stripped of their hidden meanings and significance. Consumption and its individual and social context are con-, decon- and reconstructed in the light of recent developments in social theory. For the analytical terrain on which consumption is being discovered is one devoted to the 'post-' rather than to the past. This has been the period of post Marxism, postmodernism, post-Fordism, in which discourse and semiotics play a vital role, one tending to autonomise consumption. At the extreme, consumption is presumed to have separate, independent and ambiguous effects and content, distinct from other constituent economic (especially production) and social relations. This emerges particularly with the linking of consumption to, or its being enclosed within, the field of cultural studies. To some extent, there must be some doubts about the originality of these concerns if not the form in which they are posed and the attitude adapted to them. The 1960s witnessed considerable angst about the morality and stability of consumer society. It is perceived to be one in which manipulated demand for unnecessary goods reflected the combi-

nation of the power of advertising and of the individual's psychological need to aspire, conform and surpass. Wants are increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied as a society becomes increasingly affluent (Fine, 2002: 58-59).

Consumption as the inversion of the logic of value Irrespective of the meaning of use values to the consumer, what actually constitutes consumption and how it is structured in the economy and society more generally are specific to particular modes of production. A qualitative, as well as a quantitative, grasp of the relations governing consumption is a precondition for examining who gets to consume what, and this will in turn influence how such consumption is construed over and above the role of other cultural determinants (Fine, 2002: 66).

Theoretical Background

Exchange relations are presented purely as relations between use values as criticized by Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. This is to begin to address the third charge laid against Marx – that his preoccupation with and priority to production, and his neglect of use value, imply that an appropriate examination of consumption is precluded. The chief proponent of this critique has been Jean Baudrillard having understood having fetishised the role of commodity fetishism through his single-minded critique of the reification of social relations of production. Marx may have revealed production relations but only at the expense of assigning the significance of use value itself to the realm of ideology and superstructure where it can be quietly neglected. Commodities must be seen as created in two senses: they are produced as physical objects but they are also created culturally according to how they are interpreted –

as items of consumption. For Jean Baudrillard, Marx neglects use value to a more constructive analysis by correctly recognizing, emphasizing and exploring the social construction of use value, rather than treating it as a purely physical or natural property: A man, 'endowed' with needs which 'direct' him towards objects that 'give' him satisfaction as the whole discourse on consumption is articulated on the mythological sequence of the fable. Since man is never really satisfied, the same history is repeated indefinitely (Fine, 2002: 67).

The neoclassic theory received somewhat harsher treatment from one of Marshall's contemporaries: In all the received formulation of economic theory, the human material with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that is to say, in terms of a passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature. For Thorstein Veblen, the neoclassical view of the consumer was already some generations out of date in 1898. Thorstein Veblen argued that human nature is a coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity. Being famous for the idea of conspicuous consumption, T. Veblen introduced "The Theory of Leisure Class" (although an earlier economist, Jon Rae, had presented a similar perspective on luxury consumption). As developing a theory of consumption Veblen is not just presenting social commentary or satire, the goods were both ceremonial aspect of consumption could expand indefinitely without producing any net increase in satisfaction, as Veblen so effectively and satirically demonstrated; but any point in time, there was an appropriate level of status-oriented consumption for each group in society (Goodwin, 1997: 154).

The conspicuous consumption as a concept has become one of the most widely used ideas derived from sociology and related social sciences by being one of the few concepts created by a discipline that has been so absorbed in productivist issues that it has all but missed the revolution in consumption. Its utility may also come from the fact that free of the need to be true to what T. Veblen meant by the concept, those in the popular media who appropriate it can use it ay way they want (Ritzer, 2001).

In 1930s, John Maynard Keynes created a new approach to macroeconomics that legitimized government intervention to boost employment reflecting on the nature and causes of mass unemployment in the depression. His General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money focused attention on the aggregate propensity to consume, devoting a chapter each to the objective and subjective factors influencing consumption. His principal macroeconomic conclusion in this area, the existence of a stable relationship between changes in national income and aggregate consumption, has prompted extensive theoretical and empirical debate (Goodwin, 1997: 155).

Unfortunately Keynes offered only scattered comments about his preferred alternative; having been argued that those comments are consistent with belief in a hierarchy provides a neat explanation of one of Keynes' more puzzling observations, the stickiness of prices and wages. James Duesenberry being the later economist who was closest to Keynes' approach to consumption began with an empirical puzzle: the decline over time in the amount of the neoclassical theoretical apparatus, he took it as self-evident that individual preferences are interdependent, in part socially determined, and subject to learning and habit formation. The result of social interdepend-

ence was the demonstration effect: Contact with superior consumption goods and higher standards of living leads to a desire to increase one's own consumption. Although Duesenberry mentioned in passing that the demonstration effect need not depend on conspicuous consumption, most readers will find echoes of Veblen as well as Keynes in his analysis. The relative income hypothesis was the solution to the empirical puzzle: Consumption depends not only on an individual household's income, but on its income relative to others. He is cited primarily by those who are looking for alternative theoretical perspectives today; mainstream economics, with only a few expectations, was quick to critique and then forget him. Another approach to formal modeling of alternative theories by Harvey Leibenstein can alter consumer demand for a good. Taking Leibenstein's models seriously would require complex, far-reaching changes in the neoclassical theory of consumption; instead, they are more often exhibited as classroom curiosities than used for serious analytical work. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries were an early classic in the new field of development economics by Ragnar Nurkse. Just as Duesenberry had argued that a household consumes more when it comes into contact with higher-income households, R. Nurkse concluded that the same should be true of nations. Like Duesenberry, Nurkse was concerned about the aggregate rate of savings; inadequate savings and investment were crucial impediments to development (Goodwin, 1997).

Much reference has been made to cultural theories of consumption that concentrate on the meaning of use values to the final consumer. Such concern with the interpretation of the objects of consumption is liable to acknowledge the origins of

consumption in exchange since, in contemporary capitalist society, a major part of consumption is derived more or less directly from the purchase of commodities. Indeed, the ideological construction of the use value of a commodity, as in advertising and brand image, often explicitly addresses its market origins either to establish a claim to quality – a product is 'the best money can buy' – or otherwise to deny the influence of its commercial origins altogether when presented 'as good as home-made' (Fine, 2002: 77).

Consumer Society and Modern Culture

In the modern world, consumerism is rampant; that we are dominated by consumer culture, having passed through a consumer revolution. Such a focus on the consumption associated with affluence is remarkably blinkered, not only for its neglect of those who live on the margins in advanced capitalist economies, but also more strikingly for those in the Third World for whom consumption remains a matter of life or death – whether through starvation, disease or homelessness. It is the general relief from such hardship in the developed world, some would say at the expense of the Third World, and also the recent historical origins of such affluence, that renders possible a preoccupation with levels and patterns of popular consumption beyond the mere minimum. A flood of images immediately suggests itself: the opulent megastores that occupy the centers, and increasingly the fringes, of our cities, the rows of houses packed with both consumer durables and the more immediate items of gratification to the five senses. Whether the sixth sense of inner well-being is any more satisfied, however, remains a moot point, to which critical reference is often made. In short, the notion of consumer society

has a powerful hold; it releases an array of ideas and associations as wide as the range of possessions to which they correspond. Yet it lacks a coherent analytical content by which is meant a reasonably precise definition with an associated explanatory role, whether in terms of cause or effect. In fact, precise and meaningful definitions of consumer society are extremely hard to come by; they are as rare as the use of the term is common. One reason for this is that consumption itself previously has played a minor role in the social sciences, with the notable exception of economics where it occupies an important position but remains conceptually underdeveloped for any purpose other than statistical estimation. Rather, production has traditionally served as an analytical starting point with a corresponding neglect or subordination of consumption (Fine, 2002: 155).

The various social sciences have much to say about consumption. Even so, theories of consumption have been less systematic than for production and less easily coordinated across the social sciences. This reflects the relative lack of uniformity in consumption as compared with production relations – there appears to be a wide choice of what to consume, less on whether to work or not and how. Consequently, the notion of consumer society has served as an umbrella, indeed a middle-range concept, under which consumption has been examined, seeking to provide order and generality across the disparate and the particular. This has been done by drawing selectively upon what is presumed, but is not demonstrated, to be a coherent set of analytical insights, most of which derive from immediate casual and empirical origins (Fine, 2002: 156).

Much of the modern culture is transmitted by the media of mass communication. The various media disseminate classical opera and music, tabloid stories about the lives of politicians, the latest gossips and news from the four concerns of the globe. This has profoundly altered the phenomenological experience of living in modernity (Stevenson, 1995, qtd. in Bennett, 2005).

Consumers are not passive recipients of encoded meanings and identities. Even those viewers who made sense of Nationwide message within the dominant code performed active, if partly unconscious, semiotic labor. Their general acceptance of the programme's preferred reading was the outcome of an interdiscursive encounter – rather than a result of them being blank sheets for the text to write on (Moores, 1993, qtd. in Bennett, 2005).

Beginning with a consideration of contemporary television programmes such as soap operas and game shows, it is noteworthy that such programmes facilitate the creative engagement of audiences, positioning themselves as game show participants. Starting with professionally produced niche media magazines the content of these magazines reflects changing lifestyle sensibilities of late modern individuals, in some cases cutting across or reflexively addressing traditionally gendered notions of identity and lifestyle. Beginning with a critical assessment of the concept of virtual community the internet has facilitated more ready communication between globally dispersed groups of individuals whose interests range from leisure activities such as music and skateboarding through new social movements (Bennett, 2005).

> There is and there always will be major difficulties in analyzing media and the whole sphere of information through

the traditional categories of the philosophy of the subject: will, presentation, choice, liberty, deliberation, knowledge and desire. For it is quite obvious that they are absolutely contradicted by the media: that the subject is absolutely alienated in its sovereignty (Baudrillard, 1996, qtd in Abbinnett, 2003).

Consumer Society and Turkey

Turkey averaged 5.4 per cent economic growth in the 1980s, and 4.1 per cent in the period 1990-1998. By 1998, it had become the world's 17th largest economy and had developed an impressive private sector, although a serious privatization programme only began in 1997. The economy experienced its fourth year of strong growth. Turkey is a member of the OECD and has a large, well-educated middle and managerial class and a skilled labor force. However, the country suffers from high inflation (Turkey Business Intelligence Report, July 2001).

Following the 2001 crisis, the Turkish economy rebounded very strongly, with annual growth averaging 8 percent during 2002-2004 and a 5 percent growth rate for 2005 well within reach. Inflation has come down to single digits in 2004 (9.3 percent) for the first time in the last 35 years, greatly facilitating the reduction in interest rates. Two weak spots have emerged in the picture: (i) Despite strong growth for three consecutive years, high unemployment continues to persist, at an estimated 10.4 percent on average in the first half of 2005; (ii) The current account deficit reached 5.2 percent of the GNP in 2004 and continues to remain a cause of concern as it may exceed 6 percent of GDP in 2005. With per capita

income in the richest provinces 6.9 times higher than in the poorest, Turkey stands out as a country with large regional disparities by international comparison. Internal migration has been extensive and would have been expected to somewhat contribute to bridging the gap in per capita income across regions. However, per capita incomes have not converged, with GDP growing much faster in rich than in poor regions. Faster growth of backward regions would thus contribute to reducing disparities, but also to accelerating growth of the economy as a whole (Turkey Country Economic Memorandum (2006)).

At 11.7 percent of GDP in 2004, expenditure on current transfers is lower than in most EU comparator countries (15 percent and up, with the exception of Ireland), but higher than emerging market economies such as Chile, Korea and Malaysia. Current transfers in their majority (8.5 percent of GDP) are for social protection, so that spending in this category is better analyzed in the context of the age distribution of population. Given that Turkey has a very young population and the lowest old age dependency ratio among a selected group of comparators, its social protection expenditures are oversized by international comparison. In addition, the proportion of Turkey's population aged 65 and over to the labor force will increase by 10 percentage points between 2000 and 2020, according to OECD projections.10 Therefore, despite the current favorable demographic situation, in the future, Turkey is likely to face an upward pressure on social spending in order to expand the social safety net ("Turkey Public Expenditure Review" (2006)).

Mid-1980s had been a turbulent period, through which Turkey entered a brand new era. A rapid privatization and liberalization process started, with the intensification of the west-

ernization movement, dating back to the Ottoman era (Kandi-yoti and Saktanber, 2002 qtd. in Kaya 2005). Entry of multinational companies and imported goods into the market marked a bursting period in the economy, and a competition unseen until then. This competition fired intensive marketing campaigns and advertising efforts, which would soon permeate into all areas of daily life and re-structure the whole landscape of the Turkish culture. Turkish advertising has developed very fast, in tune with advertising in the world, and especially with the more advanced film technologies and techniques, communication of advertising messages are much more enhanced. It was again around mid-1980s -with the bursting economy-, that television became widespread. Most people could afford a television set and television soon became one of the major media through which the Turkish society socialized itself (Kaya, 2005).

By the 1990s, consumerism and free marketism had become perhaps the most visible features of global unity, and for better or worse, free-choice consumerism has become the predominant global proxy for peace and prosperity. Consumerism in short promised to be a conveyance to normalcy, inclusion, and affluence as well as a demonstration to self and others that Turkey had arrived at this state of modern grace. Modernity, following Max Weber's somewhat pessimistic diagnosis, has often been imagined as a total transformation, of one cloth, as it was, and a predominantly European and North American experience at that. Anthropologists have more recently begun to argue that this is a more complex and fragmented experience, that modernities should be spoken of in the plural and examined ethnographically, and that the preeminence of the

European experience should be questioned. Turkish modernity has, since 1923, been framed by the state's nation-building project, which, like others, has struggled to reconcile national with global imperatives. The production of a distinctly national social and cultural reality, rational, secular, functional, gendered, and ethnicized, has throughout been uneasily aware of its other. The production of a spatial imaginary of place and territory has also been crucial to the state project as many commentators have pointed out, a task of representation that is never complete and easily undone (Armbrust, 2000).

Conclusion

Consumerism had emerged both slowly and distinctively. The process reflected the strength of the traditional and religious alternatives. Ultimately, the extent of change was impressive as well-which is why a new round of opposition emerged, surprisingly late by standards elsewhere in the world but striking in its focus. The result was a region where consumerism's future was unusually unclear at the outset of the twenty-first century, precisely because the debate remained so vivid and active. The choice of consumerism, for that made it amid doubts and despite potential opposition from family and friends, was more than a material one. Here was a key similarity to other instances in consumerism's world history, where symbolic meanings often overshadowed any shallow indulgence. What was unusual, as the twenty-first century dawned, was how contested the choice might still be, and how many people still explicitly sought an alternative to consumer values.

In a society in which the state of being modern is cast so insistently in terms of forgetting, and in which the modern is

so organically connected to the institutions of the nation-state, remembering becomes both a problem and a matter of cultural elaboration. This is not because the state is incapable of making people forget but because the politics of forgetting paradoxically demands the preservation of a variety of things to demonstrate the necessity of their having been forgotten. When one of these objects in the repertoire of the forgotten is an entire city, and one that currently houses at least one-sixth of the nation's population, the city itself is likely to occupy a large and significant problem in the national imaginary – a problem that springs out of the experience of modern nationalism itself. This is the reason of explaining the experience, and for all the apparent postmodernism, draws heavily on cultural techniques established by nationalist modernists in Turkey. Although transnational realities shape Turkish life with ever – increasing clarity, as indeed they have done since the establishment of the republic, cultural space is still shaped significantly by popular cultural forms, which look to the nation both as a source of inspiration and as the focus of critique.

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KATKILAR

Global Medya Süreçleri Karşısında Yerel Düzeyde Medya Çalışanlarının Profili ve Meslek Değerlerine Bakışı: Antalya Örneği[1]

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Özet:

Bu çalışma, yerel düzeyde medya çalışanlarının mesleksel profilini çıkartmayı ve elde edilen verileri, globalleşme sürecinde medya çalışanlarının mesleklerindeki değişimler açısından irdelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yerel düzeyde medya çalışanlarına yönelik profil çalışmaları son derece azdır. Ancak globalleşmenin sonuçlarının yerel düzeydeki yansımaları önemlidir ve medya çalışanları da global süreçlerden yaşadıkları yerel bağlamlarda etkilenmektedirler. Bu çalışmada Antalya bölgesinde 109 medya çalışanına uygulanan soru kağıdından elde edilen veriler sunulmaktadır. Soru kağıdı, demografik ve sosyo-ekonomik soruların yanı sıra çeşitli gazetecilik uygulamaları ve meslek etik ilkeleri hakkındaki kanaat sorularını içermektedir.

Giriş

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'de medya çalışanlarının yerel düzeyde bir profilini çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. İletişim, genellikle globalleşmenin itici gücü olarak gösterilmektedir ve iletişim kav-

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ramı globalleşme süreçlerini tartışan geniş bir literatürün temel kavramlarından biridir. İletişim sektörlerinde çalışanlar bu nedenle, globalleşme süreçlerinin merkezinde yer almaktadırlar. Globalleşme süreçlerinin belki de en fazla etkilediği meslekler iletişimle ilgili mesleklerdir. Bu bakımdan medya çalışanlarının globalleşme süreçlerinde karşılaştıkları etkiler, literatürde oldukça geniş bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Ancak globalleşme süreçlerinde yerel konumlar ve deneyimler göz ardı edilmemelidir. Globalleşme ile yerelleşmenin bir ölçüde birbirine zıt, ancak birbirini doğrudan etkileyen süreçler olduğu düşüncesini yansıtan *glokal* kavramından hareketle bu çalışma, medya çalışanlarının karşılaştıkları değişimin/dönüşümün yerel boyutlarının da izlenmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Medya çalışanlarının karşılaştıkları global etkilerin yerel konumlar ve deneyimler bağlamında da irdelenmesi gereklidir. Genel olarak iletişim literatürü, global boyut üzerinde durduğundan daha az yerel deneyimlerle ilgilenmiştir. Bu nedenle yerel düzeyde medya çalışanları üzerine yapılan araştırmalar oldukça azdır. Bu durum Türkiye için de geçerlidir. Zaten az sayıda yapılmış bulunan "medya çalışanları profil araştırmaları" arasında bütünüyle yerel düzeyde medya çalışanlarına yönelik profil araştırması bulunmamaktadır.

Medya çalışanları profil araştırmaları, diğer profil araştırmalarında olduğu gibi, belirli bir dönemde bu meslek çalışanlarının temel özelliklerini saptamaya yarar. Profil araştırmaları belirli periyotlarla yinelendikçe daha kapsamlı, anlamlı veriler sunarlar ve bu veriler meslekteki tarihsel değişimi açıklamakta daha yararlıdır. Ancak Türkiye'de yapılan az sayıdaki medya çalışanları profil araştırması, böyle periyodik veriler sunmadığı için değişimin izlenmesine yönelik ampirik verilerden yoksundurlar. Ayrıca bu çalışmalar, yerel deneyimleri yaşayan yerel medya çalışanlarına ilişkin yorumlar yapabilme-

mize olanak tanımaktan da uzaktır. Medya çalışanlarına yönelik Türkiye'de iki önemli çalışma bulunmaktadır. 1991 yılında Öke'nin (1994) ve 1993 yılında Altun'un (1995) yaptıkları çalışmalar, Türkiye'de gazetecilik mesleği çalışanlarının profilini çıkarmayı amaçlayan ilk ve kapsamlı çalışmalardır. Bu çalışmalar yöntem ve kapsam olarak, ABD'de basın çalışanlarının profilini çıkarmayı amaçlayan Weaver ve Wilhoit'in (1991) çalışmasına büyük ölçüde benzemektedir. Bunlara ek olarak, yalnızca kadın basın çalışanlarına yönelik bir çalışma da Asker'in (1991) çalışmasıdır. Ayrıca farklı bir yöntem izleyen Şendur'un (2003) araştırması ise, doğrudan gazetecileri değil de, gazetecilerin anlatıldığı ve kahramanı gazeteci olan romanlardaki gazeteci profilini araştıran bir çalışmadır. Bu çalışmalar, daha çok İstanbul, Ankara gibi merkezlerdeki gazetecileri kapsamaktadır ve yerel düzeydeki medya çalışanlarına yönelik araştırmalar değildir. Ancak, İrvan'ın (2006) araştırması bu açıdan istisna oluşturmakta ve KKTC'deki gazetecilerin profiline ilişkin veriler sunmaktadır. Öte yandan, Türkiye'de doğrudan yerel medya üzerine yapılmış çalışma sayısı da çok azdır. Bunlar arasında en bilineni Girgin'in (2001) çalışmasıdır. Ancak, araştırmamızdan başka, doğrudan Antalya'da medya çalışanları üzerine yapılmış herhangi bir çalışma bulunmamaktadır. Antalya'da basın üzerine yapılmış çalışmaların sayısı oldukça azdır. Bunların ikisi basın tarihi çalışmalarıdır: M. Güçlü'nün (1997) Antalya basınının ilk dönemine ilişkin çalışması ve Üstün'ün (2003) basın tarihi kronoloji çalışması temel çalışmalardır. Ayrıca yerel basın yerel siyaset ilişkisi bağlamında Antalya basınının ele alındığı çalışma (Yılmaz, 2004) ve 2003 yılında gerçekleştirilen Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi öğrenci profili araştırması (Atabek,

2006). Antalya'da medya üzerine yapılmış diğer çalışmalardır. Ayrıca S. Güçlü'nün (2002) ve Çimrin'in (2005) Antalya üzerine yaptıkları çalışmalarında da basın üzerine çeşitli veriler yer almaktadır. Bu çerçevede araştırmamız, doğrudan Antalya'da medya çalışanlarının profilini çıkarmaya yönelik tek çalışma niteliğindedir.

Yöntem

Bu çalışma, 2006 yılında Antalya'daki medya çalışanlarının profilini çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. "Medya çalışanları" kavramı, gazeteler, haber ajansları ve radyo ve televizyonlardaki "çalışan gazetecileri" kapsamaktadır. "Çalışan gazeteci" kavramı, basın kartı sahibi olup da fiilen çalışmayan gazetecilerin dışındaki "gerçek" gazetecileri betimleyen bir kavram olarak kullanıla gelmiştir. Çalışan gazeteciler bayramı ise, 10 Ocak 1962 tarihinde 212 Sayılı Basın İş Kanunu'nun kabul edilmesi sonrası, "Geleneksel Gazeteciler Günü" olarak ilan edildi ve kutlanmaya başlandı. Öte yandan burada kullandığımız "medya çalışanları" kavramı doğrudan medya içeriği ile ilgili işlerde çalışanları kapsamaktadır. Medya kuruluşlarında çalışıp da, doğrudan medya içeriği ile ilgili olmayan işlerde çalışanlar (örneğin matbaa işçileri, ses ve görüntü teknisyenleri vb.) bu çalışmanın kapsamında değildir. Çalışmamızda, sarı basın kartı sahibi olmak da, bir kıstas olarak kullanılmamıştır. Özellikle genç gazeteciler arasında, fiilen medya kuruluşlarında çalışan, ancak sarı basın kartı sahibi olamayanların sayısı azımsanmayacak düzeydedir (Yücel, 1995).

Araştırma, Antalya il merkezindeki 109 medya çalışanına uygulanan soru kağıdından elde edilen verileri değerlendirmektedir. Soru kağıdında medya çalışanlarının demografik ve sosyo-ekonomik durumlarını ölçen soruların yanı sıra, bu kişi-

lerin çeşitli mesleki sorunlara bakışını, etik kuralları değerlendirmesini ve medya işleyişine ilişkin kanaatlerini ölçen sorulardan oluşmuştur. Antalya'da fiilen medya içeriğiyle ilgili işlerde çalışan medya çalışanı sayısının, 200 olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Antalya Bölge Müdürlüğü verilerine göre Antalya'da sarı basın kartı bulunanların sayısı ise 164'tür. Dolayısıyla 109 kişilik bir örneklemin yeterli bir temsil kabiliyetine sahip olduğu söylenebilir. Soru kağıtları, Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi son sınıf öğrencileri tarafından, 20 Aralık 2005 ve 5 Ocak 2006 tarihleri arasında Antalya'daki medya kuruluşlarına gidilerek dağıtılmış ve doldurulanlar geri toplanmıştır. Tamamlanmış soru kağıtları geri dönüşüm oranı yaklaşık % 71'dir. Soru kağıtlarının doldurularak geri gönderilmesinde, araştırmacılar en az desteği Doğan Medya Grubu Antalya Bölge Müdürlüğü ve TRT Antalya Haber Müdürlüğü yöneticilerinden almışlardır. Bu yöneticiler, çeşitli gerekçelerle soru kağıtlarının çalışanlarca doldurulmasını çekince ile karşılamışlar, ancak daha sonra yapılan görüşmelerle bu tutumlarını değiştirebilmişlerdir. Soru kağıtlarının doldurulmasında en geniş desteği ise Anadolu Ajansı Bölge Müdürlüğü yöneticileri göstermişlerdir.

Bulgular:

2006 yılında Antalya il merkezinde medya çalışanlarının çalışmamıza katılanlarının %83.5'i erkek %16.5'i kadındır. Geleneksel olarak gazetecilik bir erkek mesleğidir ve medya çalışanlarının çoğunluğu erkektir. Ancak bu durum giderek değişmektedir. Asker (1991), araştırmasına katılan gazetecilerin büyük çoğunluğunun (%76) 1980'lerde mesleğe başladığı-

nı belirtmektedir. Özellikle 1980'li yıllardan itibaren kadın medya çalışanı oranı artmaktadır. ABD'de de 1970'lerde %20 olan kadın gazeteci oranı 1980'lerde %34'e çıkmıştır (Weaver ve Wilhoit, 1991: 19). Türkiye'de 1993 yılında erkek gazetecilerin oranı % 84, kadın gazetecilerini oranı ise %16 olarak tespit edilmiştir (Altun, 1995:139). Altun, Türkiye'de kadın gazetecilerin oranının özellikle 1990'lardan sonra arttığını da belirtmektedir. Bunda iletişim fakültelerine giren kız öğrencilerin erkeklerden daha fazla olmasının rol oynadığını söyleyebiliriz. Günümüzde, global değişime koşut olarak Türkiye'de de kadın gazetecilerin oranının %20.5'in üzerinde olduğu tespit edilmiştir (Durukan, 2005). Ancak yerel düzeyde kadın medya çalışanlarının Türkiye genelinin biraz altında olması beklenmektedir. Bu durumda Antalya'da kadın gazetecilerin toplam içinde %16.5'lik bir oran oluşturmaları bu beklentiyi doğrulamaktadır.

Araştırmamıza katılan medya çalışanlarının yaş ortalamaları 34.36'dır. Medyan değeri 32, mod (en sık olan yaş) ise 28'dir. Gazetecilik genellikle genç mesleği olarak bilinir. Bu durum özellikle çalışan gazeteciler için geçerlidir. Bu değerlendirmeyi, ABD için 1980'li yıllarda 25-35 yaş grubundaki gazetecilerin oranı % 66.9 olarak tespit eden Weaver ve Wilhoit'ın araştırması (1991: 19), Türkiye için ise hem 1991 yılında 25-35 yaş gurubundaki gazetecilerin oranını % 51 olarak tespit eden Öke'nin araştırması (1994: 40), hem de 1993 yılı için bu oranı % 78.6 olarak tespit eden Altun'un araştırması (1995: 154) doğrulamaktadır. Benzer bir değerlendirme, medya çalışanlarının medeni durumuyla ilgilidir. Gazetecilik mesleği genellikle bir bekar mesleği olarak bilinir. Araştırmamıza katılanların % 51'i bekar, % 45'i evlidir. Bekar medya çalışanlarının oranının Türkiye genelinde daha yüksek olacağını tahmin ediyoruz. Yerel kültürel yapının medya çalışan-

larının evlenmesini özendirici olduğu ileri sürülebilir. Ancak bekarlık durumu kadın medya çalışanları arasında daha yüksek orandadır ve Antalya'da kadın medya çalışanın %82'si bekardır. Bu durumu, kadın medya çalışanlarının mesleği bekarken yapabildikleri, ancak evlendiklerinde meslekten ayrılmak zorunda kaldıkları şeklinde yorumlayabiliriz. Araştırmamızda ele alınan son demografik veri ise çocuk sayısıdır. Çocuk sayısı ortalaması 1.65'dir. Ancak yaş ile çocuk sayısı arasında 0.523 düzeyinde pozitif bir korelasyon (Pearson) vardır (p<0.001), yani gençlerde yaşlılara göre çocuk sayısı daha azdır. Ayrıca çocuk sayısı ortalaması kadın medya çalışanlarında daha düşüktür (kadınlarda 1.17, erkelerde 1.71). Bu durum, kadın gazetecilerin evlendiklerinde mesleklerinden ayrıldıkları yorumuna yeni bir boyut katmaktadır: Kadın medya çalışanlarının, mesleklerinden ayrılmalarını hızlandıran bir diğer etken de çocuk sahibi olmalarıdır.

Aşağıdaki tablo, araştırmamıza katılan 109 medya çalışanının eğitim durumunu göstermektedir. Buna göre çalışanların %43'ü üniversite ya da yüksekokul mezunudur.

Tablo 1: Gazetecilerin Eğitim Durumu

	Yüzde
İlkokul	3,7
Ortaokul	4,6
Lise	48,6
Üniversite	43,1

Öke'nin çalışmasında Türkiye'de gazetecilerin yaklaşık % 79.2'sinin yüksek eğitimli (1994: 46), Altun'un çalışmasında ise %62.8'i yüksekokul mezunu (1995: 148) olarak tespit edilmiştir. Antalya'da yüksek öğrenim gören medya çalışanlarının oranının Türkiye geneline göre daha düşük çıkmasının bir nedeni olarak, Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi'nin ilk mezunlarını ancak 2005 yılında vermiş olmasını gösterebiliriz. Ancak yerel medyada eğitim düzeyinin daha düşük olması, beklenen bir durumdur.

Araştırmaya katılan medya çalışanlarına kaç yıldır medyada çalıştığı sorusu yöneltilmiştir. Bu soruya verilen yanıtlardan, medya çalışanlarının ortalama 11 yıldır medyada çalıştıkları görülmüştür. Ancak medya çalışanları, genellikle sık iş değiştirmektedirler. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre medya çalışanlarının büyük çoğunluğu, daha önce bir başka medya kuruluşunda çalışmışlardır. Araştırmaya katılanlara daha önceki işlerinden niçin ayrıldıkları sorusu yöneltildiğinde, çoğunlukla (%30) ücret düşüklüğü neden olarak belirtilmiştir. Daha iyi bir konum önerildiği için iş değiştirdiğini ifade edenlerin oranı ise %13'tür. Bu sonuçlar, medya çalışanlarının başta ücret olmak üzere, çeşitli nedenlerle sıkça iş değiştirdiğini göstermektedir.

Medya çalışanlarının örgütlenmesi başlıca sorunlu konulardan biridir. Bir mesleğin gelişkinlik düzeyi o meslek sahiplerinin örgütlenme düzeyiyle ilişkilidir. Örgütlenme, sendikal örgütlenmeyi ve dernek düzeyindeki mesleki örgütlenmeyi kapsar. Ancak özellikle 1980'lerden itibaren medya çalışanlarının sendikal örgütlenme bakımında önemli gerilemeler yaşadığı bilinmektedir. Bu durum, derneklerin ön plana çıkması sonucunu doğurmakla birlikte, sendikal beklentilerin dernekler tarafından karşılanamaması nedeniyle, bu kez derneklerin örgütlenme anlayışları eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Sonuçta, med-

ya çalışanlarının mesleksel örgütlenmelerinin oldukça cılız kalındığı bir dönem yaşanmaktadır. Gazetecilerin sendikalaşma oranı, çeşitli ülkelerde farklılıklar göstermektedir. ABD'de gazetecilerin sendikalaşma oranı %17 iken, Almanya'da bu oran %60'lara yükselmektedir (Öke, 1994: 219-220). Ancak globalleşme süreçlerinin en belirgin sonucu, sendikasızlaşma olmuştur. Bu süreç, Türkiye'de çok belirgin yaşanmaktadır. Araştırmamıza katılan medya çalışanların çok az bölümü sendikalıdır (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası üyesi 8 kişi bulunmaktadır ve toplamda oranı %7'dir). Bunların büyük bölümü de (%75) haber ajansı (Anadolu Ajansı) çalışanlarıdır. Antalya'daki medya çalışanlarının büyük bölümü (%52) Antalya Gazeteciler Cemiyeti üyesidir. ÇGD üyeleri ise toplamda %23'dür. Ancak ÇGD üyelerinin önemli bir bölümü (%68) aynı zamanda AGC üyesidir. Türkiye Spor Yazarları Derneği de, Antalya'da medya çalışanlarının bir kısmının (%6) üye olduğu üçüncü sıradaki meslek örgütüdür.

Araştırmamıza katılanlara, mevcut işlerinden ne ölçüde memnun oldukları sorulmuştur. Medya çalışanları, önemli ölçüde memnuniyet ifade etmektedirler (5 üzerinden 4.17). Bu memnuniyet, cinsiyete göre farklılık göstermemektedir (erkekler: 4.15, kadınlar: 4.28). Ancak memnuniyet ile yaş, kaç yıldır medyada çalıştığı ve ücret arasında pozitif ilişkiler bulunmaktadır.

Correlations

			MEVCUT İŞİNİZDEN NE ÖLÇÜDE MEMNUNSUNUZ
Spearman's rho	YAŞ	Correlation Coefficient	,288**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,003
		N	104
	AYLIK ORTALAMA GELİR	Correlation Coefficient	,263**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,010
		N	96
	KAÇ YILDIR MEDYADA ÇALIŞIYOR	Correlation Coefficient	,375**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000
		N	104
	MEVCUT İŞİNİZDEN NE ÖLÇÜDE MEMNUNSUNUZ	Correlation Coefficient	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,
		N	106

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Buna göre, yaş ve meslekte kıdem arttıkça memnuniyet artmaktadır (r=0.375 p<0.01). Ayrıca aylık ortalama gelir ile iş memnuniyeti arasında, çok büyük olamamakla birlikte, pozitif bir ilişki bulunmaktadır (r=0.263 p<0.01). Benzer şekilde yaş ile iş memnuniyeti arasında pozitif bir ilişki olduğu da görülmektedir (r=0.288 p<0.01).

Araştırmaya katılanlara, Türk medyasının ne kadar özgür olduğunu düşündükleri sorulmuştur. Medya çalışanları bu soruya ortalama bir yanıt vermişlerdir (5 üzerinden 2.79). Buna göre, Antalya'daki medya çalışanları Türk medyasını ortalamanın biraz üzerinde özgür olarak değerlendirmektedirler. Bu durum cinsiyete göre çok az fark etmektedir (erkekler: 2.85, kadınlar: 2.50). Bu soruya verilen yanıtlarla yaş, gelir, kıdem arasında bir ilişki bulunamamıştır. Ancak iş memnuniyeti ile Türk medyasını özgür bulma arasında düşük de olsa (r=0.194 p<0.05) pozitif bir ilişki bulunmaktadır.

Araştırmaya katılan medya çalışanlarına çalıştıkları kurumları "toplumu doğru bilgilendirme" konusunda değerlendirmeleri istenmiştir. Bu soruya verilen yanıtlar büyük ölçüde pozitiftir (5 üzerinden 4.16). Ayrıca, bu soruya verilen yanıtla iş memnuniyeti arasında önemli oranda pozitif bir ilişki bulunmuştur (r=0.519 p<0.001). Medya çalışanlarından ayrıca, Türk medyasını çeşitli kıstaslara göre değerlendirmeleri istenmiştir. Bu değerlendirmeler de genellikle olumludur:

1- Doğru ve Objektif Haber Sunulmaktadır	2.71
2- Haber Başlıkları Metinleri Yansıtmaktadır	3.36
3- Haber ve Yorumlar Ayrılmaktadır	3.36
4- Yanlış Bilgi ve Hatalar Düzeltilmektedir	3.12
5- Temelsiz Suçlamalar Yayınlanmamaktadır	2.81
6- Eleştirilere Cevap Hakkı Verilmektedir	3.21
7-Suçu Kanıtlanana Kadar Herkes Masumdur İlkesine Uyulmaktadır	2.92
8- Cinsiyet Ayrımcılığı Yapılmamaktadır	3.11
9- Özel Yaşam Haklarına Saygı Gösterilmektedir	2.61
10- Muhabir ya da Ajans İsmi Haberde Verilmektedir.	3.27
11-Yayınlanmaması Kaydıyla Verilen Bilgiler Yayınlanmamaktadır	2.95
12- Haber Kaynaklarını Açıklamama İlkesine Uyulmaktadır	3.40
13- Haber Kaynaklarından Para Hediye Kabul Edilmemektedir	2.78
14- Doğrulatılmamış Haberler Yayınlanmamaktadır	2.64
15- Mağdurların Kimliği Gizlenmektedir	3.03
16- Bilgiler Kişisel ya da Kurumsal Çıkar İçin Kullanılmamaktadır	2.88
17- Baskıların Haberleri Etkilemesine İzin Verilmemektedir	2.63
18- Haber Kaynakları ile Aralarına Mesafe Koymaktadırlar	2.80
19- Barış Demokrasi ve İnsan Hakları vb. Değerlere Sahip Çıkılmaktadır	3.18
20- Kışkırtıcı Yayın Yapılmamaktadır	3.07

Buna göre en düşük değerlendirme "kişilerin özel yaşamlarına saygı" (5 üzerinden 2.61) konusunda verilirken en yüksek değerlendirme "haber başlıkları metinleri yansıtmaktadır"

ile "haber ve yorum ayrılmaktadır" ifadelerine (5 üzerinden 3.36) verilmiştir. Bu duruma göre gazeteciler Türk basınını en çok kişilerin özel yaşamlarına karışma konusunda eleştirmektedirler. Gazetecilerin Türk basınını en olumlu değerlendirdikleri konu ise daha çok bir gazetecilik tekniği olarak da adlandırabileceğimiz "haber metini/haber başlığı uyumu" üzerinedir. Öte yandan, bu değerlerin cinsiyete göre dağılımında anlamlı farklar bulunamamıştır.

Medya çalışanlarının kendilerini siyasal yelpazenin neresinde değerlendirdikleri de sorulmuştur. Buna göre, Antalya'da medya çalışanları kendilerini ortalama olarak merkezin biraz solunda (Sol=1, Orta[Merkez]=3, Sağ=5: ortalama: 2.83) görmektedirler. Gazetecilerin genellikle merkez sol görüşlü olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Bu bulgu, bu görüşü doğrulamaktadır. Ayrıca gazeteciler kendilerini tanımlayacak politik kimlik ifadesi olarak en çok "sosyal demokrat" ifadesini (% 35) belirtmiştir.

Değerlendirme ve Sonuç:

Bu çalışmada, medya çalışanlarının Antalya ölçeğinde profilinin çıkarılması amaçlanmıştır. Böylelikle yerel düzeyde elde edilen meslek profilinin global süreçlerle karşılaştırılması amaçlanmıştır. Araştırma sonucu elde edilen veriler, bu konuda daha önce yapılmış olan çalışmalarda elde edilen bazı verilerle genel olarak uyumludur. Araştırma 26 ayrı medya kuruluşunda 109 gazeteciye uygulanan anketlerle gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Medya çalışanlarına yönelik olarak daha önce yapılmış araştırmalar, Öke, 1994 % 79.2, Altun, 1995 %62.8 oranları ile yüksek öğrenim gören medya çalışanlarını tespit etmelerine rağmen, bu oran Antalya ölçeğinde % 43.1 olarak tespit edil-

miştir. Bu veriler ışığında, yerel düzeyde medya çalışanlarının eğitim düzeylerinin, merkezlerdeki medya çalışanlarına göre daha düşük olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Araştırmaya katılanların daha önceki işlerinden niçin ayrıldıkları sorusuna çoğunlukla (%30) ücret düşüklüğü neden olarak belirtilmesi de önemli bir veri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu veriyi sendikaya üye sayısı ile birlikte değerlendirdiğimizde ise; (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası üyesi 8 kişi bulunmaktadır ve toplamda oranı %7'dir) daha anlamlı bir sonuç elde edilmektedir. Sendikalaşma oranı, global süreçlere koşut olarak yerel düzeyde de çok düşüktür.

Diğer mesleki örgütlenmenin de yetersiz olduğu araştırma verilerinden elde edilen önemli bir sonuç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Araştırmaya katılanların (%52) Antalya Gazeteciler Cemiyeti üyesidir. ÇGD üyeleri ise toplamda %23'dür. Ancak ÇGD üyelerinin önemli bir bölümü (%68) aynı zamanda AGC üyesidir. Türkiye Spor Yazarları Derneği de, Antalya'da medya çalışanlarının bir kısmının (%6) üye olduğu üçüncü meslek örgütüdür. Bu durum, derneklerin ön plana çıkması sonucunu doğurmakla birlikte, sendikal beklentilerin dernekler tarafından karşılanamaması nedeniyle, bu kez derneklerin örgütlenme anlayışları eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Sonuçta, medya çalışanlarının mesleksel örgütlenmelerinin oldukça cılız kalındığı bir dönem yaşandığını söyleyebiliriz.

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Siyasal İletişimi Anlamak
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Ankara Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi'nin kıdemli öğretim üyesi ve tez danışmanım Prof.Dr. Oya Tokgöz'ün, uzunca bir süredir üzerinde çalıştığı **Siyasal İletişimi Anlamak** adlı kitabı okuyucusuyla buluştu. Tıpkı **Temel Gazetecilik** gibi bu kitabın da iletişim fakültelerinin en önemli başvuru kaynaklarından birisi haline geleceğine kuşku yok.

420 sayfalık kitap, giriş ve sonuç dışında 10 bölümden oluşmakta ve her bölümün sonunda bir özet ve değerlendirme bulunmakta.

Yazarın giriş bölümünde de açıkça belirttiği gibi (s. 6-7), kitap siyasal iletişimi hem tarihsel hem de kuramsal açılardan incelemektedir. Siyasal iletişim literatürünün büyük ölçüde Anglo-Amerikan geleneğine dayandığını ve siyasal iletişimin de siyasetin iletişimi olarak anlaşıldığını (Köker, 1998) söyleyebiliriz. Yine de Oya Tokgöz, davranışçı Anglo-Amerikan geleneği dışında kalan eleştirel yaklaşımların siyasal iletişime yaptıkları katkılara kitabında yer vermiş.

Kitabın birinci bölümünde yazar, siyasal iletişim uygulamalarını tarihsel perspektif içine oturtuyor ve siyasal iletişimin insanoğlunun yerleşik düzene geçmesiyle birlikte başladığını söylüyor: "Siyasal iletişim uygulamaları insanoğlunun toplum yaşamında kendini savunması, toplum düzenini sağlaması, tanrı ve tanrılarla ilgili kutsal söylemi oluşturması, tica-

ret ve ürünlerin durumunu belirleme bakımından kayıt tutması, parayı kullanımı vb. tüm bunlar çeşitli kültürel etkileşimlerin sonucunda oluşmuştur" (s. 21-22). Özellikle Nurcan Törenli'nin (2005) çalışmasından yararlanılan bu bölümde Harold Innis'ten hareketle iletişim teknolojileri ve siyasal iktidarlar ve imparatorluklar arasındaki bağa dikkat çekiliyor. Yazının, papirüsün, kağıdın, matbaanın gazetenin, telgrafın, telefonun, radyonun, televizyonun, bilgisayarın ve internetin gelişimi ve bu araçların oynadıkları roller tartışılıyor.

İkinci bölümde basın ve iletişim özgürlüğü kavramları irdeleniyor. Bu bölümde ağırlıklı olarak John Keane'in (1993) görüşlerinden yararlanılmış. Bu bölümde John Milton, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Trenchard ve Thomas Gordon, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill gibi düşünürlerin basın özgürlüğü anlayışları ve mücadeleleri ele alınıyor. Yirminci yüzyıldan itibaren basın özgürlüğü yerine iletişim özgürlüğü kavramının kullanılmaya başladığını savunan yazar, bu özgürlüğün "sosyal bir hak" olarak algılandığını belirtiyor (s. 77). Yazar iletişim üzerindeki denetimleri iki model etrafında tartışıyor. Birinci model, güdümlü medya biçimini oluşturuyor. Siyasal iktidarlar kendilerine hizmet edecek bir medya yaratmak için gerekli düzenlemeleri yapabiliyorlar (s. 79). İkinci modelin temel çıkış noktası, "kişiyi ve toplumu aydınlığa kavuşturmak, daha mutlu bir yaşam düzeyine ulaştırmak" (s. 80). Yani birinci model baskıcı, ikinci model özgürlükçü bir iletişimi öngörüyor. Yazar bu bölümde daha sonra hızla uluslararası iletişim tartışmalarının gündeminden düşen dengesiz iletişim tartışmalarına değiniyor. "İletişim yönünden görülen dengesizliklerin ondokuzuncu yüzyıldaki sömürgeci düzenin kurduğu iletişim düzeninden kaynaklandığını söylemek yanlış olmaz" (s. 81-82). Yazar bu bölümde son olarak neo-liberal politikaların uygulamaya soktuğu özelleştirme uygulamalarının kamu hiz-

meti yayıncılığı üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini ve medya sektöründe ortaya çıkan tekelleşmelerin yarattığı tehditleri tartışıyor.

Üçüncü bölüm, Anglo-Amerikan yaklaşımının siyasal iletişime bakışını irdeliyor. Yazara göre, "siyasal iletişime ilişkin akademik ilginin siyasetin bilimselleşmesi sürecinde örgütlendiğini söylemek yanlış olmaz" (s. 94). Yazar bu bölümde siyasal iletişim literatürünün önemli kaynaklarını ele alıyor. Siyasal iletişime iletişimciler nasıl yaklaşıyor, siyaset bilimciler nasıl yaklaşıyor sorularına yanıtlar veriliyor: "Siyaset bilimciler, siyasal iletişimin önemini, siyasal sistemlerin işleyişi bakımından vurgularlarken, diğer yandan iletişim bilimciler, siyaset ve iletişim arasındaki yakın ilişki ve iletişimin siyasetteki rolüne işaret etmektedirler" (s. 98). Bölümde farklı siyasal iletişim tanımlarına da yer veriliyor. Benim beğendiğim tanımın, Denton ve Woodward'ın yaptığı siyasal iletişim tanımı olduğunu söyleyebilirim: "Kamusal kaynakların tahsis edilmesi, resmi kaynakların, yasama ve yürütme kararları ve yargı bakımından elinde gücü tutanlar ve resmi yaptırımların devletçe ödüllendirilmesinin veya cezalandırılmasının kamusal olarak tartışılmasıdır" (s. 109). Yani, siyasal iletişimi kamusal kaynakları kimin ve nasıl bölüştüreceğine, ödül ve cezaların nasıl belirleneceğine ilişkin olarak yürütülen kamusal tartışmalar şeklinde tanımlamak, siyasal iletişimi daha kolay kavramlaştırmamıza yardımcı olacaktır. Yazar bu bölümde daha sonra siyasal iletişime kuramsal yaklaşımları irdeliyor, davranışçı kuramın, sistem yaklaşımının, yapısal-işlevsel yaklaşımın katkılarını tartışıyor.

Kitabın dördüncü bölümü eleştirel yaklaşımların siyasal iletişime ilişkin değerlendirmelerini irdeliyor. Özellikle Frank-

furt Okulu'nun Anglo-Amerikan yaklaşımıyla zorunlu karşılaşmasını bu bölümde ayrıntılarıyla görüyoruz. Bu bölümü okurken, yardımcı kaynak olarak Beybin Kejanlıoğlu'nun (2005) çalışmasına da bakmak yararlı olabilir. Bölümde sadece Frankfurt Okulu'nun değil, eleştirel ekonomi politik yaklaşımın (Herbert Schiller, Noam Chomsky, Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Peter Golding, Graham Murdock ve Nicholas Garnham) ve İngiliz Kültürel Çalışmaları'nın (Stuart Hall, David Morley) katkıları da tartışılıyor. Yazar'ın bu bölümde İrfan Erdoğan ve Korkmaz Alemdar'ın (2003) iletişim kuramlarını değerlendiren önemli çalışmalarına da sıkça gönderme yaptığını belirtmeliyim.

Beşinci bölüm demokrasilerde medya siyaset ilişkisini tartışmaktadır. Yazara göre, liberal demokrasinin gelişiminde gazetelerin katkısı büyüktür. Yazar bu bölümde daha sonra kamuoyu kavramının nasıl geliştiğini anlatmakta ve ardından Habermas'ı izleyerek kamusal alan tartışmasına değinmektedir. Bu bölüme yardımcı kaynak olarak Arsev Bektaş'ın (1996) ve Jurgen Habermas'ın (1997) çalışmalarını öneririm.

"Temsili Demokrasilerde Siyasal İletişime Yeniden Bakmak" başlığını taşıyan altıncı bölümde önce tarihsel perspektiften parlamentoların ortaya çıkışı ve oy verme hakkının yaygınlaşması irdelendikten sonra günümüz seçim kampanyalarının nasıl işlediği tartışılmakta. Bu bağlamda öne çıkan kavram 'siyasetin Amerikanvarileşmesi'dir. Yazara göre, kitle iletişim araçları ve özellikle de televizyon, seçim kampanyalarında merkezi bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır (s. 227). Ayrıca Amerikan tarzı seçim kampanyaları giderek dünyada egemen olmaya başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda siyasetin profesyonelleşmesi, siyasal danışmanların, halkla ilişkilerin, reklamcılığın dev-

reye girmesi siyasal iletişimin doğasını köklü biçimde değiştirmiştir.

Yedinci bölüm, "medya ve demokrasi arayışları" başlığını taşımakta. Bu bölümde özellikle John Keane (1993) ve James Curran'ın (2002) medya ve demokrasi modelleri ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmaktadır.

Sekizinci bölüm medya demokrasisi (medyakrasi) kavramını, medyanın demokrasi üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini ele almaktadır. Thomas Meyer ve Lew Hincman'ın (2002) kitabındaki görüşleri irdeleyen bu bölümde partilerin ve parlamentonun önemini yitirmesi, medyakrasinin yükselişi, eğlencelik haber, eğlencelik siyaset, haberde magazinleşme, medya hastalığı gibi kavramlara açıklık getirilmektedir.

Dokuzuncu bölüm, siyasal iletişim açısından toplumsal muhalefet hareketlerine, terör ve şiddete nasıl bakabileceğimizi tartışmaktadır. Yazara göre toplumsal muhalefet hareketleri siyasal yaşamın kıyısında kalan sorunları siyasallaştırırken demokrasinin gelişimine katkıda bulunmuşlardır. Öte yandan, terör örgütleri ise demokratikleşmeyi sekteye uğratan, hükümetleri baskıcı uygulamalara teşvik eden bir rol oynamışlardır.

"Uluslararası Siyasal İletişim" başlığını taşıyan onuncu bölümde savaş ve barış gazeteciliği tartışılmaktadır. Medyanın Vietnam, Falkland ve Irak savaşlarındaki rolü, Irak'ın işgalinde gündeme gelen iliştirilmiş gazetecilik uygulaması ayrıntılı biçimde ele alınmaktadır. Bölümün sonunda savaş gazeteciliğine bir alternatif olarak önerilen barış gazeteciliğinin kavramsal çerçevesi çizilmektedir.

Sonuç bölümünü siyasal iletişimin profesyonelleşmesi tartışmasına ayıran yazar, "siyasal iletişimin profesyonelleş-

mesinin, siyasal partilerin gerilemesi, medya mantığının zaferi, iletişim etkinliklerinin merkezileşmesi, denetim ve sorumlulukla da ilişkisi bulunmaktadır. Medyanın ticarileşmesi, profesyonelleşme, oy verme oranının düşmesiyle bağlantısı mevcuttur" (s. 415) demektedir.

Yukarıda kısaca kitapta yer alan bölümleri ve konuları ele almaya çalıştım. Elbette bu okumayı yaparken belki yazarın niyet ettiğinden farklı bir okuma biçimi de yapmış olabilirim. Her bilimsel kitap gibi bu kitap da bizi başka kaynaklara bakmaya da yönlendiriyor. Aşağıdaki kaynakçada önemli olduğunu düşündüğüm kaynakları belirttim. Kitabın kanımca tek eksik yönü, sonunda bir dizin'e yer verilmemiş olması. Yazar siyasal iletişim literatürüne sadece ne kadar hakim olduğunu göstermiyor, aynı zamanda bu devasa literatürün nasıl okunabileceğini de ortaya koyuyor.

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Yazılar Times New Roman karakteriyle 12 puntoda ve 1.5 aralıklı olarak yazılmalı ve 10-30 sayfa uzunluğunda olmalıdır. Yazılar yaygın olarak kullanılan bir kelime işlemci programı ile yazılmalıdır. Başlıklar ve ara başlıklar kısa ve belirgin olmalıdır. Makale içindeki grafikler, resim olarak kaydedilmelidir. Yazıların, **gatabek@akdeniz.edu.tr** adresine e-posta ile gönderilmesi yeterlidir.

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Akdeniz İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi'ne gönderilecek yazılarda kaynak gösterirken uyulması gereken kurallar şu şekildedir:

Metin içinde kaynak gösterme:

Yazılarda gönderme (reference) yöntemi olarak, yalnızca metin içi referans yöntemi kullanılmalıdır. Tüm referanslar, ana metinde parantez içinde, yazarın adı, basım yılı ve sayfa numaraları ile belirtilmelidir. İçerik dipnotları ve diğer açıklamalar sayfa altında verilmelidir. Metnin içinde numaralandırılan notlar, sayfa altında numara sırasına göre yerleştirilmelidir. Notların içinde yer alacak referanslar için de metin içi referans yöntemi kullanılmalıdır.

Bir kaynaktan yapılan alıntılar metin içinde çift tırnak içinde gösterilmelidir. 30-40 kelimeden uzun alıntılar, tırnak kullanılmadan girintili (indent) paragraf olarak verilmelidir.

Referans gösterirken, yazar ismi metin içinde geçmiyorsa parantez içinde yazarın soyadı ve yayın tarihi belirtilmelidir: (Lewis, 1991). Belli bir sayfa söz konusuysa, yazar soyadı ve yayın tarihine ilave olarak sayfa numarası da yazılmalıdır: (Lewis, 1991: 13). Yazar isminin metinde geçtiği durumlarda kaynağın yayın tarihi ve sayfa numarası yazılmalıdır: (1988: 13). Birbirini takip etmeyen sayfalar için önerilen yazım şekli ise şöyledir: (Lewis, 1991: 13-8, 54- 7).

İki yazarlı kaynaklarda, her iki yazar soyadı da kullanılmalıdır: (Erdoğan ve Alemdar, 2002). İkiden fazla yazarlı kaynaklarda ise "vd." ibaresi yer almalıdır: (Keyman vd., 1996). Aynı yazarın, aynı yıl yayınlanmış birden fazla eseri kullanılıyorsa, basım yılına a, b, c, gibi harfler eklenerek birbirinden ayrılmalıdır: (Koloğlu, 1999a).

Metin içinde aynı konuda birden çok kaynağa referans verilecekse kaynaklar birbirinden noktalı virgül ile ayrılmalıdır: (Kabacalı, 1994: 13; Koloğlu, 1999: 28).

Kaynakların düzenlenmesi:

Kaynaklarda sadece yazıda göndermede bulunulan çalışmalara yer verilmeli ve bu çalışmalar yazar soyadına göre alfabetik olarak sıralanmalıdır. Bir yazarın birkaç çalışması kaynaklarda yer alacaksa, yayın tarihine göre (eskiden yeniye doğru) bir sıralama yapılmalıdır.

Kitap:
Koloğlu, Orhan (1992). **Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın**. İstanbul: İletişim.

Çeviri kitap:
Fiske, John (1996). **İletişim Çalışmalarına Giriş**. Çev., Süleyman İrvan. Ankara: Ark.

Derleme kitap:

Bora, Aksu ve Günal, Asena (der.) (2002). **90'larda Türkiye'de Feminizm**. İstanbul: İletişim.

Derleme kitapta makale:

Hall, Stuart (1997). "The Work of Representation", **Representation: Cultural Represantations and Signifying Practies**. Stuart Hall (der.) içinde. London: Sage Publications.

Derleme kitapta, çeviri makale:

Paz, Octavio (2000). "Tarihin Sonu'nda Batı Doğu'ya Dönüyor", **Yüzyılın Sonu, Büyük Düşünürler Çağımızı Yorumluyor**. Nathan Gardels (der.) içinde. Çev., B. Çorakçı Dışbudak. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür. 137-144.

İki yazarlı kitap:

Toksöz, Gülay ve Erdoğdu, Seyhan (1998). **Sendikacı Kadın Kimliği**. Ankara: İmge.

Dergide makale:

Asiliskender, Burak (2004). "Kimlik, Mekan ve Yer Deneyimi", **Kültür ve İletişim**. 2(7): 73-94.

Yayınlanmamış tez:

Dursun, Çiler (2002). **İdeoloji ve Özne: Türk-İslam Sentezi**. Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi. Ankara: A.Ü. SBE.

Gazete yazısı:

"TCK yoksa müzakere başlamaz" (2004). **Hürriyet**. 21.09.2004.

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"Yellow Journalism" (2004).

http://www.pbs.org/crucible/journalism.html. 10.06.2004.

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Atabek, Ümit (2003). "WITFOR ve Dünya İletişim Teknolojileri Forumu".

www.umitatabek.net/witfor.html.20.04.2003.